THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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By the Editor

N this issue of the *Modern Churchman* we publish the Presidential address together with ten papers delivered at the Modern hurchmen's Thirty-sixth Annual Conference held in St. Anne's ollege, Oxford, September 14-18, 1953. The theme of the onference was *Liberal Christianity in the Twentieth Century.* he titles and authors of the papers were as follows :—

The Permanent Values of Liberalism, by Sir Henry Self, K.C.B.

Liberal Christianity in an Established Church, by the Right Rev. W. D. L. Greer, D.D., Bishop of Manchester.

The Continuing Task of Liberal Theology, by Canon J. S. Bezzant, M.A., B.D.

Liberal Protestantism, by the Very Rev. Dean Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D.

Liberal Catholicism, by D. J. W. Bradley, M.A.

Liberal Nonconformity, by E. L. Allen, M.A., Ph.D.

Progressive Judaism, by J. W. Parkes, M.A., D.Phil.

Continental Theology, Protestant and Catholic, by Prof. Marcel Simon, University of Strasbourg.

Freedom in Religion: the Psychological Basis, by R. S. Lee, M.A., D.Phil., Vicar of the University Church, Oxford.

The Moral Foundations of Liberalism, by H. C. Snape, M.A.

The Future of Religion, by Professor Gilbert Murray, O.M., D.Litt., F.B.A.

Although conscious that English Liberal Churchmen are a the present time living in an environment marked by religiou reaction on the one hand and by irreligious indifferentism on th other the basic spirit of our 1953 Conference was optimistic—th spirit of those facing a storm at sea but quite convinced that i the vessel were properly handled it could come through. Th outlook of the Conference was well summed up in the concludin words of its chairman and organiser, the Rev. A. W. Adams Dean of Divinity of Magdalen College, Oxford :

> 'We hear much talk at present about the eclipse of Liber Christianity. An eclipse is the passing of the moon (which from ancien times has been associated with lunacy) across the face of the sun, th source of light. It passes, and is passing.'

After a recent Continental 'ecumenical' conference, Dr. Bart is said to have remarked to Dr. John Baillie : 'It is cheering t see how the Americans are coming on.' 'Yes, indeed,' replied hi companion, 'and also the way in which you yourself have com on.' It is to be hoped that a parallel 'coming on' characterize our English Liberal Christianity.

The agents and factors of this Christian 'coming on' hav been disconcerting in their variety, methods and achievements This is reflected in the Oxford Conference papers. But this dis concerting and unpredictable element in the coming of th Kingdom of God is as old as the Gospel itself. The Apostles o Jesus expected it to be achieved by an imminent apocalyptic cata clysm consummated by Jesus Himself descending from Heaven a Victor and Judge. Although this primitive, apocalyptic, eschato logical belief was not derived from Jesus Himself as Dr. Glasso has demonstrated in his enlightening volume, *The Secon Advent*, and it no longer dominates Christian thinking, yet it di dominate the apostolic *kerygma*. Nevertheless, Christian though to-day is faced by the double problem of how is the Kingdom t come and what part must the sons of the Kingdom play in it coming?

But what has the Gospel of the Kingdom of God as proclaime by Jesus to do with Christian Liberalism to-day?

It is needful to understand what that Gospel was, for it is th basis, ideal, and inspiration of English Christian Liberalism. A we see it, Jesus Christ was the *first* Christian Liberal and He wa also the *ideal* Christian Liberal.

Brought up a Jew, He knew every side of Judaism. As a bo He lived in Galilee when the patriotic militarist zealots wer being crucified by the Romans : later in life He was closel associated with Pharisaism—indeed Edwin Abbott surmised tha

one time Jesus was actually a member of this School of Jewish alists and literalists: after that, Jesus became a disciple of that phetic ascetic, John the Baptist. At His Baptism by John, inted by the Holy Spirit, Jesus experienced the Divine Call be the Messiah.[1]

But how was He to exercise His office? His Triple Temptation made it clear that He must not rely on materialistic welfare, raculous interventions or militarist conquests in propagating s Gospel of the Kingdom.

'The Kingdom of God,' wrote St. Paul, 'is not meat and nk but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost' *m.* xiv 17). Surely a definition inspired by the reply of Jesus he tempter: 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every d that proceedeth out of the mouth of God' (*Mt.* iv. 4).

But in what sense was Jesus a religious Liberal? (The word eral is derived from the Latin *liber* which means free.) First foremost He was a Liberal because He was a Liberator. His spel of the Kingdom of God sought to liberate contemporary aism from zealot militarism, Pharisaic literalist legalism, lucean sacerdotalism and its brutal sacrificial system. Freedom the outstanding characteristic of the Religion of Jesus as Paul recognized: 'With Freedom did Christ set us free.' l it was this Liberalism of Jesus which was the undoubted se of His crucifixion.

Liberalism has two aspects and should have two functions. edom *from*—that is negative—and freedom *for*, which is itive. What was the *positive* contribution in the religious ration accomplished by Jesus? It was His Gospel of the herhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. The positive s of the Good News of Jesus was the Love of God to be procated in all human relationships. It was the call to a higher, er and happier life—not world renouncing but world conseing. Jesus taught that there is no dictatorship or lordship in Kingdom. 'He that would be great among you: let him me the servant of all.' In the Kingdom, service is 'perfect dom' and the supreme expression of its practical love. It is ealization of this positive Liberal Christianity which is needed very sphere of human activity to-day, 'so to live that Christ ld approve our life,' as J. S. Mill wrote. This positive Liberal stianity is historically enshrined in the Gospel of the Kingdom erved by the Synoptic evangelists.

[1] Anointed is the translation of the Hebrew *Messiah* and the Greek *Christ*.

The Prayer of the Kingdom: The Lord's Prayer wi doxology (*Mt.* vi, 9-13, A.V.).

The Duties of the Kingdom: The Two Great Comman ments (*Mk.* xii, 28-34).

The Heirs of the Kingdom: The Beatitudes (*Mt.* v, 3-10 the Salt of the Earth: the Light of the World (*Mt.* 13-16).

Contrasted types in their relation to the Kingdom: T Prodigal Son (*Lk.* xv); The Good Samaritan (*Lk.* The Pharisee and the Publican (*Lk.* xviii); The She and the Goats (*Mt.* xxv., 31-45).

Methods and values of the Kingdom:

Educational: The Sower.

Invisible influence: The Leaven.

Small beginnings and the final triumph: The Musta Seed.

Inestimable worth: The Pearl of Great Price and t Hidden Treasure.

Motto of the Kingdom: 'Seek first the Kingdom of God a its righteousness and all things needful for this life sh be added unto you.'

The Gospel of the Kingdom is no less clearly exemplified the character, conduct and spirit of its Messiah who, when crisis came, chose to die for His Gospel of the Kingdom. though from the time of His Baptism Jesus was convinced t the Divine Father had chosen Him to be the Messiah yet forbade the demoniacs to address Him as such and comman St. Peter not to proclaim His Messiahship, and only publi affirmed it Himself in response to the challenge of the H Priest, although aware that by such an affirmation He was pass the death sentence on Himself, which he consecrated and c summated in two memorable prayers: 'Father forgive them they know not what they do'; 'Father into Thy Hands I comm my spirit.' He knew that His conception of His Messianic Miss and Message was utterly alien to contemporary Jewish Messia expectations: He was no Jewish king: He repulsed John James when they petitioned Him to appoint them to high of in the Kingdom: 'Ye know not what ye ask . . . it is not min give.' For Jesus, Messiahship was not regal nor priestly prophetic, and foreshadowed the fate of the greatest of

ophets. His healing ministry was not primary and He attributed ccess not to Himself, but to the faith of the afflicted. 'Thy faith th healed thee: go in peace.' The spirit of child-like trustfulss and willingness to learn was what he valued most in His ciples: 'Suffer the little children to come unto Me for of such he Kingdom of God.'

Jesus was not a second or greater John the Baptist. His good ws of the Kingdom was of 'a new order': 'The law and the ophets were until John,' said Jesus, 'but now the Kingdom of d has come' (*Mt.* xi, 12; *Lk.* xvi, 16). 'It was said to them of l time, but I say unto you . . .' John was a very great man, said sus, but 'he that is little in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater n he' (*Mt.* xi, 11; *Lk.* vii, 26).

The religion of John was ascetic. 'John came neither eating drinking,' but . . . 'the Son of Man came eating and drinking' was condemned as a 'gluttonous man and a wine-bibber' (*t.* xi, 18; *Lk.* vii, 34). The religion of Jesus belonged to the ritual and moral order and it was in that sphere that it operated remely and naturally. 'Come unto me and take my yoke upon and learn of me for I am meek and lowly in heart and ye shall l rest unto your souls' (*Mt.* xi, 29). The religion of Jesus, as shrined in our Canonical Gospels, has suffered not only from us being on occasions above the heads of His reporters, and o from the interpolation of ecclesiastical interpretations and ditions derived from the *kerygma* of the Apostolic Church. t there is yet another source of perversion. The fact that a mber of the leading apostles of Jesus had been the disciples of n the Baptist before they became the disciples of Jesus led m to attribute to their new Master not only the spirit but also umber of the sayings of their old master.

Does not such a Liberal Christianity need an organization for propagation and maintenance? Certainly it does, although ristian history demonstrates that the most effective work in propagation of the Christian Religion has been done, not by cial organizations, but by inspired individuals.

There is no convincing evidence that Jesus either organized had it in mind to organize an official Catholic Church. Gospel icism demonstrates that the words attributed to Jesus in *tthew's* Gospel, 'If ye hear not the Church let him be unto e as a Pagan and a Publican,' were never uttered by the end of 'publicans and sinners': so also the expansion of ist's charge to Peter at Caesarea Philippi, contributed by the ne Gospel, is a later ecclesiastical addition to the Words of us.

The type of organization which the Kingdom demanded f its propagation and application, process and penetration, is mo profoundly exemplified in the promise of Jesus: 'Where two three are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst them' (*Mt.* xviii, 20). Liberal Christianity demands a Liber Christian Church. This is the conviction of Liberal Churchme This Liberal Church must of necessity be capable of consta adaptation and repeated reformation to meet the manifold nee of an evolving environment. Its unity is not based on, n secured by, institutional, liturgical and dogmatic uniformity, b by loyalty to the ideals of the Gospel of the Kingdom and Jesus, its Messiah: 'They shall hear my voice; and they sha become one *flock*, one shepherd,' not as mistranslated and pe verted 'one fold, one shepherd.'[2]

The greatest danger facing Christian Liberalism to-day com not from an antagonistic world, but from the Christian Chur itself. A church policy which seeks to secure for the Church t 'crown rights' of the Kingdom. The Church is not the Kingdo but it ought to be the loyal and humble Servant of the Kingdo Its message ought not to be: 'Submit to the pronouncement the infallible Church,' but rather: 'Hear what the Spirit sa unto the Churches.' This charge is repeated seven times *Revelation* (ii, 7, 11, 17, 29, and iii, 6, 13, 22). It is this bas loyalty to Christ and His Gospel of the Kingdom, humble depe dence on His enlightening Spirit—'I have many things to s unto you, but ye cannot bear them now' (*Jn.* xvi, 12-25)—whi inspires Christian Liberalism.

Churches may survive or perish, but the Kingdom abide they may affirm or they may deny the truth which the Divi Spirit is seeking to teach mankind: their value depends on the loyalty to the Spirit of the Kingdom and its Messiah: 'This my beloved Son: hear ye him' (*Mk.* ix, 7). He is 'the Etern Contemporary': 'Lo I am with you all the days even unto t end' (*Mt.* xxviii, 20).

[2] Bishop Westcott pointed out years ago the disastrous misunderstandi which the mistranslation one *fold* for one *flock* (*Jn.* x, 16, A.V. derived fr the *Vulgate*) has brought about in the history of Western Christendom.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., B.D., M.Sc.

THE PERMANENT VALUES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM

I. Introductory

MY theme covers the permanent values of liberalism; obviously it is not political in character but directed to liberal Christianity, which will be the subject of our Conference. Looking at the programme of addresses ahead of us, one is struck by the variety of approach to the modern situation in its bearing upon liberal Christianity. I imagine liberal Christianity is synonymous in most minds with Modernism and that the Modern Churchmen's Union is, therefore, the natural forum for bringing the present situation to a focus. The pioneering work of this century by the great modernist leaders played a leading part in holding the position for Christianity in the modern world. But there are many to-day who feel that the tide of achievement has receded and that we are now in a deep trough from which there seems little prospect of recovery. I personally do not share this pessimism. I am convinced that the great hope of the future, particularly for the Christian churches, lies through liberal Christianity provided we understand its nature and purpose. At the outset I should make it clear that liberal Christianity has many facets. It has a Protestant wing and a Catholic wing and in between is the great body of those who feel it possible to walk the middle way within the established Church, convinced it has a great destiny springing naturally from its past, particularly in the task of reconciling Christianity with the modern world, but at the same time in itself becoming the co-ordinator of all the churches. There can be no real prospect for the Christian religion, itself, and *a fortiori* for liberal Christianity unless we can see the road to a federation of Christian churches—but a federation which enables each to retain its autonomy and unique forms of expression and activity.

I say it is essential to understand the nature and purpose of liberal Christianity but that will, I am convinced, be developed fully clearly in the course of this Conference: my rôle should, I submit, be limited to a treatment of its basic significance, concepts, methods and fields of enterprise. It is above all necessary to recall that liberalism is an attitude of mind, an adventure of faith and a determination to hold the values of the past, whilst welcoming the possibilities of modern development for the future.

Liberalism believes fundamentally in the function of reason, the status of values, and the society of 'persons' with their rights and responsibilities.

Firstly, as to the function of Reason. There has been over the last twenty years a queer intellectual freak called 'The Flight from Reason.' Ardent Christians, led by their reason to make the most of their existence and the world in which they manifest themselves, yet make the amazing somersault of declining to allow it to act as their guide and companion into the inner mysteries of religious experience: rather they think they reach the acme of life by derogating from the function of reason and turning to unaided and uninterpreted mystic intuition. That way lies illusion, if not *hocus pocus*. With the Cambridge Platonists we must stand on Proverbs xx, v 27, where reason is called 'the candle of the Lord within us.' Without the light of this candle we would indeed move in mystic darkness. No Christian would wish to live without the background of mystic experience and religious expression. But equally no thinking Christian should deny the function of his God-given reason to enable him better to understand that experience and bring it to a higher focus. If there is one revelation mediated by science it is that the universe is rational through and through.

Next there is the status of values. To have lived through this century with two world wars without appreciating how the universe is steeped in moral values seems to me to be impossible. History has demonstrated beyond all question that the individuals or nations who persistently flout the moral verities must, despite the temporary phase of over-weening and apparent success, end in irretrievable disaster. This large scale demonstration of the moral law is reinforced in every personal life pursued in an endeavour to respond to the inner call of conscience. But conscience is a categorical imperative not only in the realm of morals, but also in the field of aesthetics and the pursuit of truth. This in itself demonstrates the status of values and the fact that life and its environment are grounded in values. Surely this should convince us that liberalism must take its stand on the need for the principle of development to operate fully in our progressive realization of values, both in individual and collective experience. There can be no question of holding back the historic faith from proper examination in the pursuit of heightened truth, and every form of modern achievement should be grist to the mill. It is a call to the adventure of faith in the conviction that religious belief can find its trusted allies in science, philosophy, art and all forms of human culture. There can be no wrapping up of Christianity in cotton

ool lest it would be sullied, soiled or undermined by contact with odern knowledge. That is to make God smaller than ourselves id to deny His supremacy in the universe as in the inner life of an. He is the Creator of values in a world fashioned by Him for at purpose; and it is the supreme function of liberalism to main- in this thesis of values as the transcendent inspiration and goal f life here.

It is natural to pass on to the third stage of the human persons.' Liberalism stands for all the achievements of history being the achievements of human persons in their passage rough a temporary phase on the road to a spiritual destiny. Whether viewed from within the solitude of the inner life or rough the necessary corollary of human society, persons are e supreme manifestations of human possibilities. What may be e further status to which such persons will pass here-after is iled from us now but we cannot suppose that the road of velopment does not continue in the shaping of personality just it so clearly does in the working of conscience, the pursuit of th or the expression of beauty. Always we find ourselves com- g up against the fact of persons with their rightful status in the rld despite the over-whelming contrast of the vast physical iverse and the brief span of human existence in it. This is where e person reveals his spiritual status. He can rise above his vironment and his circumstances and calmly go forward in the nviction that life has a meaning for him, that he has a spiritual stiny and that his reason is given to him to enable him to discern e road. The strength to achieve will come from the religious mmunion which is validated by that reason. In any event, alues' imply 'valuers.' The function of the human person is t only as the achiever of values, but as the valuer of values.

This thing is so important that I fear I must intrude some storical background on you to show how improperly the present ntury has become steeped in the belittlement of religious perience and the parallel exaltation of science. Scientific aterialism is no longer in accord with scientific development but, vertheless, it is widely accepted as the world-outlook shaping an's attitude to life. We are thus led to shape human destiny (if y) in terms of race development on this earth with no hope for e individual hereafter. Liberalism is the mediating core of man culture. It is the source from which the scientific adventure rang. The adventure itself now threatens to side-track develop- ent and lose the basic strand of religious tradition and ex- rience. As Liberalism provoked the adventure seven centuries o, so to-day it must redirect its path.

II. Three Centuries of Awakening and the Sequel

The Middle Ages closed with a classic attempt by Sair Thomas Aquinas to reconcile revelation and reason and to preser a system of world philosophy derived from experience, bu illumined by revelation. It is a matter for examination to-day t to see how far the twentieth century philosophy of religion has i substance changed from Aquinas' exposition despite the impact o the scientific revolution and modern thought. That revolutio emerged in the seventeenth century. Between the thirteenth an seventeenth centuries there was a period of intense romantic an religious development crystallising out in three movements—th Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation and the Catholi Counter-Reformation. Throughout there is a general awakenin of the status of humanity and the individual responsibilities an potentialities of its members. The work of Aquinas was stimu lated by the recovery through the Arab world of the basic work of Aristotle. The Renaissance was in turn fired by the recover of the basic features of Plato as refugee scholars came west fo lowing the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 A.I The pulse of life found in Plato coincided with the dawn o human reason striving to function in freedom from dogmatic inte pretation of revelation.

There quickly developed a wide sweeping movement prepa ing the way for the revolution of the seventeenth, eighteenth an ninteenth centuries which produced a scientific interpretation o life and the world in terms of mechanistic determination an and materialism. I particularly ask you to note the paradox tha the movement began as an adventure of man's personality respon ding to his intellectual conscience that truth must prevail. Y the movement springing from freedom and adventure ended in doctrine of deterministic materialism which saw no destiny fo man as 'person' in its universe. The classic Christian doctrine o Divine and human personality was thus in danger of rejection a the hands of the 'persons' for whom it had prepared the wa One might sum up by saying that between Aquinas and Descarte we see first the rich fruits of human personality in full manifesta tion in the Renaissance; then in the challenge of the Reforma tion and also in the reaction of the Counter-Reformation which provoked; finally we see the dawning of that scientific revolutio launched by human 'persons' and rapidly mounting in challeng until it denied the status and nature of its creators. Scientif determinism was to emerge within a century and, as such, hold no place for human 'persons' or their values and still less for an

ther than an impersonal Deity. The movement was rapid until it ed to Laplace's statement to Napoleon that he had no need for any such hypothesis' as God.

Thus the new world of scientific determinism within a self-ontained and self-regulating universe took clear shape and eemed to be all-triumphant when it received the *cachet* of Darwinism in the nineteenth century. Yet there is nothing incon-istent in evolution nor yet in science, with the experience of eligious revelation as a guide to spiritual values and as testimony o the fact of a spiritual world transcending the visible universe. his is not to deny that religion is subject to development in esponse to revelation, equally with science—but its development urns on a higher response than that of the intellect. This is mani-est, for example, in the New Testament teaching of (i) a new evelation of God's nature, (ii) a new morality and (iii) a new ision of human nature. Spiritual character can turn on goodness one, whereas it cannot turn on intellect alone. It might reason-ply be asserted that the rôle of science is that of revealing ature, as the creation of that spiritual world experienced in ligion. The association would be salutary for both and not least religion. If science is to recognise the legitimacy of the spiritual alues mediated by religion, religion must be ready to purge her udities and illusions by the scientific approach. Only so can an hope to 'disentangle the true spiritual lesson from the cessories.'

It is well to remember that the 'voice' of conscience survives l claims for mechanical determinism, not only in its insistence moral responsibility, but even more in its emphasis on man's ity to reverence the mystery of life, and to stand firm in the ith that life has in its own status a supreme worthwhileness ich must be pursued at all costs. The antagonism between ligion and science springs primarily from a difference of temper; e man of science tends to shut out moral and spiritual con-ideration from his philosophy, whilst the religious believer is clined to shut out the physical. But the spiritual cannot be rceived by the physical and the capacity for spiritual, just as scientific, perception necessarily varies with the man. What needed to-day is a balancing of the two—for scientific percep-n has temporarily outrun its religious associate and become storted in the process.

III. The Modern Situation

This unbalance between science and religion is the primary ot of twentieth century apathy towards the worthwhileness of

life and its claims. Gone (one hopes but for a time) is the sense of destiny and high purpose both for humanity and for its individual 'persons.' Indeed, scientific materialism has dominated this century so much that it has become ingrained in the common outlook. This has led to a firm belief in the power of science to adapt the world to human needs and ensure a brave new world providing comfortable living for an ever increasing population. But here are just a few which may be catalogued as threatening menaces to this prospect:

(i) the world population is rapidly outgrowing the potential food supply;

(ii) the human race is plundering the material resources of the earth at a rate spelling short-term exhaustion; in short it is gambling with the future;

(iii) no attempt is made to apply the principles of eugenics and the unfit breed faster than the fit;

(iv) leisure becomes more important than work, yet

(v) education is still thought to end with compulsory school attendance;

(vi) the welfare state offers itself as a substitute 'here' for the Kingdom of Heaven 'yonder,' whilst

(vii) over all looms the hydrogen bomb.

I cannot develop these themes here but all call for a true liberal outlook. Let us glance at the manner in which the human race disposes of the resources of the universe. In a few years we shall dispose of the coal, gas and oil deposited in the ground over untold ages. We turn vast areas into deserts by soil erosion. We chop down timber right and left and leave devastated areas. We extract oil and have not even the decency to remove the derricks from the exhausted oil-fields. We bank on providence to give to the human race an open cheque on new sources to be revealed from time to time for maintaining the life which we have done nothing to deserve. To-day we cloak our wild squandering of power resources by the specious belief that nuclear energy will make good our needs when current resources give out. Have we any guarantee that we shall use nuclear energy to our benefit or our destruction? By what justification do we so recklessly squander the resources of the world? Has the human race done anything to justify its existence? *Homo sapiens* must justify himself in presuming to such a title. He must discern his origin and his prospects—and shape his destiny accordingly.

Or again, on the theme of 'easy living.' The origins of man stem from untold prehuman ancestry. We are animals gradually becoming civilised. Our roots are based on the principle of the struggle for existence.' Life has always been hard and we cannot turn to-day to 'easy living' without risk of disaster both to the individual and the race. Nature thrown out of the window will return through the front-door. Easy living connotes a spineless mediocrity. Liberalism urges the need for adventure as the spice of life. Without it the modern youth turns to false situations and mistaken activities as the expression of the suppressed zest for adventure, inherited from his animal ancestry and inspired by many centuries of human achievement.

The problem of food supply for an ever growing population and the need for application of the principles of eugenics, bring some the warning of the categorical imperative of conscience demanding reverence for the mystery of life. 'Birth control' must be taught to the ignorant in terms inspiring reverence for life, marriage and parental responsibilities. We have no title, we have no right to let the human race degenerate any more than we are allowed to sin against the light by encouraging individual human beings to fall from a full sense of the supreme worthwhileness of life—an undying quality which must be both respected and served.

These are only a few of the many themes which must spring to your minds when religious Liberalism seeks to apply itself to the development of human life and the principles upon which its destiny must be shaped. I would ask you to proceed briefly to their more specific application in respect of three fields which are particularly critical in the modern world, *viz.*:

(*a*) the field of organized religion;
(*b*) the field of social organization;
and (*c*) the industrial front.

IV. Religious Liberalism and Organized Religion

My theme has been focused on this prior attempt to demonstrate that scientific materialism has emerged as an invalid outlook upon life and yet has so worked itself into the system of human thinking that its threat to Christianity is menacing. Ranking very close in the order for challenge by liberalism comes the need to counter the discredit attaching to organised religion which has now fallen to an 'all-time low.' An archdeacon said to me recently that the Church has dwindled to a religious sect in a

pagan community. Strange words these, from an archdeacon of the established Church, yet they reflect very clearly the general attitude towards organized religion. By organized religion, one must have primarily in mind both the established Church and the allied Protestant bodies, but it is probably true that the stigma attaches less to the Roman Church. This very consideration indicates the reason for the disastrous fall in the public respect for those churches which take their stand on human reason rather than on credal authority. The former group is succumbing to scientific agnosticism because it relies on reason, yet refuses to join science in the rational adventure. The Protestant churches are failing to meet the scientific challenge, that is why I have glanced at the source of the scientific erosion of religious belief.

Thus it becomes the prior duty of the Church of England as the established Church and the proved custodian of religious tradition in this country, to make a special effort to re-establish the Christian faith in the light of modern knowledge. The Church of England is in a unique position to focus the common position of all denominations in this country on matters passing beyond sectarian interest. This Union itself stands within the Church as a rallying point for church opinion. Most critics of the Union regard it as being primarily and unduly concerned with destructive criticism of credal belief. To-day this is not so. The time for criticism of such matters has largely passed—thanks to the pioneering efforts of the early modernists which culminated in the 1938 Report by the Doctrinal Commission appointed by the Archbishops. The modernist's position is fully ensured within the scope of this Report and the Union is now actively concerned with making a constructive contribution to the reconstruction of belief. This is an all-important and essential step to the re-establishment of the prestige of organized religion in this country. Efforts to build up congregations and stimulate enthusiastic movements cannot bring lasting results unless the belief of the churches is matched with modern knowledge. Here lies one particular justification and scope for this Union.

Much could be said also on the need for Christian Re-union which is a cardinal principle for Liberalism. It would be idle however, to suppose that it will be achieved except by long wrestling and patience with the prejudices and vested interests on all sides. Maybe, full re-union will remain as an indefinite hope of the future and we shall have to be content with the less modest objective of federation. Nevertheless, there are immediately to hand the practical steps of full inter-communion not only in the sacraments, but also in the exchange of pulpits and by inter-

nominational services and activities. Surely the position for ristianity has become so serious in the modern world that the ie-hards' of all schools must be suppressed in their opposition these modest but urgent measures of communal sharing in the irit of Christ?

V. Religious Liberalism and Society

It is not necessary for me here to develop the theme of igious liberalism in the development of society and its proper look beyond the brief references already made. But I must nind you that the forward movement of society turns entirely the prophets keeping ahead of the priests. Particularly in field of social problems do the priests strive hard to preserve customs and traditions entrusted to their care. This is as it uld be, but the fact remains that unless the prophets are zealous challenge of the priests, there is the perpetual threat of stag- ion. This is so typically illustrated by the problem of marriage l divorce. The Union as the custodian of religious liberal dition has taken an active part in preserving the proper liberal tment of this and similar matters against the more rigid lesiastical approach of traditionalist clericalism. Without the ion and its work there is serious risk that ecclesiasticism will vail in its efforts to reduce the church to a select rump, itself vorced' from the vast majority comprising the rest of society. ere must be the unifying influence of liberalism operative in field if the problems of the growth of society are to be treated sympathy and enterprise whilst yet preserving for that growth supreme values of the past and its traditions.

VI. Religious Liberalism and the Industrial Front

It is, however, on the industrial front, every wit as much as he social front, that the Church of England is needing inspira- . It is becoming increasingly obvious to thinking men engaged dustry how wide is the gap that exists between the religious t and the industrial front. At present there seems no effective ns of bridging the two or of any adequate development of the istian contribution to the problems of modern industrial elopment. I say this in knowledge of the splendid work done ne Church of England and other denominational groups work- n this field. The situation has developed beyond the capacity ese movements and is now raising critical principles which t be faced if the future is to be held. This is not the occasion laborate those problems. I must be content to point to the

clear need for a common religious front to the industrial situatio directed through a joint organization. This illustrates the cas for a loose federation of the churches as the best means of makin a common approach, for example, to the industrial front as typical field in which denominational differences should be sub merged. Some such loose federation and joint approach woul seem to be a necessary preliminary to enable industry to co laborate in a combined effort to deal with the basic problem arising on both sides.

Unless there is some treatment of the problems of th industrial front with its increasing mechanization of industri work and the organized treatment of human relations withi industry as it becomes increasingly aggregated in large unit there seems little prospect for the churches to play any effectiv part in the forward development of the national life in its econom and industrial aspects. The social front can be treated provide there is any chance of raising the funds and stimulating the nece sary enthusiasm. The industrial front, however, tends to trenc itself off in such a way as to prevent any co-ordinated balancin of the life of human beings throughout the twenty-four hou of the day. What is wanted is not organization and personnel bring about the preaching of the Gospel inside the factories; th seems to be a mistaken approach. The real problem is to ensu that the treatment of human relations in industry itself is matche by Christian treatment both on the social front and also in th parallel strand on the religious side. If all three fronts mo forward in reasonable harmony, they each offer so much th greater potentiality. At the same time the treatment of huma relations within industry can be greatly facilitated by the co laboration of religious social and industrial workers, *e.g.* by catc ing up the industrial treatment at a point where it necessari leaves off. Experience shows that individuals are in the recepti mood for the further understanding of the allied social an religious problems as they make progress with their understan ing of industrial matters. It is now general practice to ho regular conferences on industrial problems with facilities f group treatment which automatically suggests subsequent soci and religious discussions as an outcome of the purely industri treatment. There is no organisation on the side of the churches enable them to take advantage of this growing situation; it w inevitably, in their default, pass beyond their influence and tu to other sources for inspiration and ideals. The prospect cann but be serious for the whole future of humanity as well as for t future of both organized and individual religion.

VII. Conclusion

I have attempted a survey of the basic nature and principles liberal Christianity with an indication of the challenges which is bound to face in the pursuit of those permanent values which e implicit in it. Whether we shall rise to the future will be etermined, it would seem, within the next few decades. The eriod of reconstruction after two world wars will be critical for uman destiny. Failing adequate treatment there seems little oubt but that the Christian religion will be bye-passed and the uman race will go in search of some new creed or some Will o' e Wisp adventure without regard to the values tried and proved the fire of human experience and embodied in its established aditions. I plead that liberal Christianity shall organize itself in ch a manner that it can undertake the task which so manifestly mands its devotion. The future must be sought in the spirit of dventure—but it must be adventure guided by principles and lues revealed and proved by the past. It is the supreme task of beral Christianity to reconcile these two aspects as the human ce gropes towards the religion of the future.

LIBERALISM IN AN ESTABLISHED CHURCH

By the Right Rev. W. D. L. Greer, D.D., Bishop of Manchester

LIBERALISM is an attitude of mind and spirit: it is not a body of conclusions. Of course there must needs be conclusions, but the identification of such conclusions with liberalism is a disservice to the cause. This is not to say that liberalism does not possess certain principles and convictions; it most certainly does. But these principles and convictions are heuristic and descriptive of the way in which religious truth should be held, safeguarded, and commended to others. Formal orthodoxy can be a very unlovely thing and so too can formal and self-conscious heterodoxy. Both display a rigidity and vehement dogmatism in matters of secondary importance which are alien to the liberal spirit.

But let me attempt to define more closely what we mean by liberalism in the realm of theology and religion. The word has been used as a term of praise and of abuse; it has no accepted connotation; it has been appropriated by some who called themselves Catholics, by some who prefer to be known as Protestant, and by some whose theological luggage is unlabelled. I have already made it plain that in my judgment the word is improperly applied when it is attached to the conclusions of theological or biblical study; such conclusions may be reasonable or unreasonable, soundly based or flimsily based, probable or improbable, but they cannot be liberal or illiberal. Liberalism is a term used to define a certain attitude of mind and spirit; it should not be attached as a term of commendation or condemnation to theological propositions or conclusions.

In the first place I think we may say that liberalism is concerned to emphasize the importance of truth in religion. Zeal, devotion, dedication, even sanctity can all too easily become corrupted unless it be remembered that we are called to love God with the mind as well as with the heart. The garden of faith has its fruits and flowers, but like all productive soil it throws up a crop of weeds. The spirit of truth is the gardener whose task it is to discourage weeds and provide the freedom of soil and air in which the fruits and flowers may grow. It will, of course, be claimed by every group and school of thought that it is equally concerned with truth in the religious sphere; if it really is, then it is entitled to lay claim to the title of liberal, but is it not true to say that there are many Christians who by temperament and conviction are more inclined to accept than to question, who-

terest lies more in cultus, ritual and ceremony or in emotional e-orientation than in devotion to the truth? Their attachment to uth shows itself in a concern to have truth on their side rather an be on the side of truth—a temptation which indeed besets s all. The Roman dogma of the Assumption grew not out of storical fact, but out of the needs of cultus and of indiscreet evotion. The reason why biblical literalism is still widely held not that it is simple or appeals to reason; quite the reverse. It accepted because it is assumed to be part and parcel of a very al emotional experience, and that experience is determinative of hat is held to be true. In our own Church what are claimed to e pastoral considerations are not infrequently allowed to deter-ine both theory and practice. Indeed were a bishop to murder s wife and claim that he did so for pastoral reasons I believe he ould stand a good chance of getting away with it.

As against all this tampering with truth in the interests of ligious expediency liberalism holds that the truth must be fol-wed wherever it may lead, and it often does lead to conclusions ich shock the unthinking orthodoxy and even the discoverer mself. Just because liberalism has had a hard fight against any enemies it is inclined to overemphasize the battle on the tellectual front and to forget that a man will sometimes die for flag though he would be hard put to explain what the flag stands r. Cultus, ritual, ceremony, music, and posture have an impor-ice which liberalism is too apt to overlook. Man is not a dis-bodied mind. Descartes laid the keel of modern philosophy on e dictum *cogito ergo sum*. But the fact is that the vast majority mankind do not *cogit* but nevertheless continue to exist, rhaps even more obviously or comfortably than those who do. ere is a moral to be drawn from the popularity of strip cartoons our modern newspapers.

In this tendency of liberalism to overemphasize the mental ment in religion may be found the reason for liberalism's weak-ss in embodying ideas in institutions and in cultus. We are pre-ed to die for our ideas, but not to pay for them. Perhaps we ve something here yet to learn from the children of theological rkness, for ideas need embodiment in institutions and cultus if y are to reach the majority of ordinary folk. And if recent of of this be asked for the obvious effect of the Coronation emony may be cited.

What I have said is not meant to imply that truth in religion be overemphasized, but the artificial isolation of the mental tent of religious faith can easily frustrate the dissemination of ue faith and a sure hope.

It is a sound instinct which makes a child ask the question 'But is it true, daddy?' Later on we learn to ask other questions: Is it comforting? Is it wise? Is it diplomatic? Is it to my own advantage? But the first question is fundamental though alas it is all too easy to get all these questions mixed up together.

Man with his burning soul
Hath but an hour of breath
To build a ship of truth
In which his soul may sail
Sail on the sea of Death.
For Death takes toll
Of beauty, courage, youth
Of all but truth.

Such is the liberal's conviction and if he finds in the Christian Church that ship of truth in which his soul may sail he yet regards it as his responsibility to keep that ship in repair, to bale out the bilge which penetrates the timbers, and to scrape away those limpets which adhere so tenaciously to its hull.

If reverence for truth, however awkward, however disturbing, is the first clause in the liberal creed, the second which follows directly from it is belief in the necessity for intellectual humility. And truly I would say that this was the outstanding characteristic of those whom one regards as the leaders in the movement. Only he who has sought the truth—sought it with toil and tears—is fully aware of how little he knows. Only he who has attempted to stand outside the warm confines of accepted systems and customs knows the sobering chill of the broad space which lies beyond. Humility will be acknowledged by all as a Christian virtue—perhaps even the Christian virtue. But strangely enough Christian humility is seldom commonly thought of as extending to things of the mind. 'Thou wast altogether born in sin and dost thou teach us?' still expresses an attitude of mind both common and approved amongst many who call themselves Christian. Zealous dogmatism and premature conviction display an unlovely arrogance which goes unrebuked in some religious circles. What a dangerous thing is theology! A superficial study of it and a few technical terms will enable a man to think that he is on familiar terms with his Creator. The sounding lead of the human mind has only the smallest reach; it tells us enough to keep our shallow bark off the rocks, but it scarcely reaches below the surface of the mystery by which we are surrounded. Yet there are not a few who call themselves liberals who are dogmatically undogmatic and illiberally liberal. They confuse the spirit of liberalism with the

onclusions of some liberals and, having accepted the latter, view ith contempt those whose conclusions differ from their own. hese are pseudo-liberals.

Humility of mind and humility in our intellectual approach to hers follows not only from an appreciation of the limits of uman knowledge; it is a consequence of a Christian anthropology. ur thinking is shot through with motives, desires, hopes and ars of which we are often unaware. Sin reaches the intellect no ss than the emotions. This is no reason for abandoning the arch for truth any more than sin is a reason for abandoning the fort to attain to goodness. But it is a reason for humility of mind s well as of heart.

The search for truth presupposes intellectual liberty. Where e conclusions are prescribed the study is precluded. Liberals ve been foremost in the battle for liberty and many to-day ercise that liberty oblivious of its origin and regardless of its ice and preservation. The leaven of liberalism has penetrated l parties and schools of thought. Heresy-hunting was at one me the most popular ecclesiastical blood-sport, but of recent ars there has been a marked disinclination to engage in it. Some w would say that this is to be regretted, since it indicates that eople no longer take theology seriously. But surely the true ason is that there is a growing conviction that heresy-hunting is bad way to safeguard truth. The fox escapes and we start the ar of acrimony. Well does the Doctrine Report say 'To admit crimony in theological discussion is in itself more heretical than y erroneous opinions upheld or condemned in the course of e discussion.' The theologically conservative are often unduly rrified of error. They believe that God can forgive sins but that e is incapable of forgiving mistakes, especially theological mis-kes. If the danger of conservatism is petrefaction, the danger liberalism is liquefaction. But the remedy for both is a firm nviction in the overruling power and guidance of the Holy pirit. In the search for truth mistakes will be made and false nclusions arrived at, but these may best be combated not by thoritative anathemas and heresy trials. They are best met by continuation of the search and by rational argument and discus-on. Liberalism believes in the power of the Spirit of Truth: it is no belief in the plenary inspiration of clerical gatherings, ven of the Modern Churchmen's Conference. When it is touched th intellectual arrogance liberalism can easily degenerate into eological individualism. 'Most friends of truth,' said Vinet, ove truth as Frederick the Great loved music. It used to be said him that (strictly speaking) he was not fond of music but of

the flute, and not indeed fond of *the* flute but of *his* flute.' We have all met self-styled liberals whose love for truth was of that kind. The theological egotist is not to be confused in ourselves or in others with the liberal. Nor must we confuse liberalism with libertinism. There *are* limits to the beliefs which may rightly be held within the church visible. Where those limits should lie is by no means easy to determine. I personally would regard what is said on this subject in the prolegomena to the Doctrine Report as both fair and reasonable; indeed the Report taken as a whole is a very liberal and persuasive document.

We must, however, be on our guard against supposing that truth is ultimately dependent upon the exercise of liberty. The reverse is true; 'ye will perceive the truth and the truth will set you free.' Similarly in the ethical sphere real freedom of action is dependent upon submission to the moral ideal. The point which I wish to make here is of capital importance if we are to distinguish between liberalism and libertinism, and to understand the times in which we live. Christianity must always attach a peculiar importance to the element of authority in faith. The Gospel is an authoritative message concerning certain facts. Christian freedom derives from the acceptance of that message. But there have been some claiming the name of liberal who would reverse all this. Their motto is 'Freedom will give you truth.' They say in effect (to quote Oliver Quick):

> 'Let the Church cease to bind the intellect with any creed or dogma; let the human mind be encouraged to regard nothing as fixed or certain in the sphere of belief, then the truth will gradually emerge out of a healthy conflict of unfettered opinions amongst those who acknowledge themselves only seekers . . . To-day it would be waste of time to dwell on the mistakes of Victorian liberalism. Events since the first war have remorselessly exposed the futility of its pathetic trust in human nature unevangelized and unredeemed. In the last twenty years the pendulum of human inclination has swung violently back again from the side of evolutionary democracy to that of revolutionary despotism. Many have found in the iron discipline of Communist or Fascist parties something of that sense of freedom in common self-dedication which characterized original Christianity. We must go back to first principles. The claim of Christianity to make men free depends upon the truth of its Gospel.'

After persuasively defining the true function of creed and dogma in Christianity, Quick concludes his discussion of the subject with these words:

> 'Simply because its inspiration is Christian and acknowledges Christ's law of love, room must be found for drastic criticism within the spiritual liberty and communion of the Church, even at the cost of difficulty and tension. The Spirit operating in this whole body will prove its truth or falsehood when patience has had its perfect work.'

'The way for the Church to keep and manifest her divinely ordained authority in faith is *not* to adopt measures of repression whenever the critic's voice is raised, but rather to trust the one Spirit to reconcile within the freedom of this one fellowship the diverse gifts of which he is the author.'

What Quick asks for will never be found by contesting cases fore ecclesiastical courts, and by providing legal safeguards for eedom of interpretation; it can only be found in a community nich rejoices in sharing a saving truth, and where faith is active l love.

The next constituent in true liberalism which I would point is humanism. And by that I do not mean secular optimistic manism, nor the pessimistic humanism of the existentialists. I ean the humanism which has an old and honoured place within e Christian Church, and is based, not upon secular optimism, t upon the conviction that God created the heaven and the rth, and his interest is not limited to ecclesiastical institutions d concerns. In these days of increasing specialization in every here of knowledge it is more than ever necessary to insist that sphere of human interest is unrelated to the Kingdom of God. ou may remember that Baron Von Hügel, when beginning the struction of his niece in the Christian faith, turned her attention st to Greek coins. In this country the relation between the urch and at any rate the older universities has been close. The urham Report (of 1944) on Training for the Ministry rightly essed the importance of this relation; there are, however, ndencies in some quarters which would minimise it. I hope these ll be resisted, for humanism of the kind I have mentioned is t often found amongst clergy who are seminarist trainees, and e of the bridges between the Church and the world in which e Gospel must be preached would be broken were this relation tween Church and university to lapse. It is, however, a hopeful n that many modern universities whose antipathy to theology und expression in their statutes are now willing and eager to tablish faculties in theological and biblical study. But the word manism is patient of an interpretation wider than that which I ve given to it; it means too not simply a broad cultural interest t also a wide interest and concern for the life of the whole com- unity. This ideal is summed up in the title of 'Parson.' I nember a friend of mine remarking that it was this ideal which ndal Davidson had before his mind but that there was a subtle ange during the primacy of his successor. The idea of a clergy- n became more ecclesiastical. The Church became more con- rned with itself than with the world. There is, I think, some

justice in this remark, though there were more influences than th Archbishop at work in effecting this change of emphasis. It is however, one to be most strenuously resisted. When the Churc concentrates on its own safety and survival it really endangers both

There is yet another meaning carried by the term humanism Humanists do not accept the doctrine of the total depravity o human nature and the total otherness of the divine. Consequentl there was amonst liberals a strong opposition to the theology o Karl Barth. No doubt this was in part justified, and yet I canno but think that many liberals were prejudiced through a lack o understanding of the situation to which Barth had to speak. It i certain that Barth created the theological ground on which th Confessional Church was enabled to stand in the face of terrify ing attack. It is not necessary to agree to all that Barth has taugh in order to admit (as some liberals have been reluctant to do) tha Barth is a great theologian who has much to say to these times. Ar we liberals not sometimes a little too impatient of paradox? 'See simplicity and distrust it,' says A. N. Whitehead—a paradox o paradox. That clear-minded Anglican Bishop Creighton used t say, 'The two chief means of teaching are exaggeration an paradox. One or other is necessary to attract attention and sho reason for independent thought.' A true assessment of huma nature in its relation to the divine can perhaps only be conveye by paradox, as Pascal does when he says: 'It is dangerous t show man too often that he is equal to the beasts, without showin him his greatness. It is also dangerous to show him too frequentl his greatness without his baseness. It is yet more dangerous t leave him ignorant of both. But it is very desirable to show hi the two together.'

A liberalism which at times degenerated to libertism flourishe in the 1920's and early 1930's. Then, for a variety of reasons bot good and bad, a reaction set in, till the word liberal became almo a term of abuse. We are now, I believe, entering a post-ant liberal phase. But we would do well not to attempt to seek nosta gically for the liberalism of thirty years ago, but apply our prin ciples and convictions freely and boldly in what is a new ag God has spoken in these latter years in mercy and in judgmen and surely we must be ready to learn from events and not t bemoan them or bark at them.

It follows from liberalism's emphasis on the centrality of trut in religion that it should make a continuous and determined effo to relate the Christian Gospel to new knowledge in other fields o human thought. It is this effort which gives rise to the ter Modernism. Now I frankly admit that I do not much like th

label. Partly because it is an ambiguous term. In its Roman manifestation it is to be identified with an attempt to detach the Christian Faith from its historic foundations and so free it—free it to become simply another mystery religion. Partly because it suggests that only those who assume it are abreast of modern knowledge. And partly because it has become largely associated with the holding of certain theological conclusions rather than with an attitude of mind and spirit towards the quest for theological truth. I much prefer the title liberalism; it is this term which is worth while rescuing from misunderstanding and abuse. Nevertheless having said so much, I hope without offence, I fully admit that it is characteristic of liberalism consciously and continuously to attempt to relate the new to the old, and to be sensitive to fresh discoveries and contemporary trends of thought.

The importance which liberalism has attached to freedom and liberty has always inclined liberals to lay emphasis upon the position of laity in the Church. I have already said that we find it rather easy to believe that clerical gatherings are not gifted with plenary inspiration. And I suppose there are few of us who would not be strenuously opposed to the present proposed canons becoming the law of the Church without (not simply lay consultation) but real lay assent. Our present Convocations are a medieval anachronism. Appropriate to times when very few laymen could read or write, it is now difficult to see what useful function they perform. It is not without interest to note that in this stress on the importance of the layman in the Church we stand closer to Constantinople than to Rome—just because the Greek Church preserves the primitive tradition and Rome does not. I often think that liberals would do well to devote more interest to the Orthodox churches of the East than we have done in the past, for we have a closer relationship to them both in ethos and theology than we have with either Rome on the one hand or Wittenberg or Geneva on the other.

Thus far I have done little more than attempt to define what meaning I wish to give to the term liberalism. I realise there is much more that might be said, for I have said nothing about the relation of liberalism to questions of reunion, to ethical and pastoral problems, and to the work of the Church overseas.

But time presses and I must pass on, having roughly defined what I mean by liberalism, to deal with the latter part of the title of my address, 'Liberalism *in an Established Church*.'

There are I would guess not a few liberals who would regard the establishment as the one bulwark against obscurantism, fana-

ticism, and servitude. I doubt if this opinion can be sustained when we think of the Church of Ireland, the Protestant Episcopal Church of U.S.A., or indeed a number of other disestablished or unestablished provinces in the Anglican Communion. We must remember that in a church which has no state connection the laity almost invariably and inevitably come into their own. The reason is economic. 'No taxation without representation' is a maxim the force of which is seen by ecclesiastics when their existence depends upon its acceptance. The Church of England would not necessarily become less comfortable for liberals if it were disestablished. That would happen only if liberals (as alas they so often do) refused to play their rightful part in the church's assemblies. This, of course, is not to say that I favour disestablishment; quite the reverse. I am in favour of establishment, but for reasons other than the preservation of liberalism. It is interesting to note that there has been a very considerable change of opinion on the whole subject since 1928. There are few to-day who would follow Bishop Henson in his desire for severing the state connection. In these post-war years we see as perhaps we never saw before the importance of the state's formal recognition of the Christian Faith. At one time it was thought that the establishment was a bar to reunion with the Free Churches, but the recent report of a Commission appointed by the Free Church Federal Council entitled 'The Free Churches and the State,' disproves this contention. 'Free Churchmen reject state control of religion; they welcome state recognition of religion.' 'They admit more fully than they used to do the value of such recognition in its many present forms.'

Undoubtedly the ideal form of relation between church and state is that which exists in Scotland. But such a relationship would become possible here only if we were to come to terms with the Free Churches. I ardently hope that this may eventually happen. If it does not, there seems a real likelihood of the establishment becoming increasingly unworkable; it will attract attack from without and it will become enfeebled through the denial of its rightful autonomy within.

Although disestablishment would not necessarily involve any diminution in the freedom which we enjoy, it might well have the effect of driving the church nearer to the periphery of public life and interest. This is a consequence which all liberals would deplore. Liberalism has always strenuously contended that in Christ's Kingdom no sphere of human thought or activity can lay claim to extraterritorial rights. The establishment in some sense visibly symbolizes that truth.

It may indeed be said that with the advent of the welfare state e argument for establishment is greatly strengthened. Time as when almost all personal and voluntary services were the rect concern of the Church. The Church originated them; the hurch administered them; the State did little more than concern self with rough justice and hold the ring. Those days are gone, id there is a very real danger that the new state services, unless ey are prompted and inspired by Christian motives, will become echanical and depersonalized. Industry too is rapidly reaching e stage when the customary incentives are insufficient to arantee stability and efficiency. The pay packet is not enough make industry meaningful; something more is needed. And it hard to see where that something more can come from except m a faith which is concerned not with a part of life but with the hole.

But perhaps I am getting a little away from my subject. Let look more closely at what establishment involves. Here I can no better than remind you of the paragraphs on this subject in e recent Church Assembly Report on Church and State.

> 'The particular characteristics of the status of the Church of England are what constitute the relationship which goes by the name of "establishment." These particular characteristics embrace both rights and privileges, and on the other hand restrictions and limitations, and it is not always easy to distinguish between them. The status of establishment includes the restriction to Anglican clergymen of the office of chaplain to the Speaker of the House of Commons and of certain professorships and chaplaincies in the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Durham; the right of the Archbishop of Canterbury to crown the Sovereign; precedence in all religious services associated with events of importance in the national life; the representation of the Episcopate in the House of Lords; the requirement that the Sovereign must join in communion with the Church of England; the right of the parish priest to celebrate marriages recognised as lawful, and his position as "persona" of his parish and not merely as minister of a gathered congregation.
>
> 'The restrictions and limitations may be summarized as follows: the royal nomination of bishops,. deans, and some cathedral canons, and the patronage of "crown livings"; the requirement of the royal authority for the summoning and dissolving of Convocation, and of the Royal Assent to any canons deliberated and drafted in the Convocations; the right of final veto possessed by each House of Parliament on measures submitted by the Church Assembly; and the constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final Court of Appeal from the ecclesiastical courts in ecclesiastical causes.'

The rights and privileges are all of some importance, but none them is at the present time a subject of serious dispute. The rt searchings and controversy arise over the restrictions and itations; two in particular—Crown nomination of bishops and ns and the parliamentary final veto.

As regards nomination to the episcopate I imagine that mo liberals would support the *status quo*, anomalous as it seems be; and I imagine too that if asked to supply a reason for the attitude they might reply: 'All reasonable men are liberals. Th Crown is more likely to appoint reasonable men than the Chur Assembly. Therefore, the present practice is to be preferred.' T this syllogism they might, having regard to appointments recent years, add the following: 'Young men are on the who more likely to be reasonable, and less likely to be autocratic tha old men. No liberal is autocratic and all liberals are reasonabl Therefore again the present practice is to be preferred.'

But is the Crown disposed to look for reasonableness in nominees? On the whole I think we may say yes, though we m admit its judgment is not always infallible. The state has alwa enough problems to cope with without adding to their numb Its concern is to hold the community together and keep the bo from rocking. If any government was disposed to rock the bo it can do so much more effectively by legislation than by maki risky or unacceptable appointments.

The argument from youth is much more shaky. No one can so autocratic or bigoted as a young man who is in love with h own opinions. I would guess that the reason why of recent yea the age of elevation to the episcopte has fallen is that the tel phone, the typewriter, the motor car, and the general tempo life makes it cruel to appoint, as was once quite common, men the late sixties or early seventies. A sound wind is required those who engage in the episcopal race.

As regards the state's right of final veto I hope we would agree that while this must necessarily remain in matters relati to property and the rights of individuals it should not remain matters of doctrine, worship, government and discipline in t Church.

Archbishop Davidson speaking after the rejection of the 19 Prayerbook, made on behalf of the entire episcopate of bo provinces a final declaration which reads as follows:

> 'It is a fundamental principle that the Church (that is the Bisho together with the clergy and laity) must in the last resort, when its mi has been fully ascertained, retain its inalienable right, in loyalty to Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to formulate its faith in Him, and arrange the expression of that Holy Faith in its form of worship.'

I would not wish to dispute that cautious declaration; I wou only point out that the key words are 'when its mind has be fully ascertained.' With our present consultative machinery it is no easy thing to do. The House of Laity in the Chur

ssembly is in many ways an excellent body, but it is certainly ot really representative of lay opinion throughout the Church. hat is not its fault; the defect lies in our social or economic stem. Anything we can do to make that body more truly repre-ntative will be labour well spent. For the time will surely come nen the Church must set its own house in order and it would be sastrous were we left to the mercy of contending ecclesiastical essure groups.

But I would not wish to conclude upon a note of hesitancy, for view the future with great hope. Party strife within the Church, ile not a thing of the past, is not what it was twenty-five years o. There has been a drawing together, and that drawing gether is largely based upon a new understanding of the Bible ich in turn derives from the liberal approach.

Liberalism in this fallen world will always have a task to rform. And it has perhaps a greater opportunity in an estab-hed Church such as ours than in any other. But we need to rally r forces, not ostentatiously, but quietly and effectively, and clear in our own minds about the particular tasks that this new e (in which we live) calls us to perform.

I have dealt more with the spirit which should animate our terprise. It remains for this Conference, having surveyed the ld more widely, to determine a policy matched to our day and neration.

THE CONTINUING TASK OF LIBERAL THEOLOGY

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, B.D., M.A., Dean and Fellow of St. John's College, and Lecturer in Divinity in the University of Cambridge

THE task of liberal theology is determined by the characteristics of the liberal mind and its consequent attitude to the prevalent theology of the day. Those who gleefully proclaim to be discredited or dead forget that it is a recurring phenomenon.

There are common notions that a liberal Christian is one who denies or holds in some diluted form certain doctrines historically regarded as essential in the Christian religion. Either or neither or both of these propositions may be true of particular liberal Christians but neither of them constitutes a person a liberal Christian. The distinctive characteristic is a conviction about the nature and place of authority in religious belief. A liberal Christian fully recognizes that authority of one sort or another is generally *the means by which* people first come to know about what is in fact true: what he rejects is every claim that there is any authority which can be *the ground of truth* in any sense which would fain exclude appeal to anything behind or beyond the authority itself. This latter notion he holds to be false and mischievous. He is well aware that theological propositions, like others, may be true and valuable though he is himself unable to perceive the truth of them; but he also knows that nothing can be true *for him* except in as far as he may be enabled by his own insight to realize that it is true or to find reliable grounds on which to accept the verdicts of others. Anyone who affirms the truth or reasonableness of any proposition whatsoever is thereby also asserting, by implication, its *knowable* trueness or reasonableness. This necessary implication is contantly overlooked and so its most important significance can be ignored.

Again, a liberal Christian may well believe that there has been revelation in and through particular persons, experiences, events and their interpretation; but he refuses the notion that formulated doctrinal propositions are themselves divine revelation. He may, with William Temple, recognize truths of revelation but not revealed truths. For 'truth' is not a synonym for 'fact'; it is the correct correspondence of mind with fact; and the liberal Christian agrees with Whitehead that finality cannot be claimed for any dogma without claiming a commensurate finality for the form of thought in terms of which it is expressed. He does not suppose the human mind to be capable of understanding the

ysteries of the being of God or of human life; but what he does sist upon is that when he is considering theological propositions is not directly considering the mysteries of the being of God, of the person of Christ, or of human existence, but rather what ner men have said about these matters, presumably with the tention of enlightening him. If a man has ability and knowlge comparable with those possessed by the men who framed e doctrinal propositions, he will confess to no presumption or ide in claiming that he ought to be able to understand and judge em; and in as far as they may be unintelligible or inconsistent th knowledge or well-grounded belief, he will conclude that in far they fail of their purpose and lack justification.

The continuing relevance of these principles should be at ce clear as soon as we realize that very influential factors, not themselves religious, go far to determine the beliefs of those o profess religion. Very few of us indeed initially accept our ligion as the result of at all fully informed judgment or mature lection; the religious beliefs people know and accept are often tters determined by the land of their birth, their parentage and ture; while the psychologists are always warning us, on abunnt evidence, that what we call reasons and grounds of belief often little more than ingenious excuses for what a person, ociety, or a nation wants to be or to happen. And though the eral Christian will hesitate long before being confident that is right when others, equally able, informed, and sincere, nk otherwise, he must nevertheless refuse to be influenced by fact that very large numbers of people accept a religious lief. Numerically large, powerful, wealthy and well disciped organizations exist to maintain and propagate particular gious beliefs by means which the liberal cannot regard as evant to their truth, though it belongs essentially to his task ake account of them. There was a time when such persons as ler, Mussolini and Stalin were frequently speaking and writ-, and few outside their own countries were aware of what they e preaching, or cared if they were aware: there came a e when the whole civilized world hung on their words and carey scrutinized every phrase in the attempt to guess what it ht portend for the world's peace. This was not in the least ause their words had become wiser or more true than they ever e: it was because these men had come to exercise decisive er over the beliefs and actions of millions. The same thing pens in religion. We may gladly recognize that the Roman holic Church guides immense numbers along the narrow way leads to life, yet also recognize, and have a paramount duty

in the cause of truth to emphasize, that (as an example) in as fa as the gigantic and exclusive claims of the Papacy are alleged t be justified by the New Testament, the exegesis is such that, wer it the work of a small sect, no Christian theologian would wast time in refuting the exegetical achievement. We have to tak account of it, not because of its reasonableness, or even becaus of the magnificence of its affront to reason, but because of th great influence of the Church which claims and propagates it a the truth.

In no calculable time will these influential causes of beli appreciably change. It is the continuing task of liberal theolog to take account of them, resolutely refuse to be imprisoned b them, and to take every legitimate means to ensure that they affe us as little as possible. That reason is the latest of human acquir ments and always in danger of being overwhelmed by mor powerful elemental forces, so far from leading us to abandon depreciate reasonableness in religious belief, should impel us insist the more firmly upon its vital importance, and never forget the fact that all that has been most beneficial and true the beliefs of mankind has come into the world, not by ar esoteric or occult means or methods, or because it has been pr claimed as divine revelation, or by accident, but rather when me have been using their natural powers to the fullest extent, unifie under the sway of their highest endowment. One simple fa shows the fundamental importance of reason, which no empiric psychologist identifies with what used to be called rationalism when this endowment is lost by disease, no religious appeal can b usefully addressed to the sufferer, and no delusion is too absur to be entertained with complete conviction.

Liberal theology can and will always need to learn much fro the insights and thoughts of those whose basic attitudes in matte of belief it cannot adopt; and we must understand these bas attitudes. In every generation there are those who employ the mo able and ingenious activities of reason to prove its impotenc just as scientists have patiently designed elaborate experimen to prove animal behaviour purposeless, and then, arguing th man is as other animals, concluded that 'purpose' is a conce irrelevant in accounting for bodily activities, their own included the extreme examples of both are cases for the pathologi The decline in religious belief and the frequent open hostili towards it inevitably lead to the process known as 'closing t ranks' in a religious society which feels itself menaced and do not intend to surrender. It is by no means only or mainly the Church that it does not pay to think except on certain lin

hen the strength of combination is necessary to a difficult task, n do not approve, and easily show that they have little use for, yone who does not keep step with authority and the majority. here are some who will think and say in private what they will ither say nor act upon publicly. That the tide has ceased to w with liberal theology may perhaps have assisted the passage some to other camps. Again, the balance of relations between igious faith and belief and other knowledge and belief are mplex and often perplexing; and there is much in the modern rld to tempt believer and unbeliever alike to cut the difficulties what amounts to a denial either of faith or of reason, and, half-consciously, to line up with forces whose vigour depends upon rrowness of vision. It is tempting to suppose that what seems satisfy religious needs must be true and good, and to forget t popularity of teaching may depend less upon the presence of sitive truth which people approve than upon the absence of th which they dislike. All these things, in a time like ours, are be expected and must be accepted.

Liberalism of mind, not only in theology, is nowadays at discount. That we can understand. But what is perplexing is t many churchmen should openly rejoice at what they call the lapse of liberal theology and strangely imagine that it some- w shows the truth of their own very different outlook. Liberal ology is 'dated,' 'outmoded,' 'old-fashioned,' and would ubtless be more abusively characterized were it not for the rtesy which now prevails among theologians. What sort of ntality is thus revealed, and does it not afford ground for the vest distrust of the judgment of those who display it? They gleeful at the eclipse of the hope and belief in an increasing sonableness, humanity and tolerance in the world and in the urch. This is a matter rather for sorrow than congratulation, d to rejoice at it is no more wise than Christian. For it is not son, but human unreason, which has produced the calamities l the most depressing and difficult features of our time. Liberal ologians of the eighteenth century are likewise held in con- pt by people who have never read their works. Butler and rkeley produced masterpieces of fair and serious reasoning d, in the thought of their age, provided a much more solid basis faith in a divine providence and order than do those who scoff 'eighteenth-century rationalism.' One can but wonder at the te of mind of such people, and also wonder at the distance they e travelled from the *ethos* of their own Church, which has ays been to present a sane, intellectual and balanced form of ristian doctrine. Nor will the Church of England ever justify

herself in any other way. If she makes other appeals then, if th appeal is in one direction, Rome quickly shows the amateurish ness and contradictions involved; or, if the appeal is in anothe direction, our Church cannot compare with the great Protestan Churches of the Continent or with the Free Churches of the mor Western world.[1]

It is the primary and continuing task of liberal theology t maintain the validity of its own fundamental principles an methods. The danger of their eclipse in the Church of Englan was never more serious than it is to-day, though the danger doe not arise from the likelihood of openly repressive action b ecclesiastical authority. The danger will increase in the future for the ministry now receives few men who know anything mor of liberal theology and its methods than that they are everywher spoken against. The present danger arises from the theolog which has displaced liberal theology. Its appeal and influenc derive from its mental affinity in the sphere of religion with tha of the world of our generation, which is itself a reason for nc accepting it as either a true or permanent expression of the Gospe It is assumed that man cannot apprehend God through knowledg of the created universe, his conscience or his thought. Apprehen sion is possible only through revelation, which the more extrem forms of this theology, which are the only logical forms of it, den that man has any power to seek or to receive; only the revelatio itself can create its own acceptance by conferring an allege divine gift of faith. Propagandist apologetic, whether Catholi or Protestant, disparages private judgment in the interest c exalting that of the Church and/or the Bible. Here are all th characteristics of the modern world—distrust of reason, despa of man and humanist ideals, subordination of the person to party society or state and reverence for paradox in which alone trut is to be found.[2] The 'Catholic' branch of the theological mov ment which has dethroned liberalism is quite frank about its basi

[1] The expansion of the Anglican Communion has indeed been remarkabl but we must keep a sense of proportion. At the World Convention of Baptis alone, half as many again communicants are represented than by the bisho at a Lambeth Conference.

[2] Genuine facts and experiences expressed in intelligible propositions v may well believe, even if, taken together, they issue in paradoxes; for th may well indicate no more than the inability of the human mind to compr hend the co-existence of what is paradoxically divided. There are suc genuine mysteries in our religion, as there are in our apprehensions of natu and of human life. But literalized metaphors and linguistically-generat entities which issue in paradox are unnecessary and are not genuine par doxes. They are superfluous muddles and generate only spurious mysteri

ing concerned with taking the Faith as something revealed by od in Christ, 'the Faith' being the dogmatic theology of the edieval Church 'and a view of the Bible as the inspired word of od' which it is 'the theologian's first duty not to criticize but to terpret.' It was not one called a Modernist but William Temple, ortly before his death, who wrote:

> 'A good many of us feel that the neo-Thomist group in their eagerness to re-assert the truth and authority of the Bible are ignoring the lesson of the nineteenth century and becoming involved in a position which is either obscurantist or humbug. *E.g.* one of them, when pressed, after saying that the Bible is true in whole and in part, said its truth might consist in the true statement of a false position!'[3]

nere could hardly be a better characterization of a large amount the so-called 'Biblical Theology' of the present time; and the sults to be expected are becoming plain. It is now often garded as a sufficient refutation and dismissal of any theological tement to dub it 'non- (or un-) biblical,' as though that could cide any issue of truth or error whatever, with the sole exception whether the alleged 'non-biblical' statement is or is not in Bible; unless, indeed, the Bible is literally revelation in the ndamentalist sense. Again, one hears and reads, beyond the int of weariness, about 'the biblical view' or 'doctrine' of this, t, and the other. In as far as there is unity of view in the Old stament, it was largely imposed by its later and latest editors, l, even so, great differences survive the editing; but more en there is simply no such thing as 'the biblical view,' but only reral 'views' on the particular matter in the Old Testament. e same is true of the New Testament, though to a less degree. e old allegorical and typological methods of interpreting the ble (which fell into discredit because of the abuses to which y led) have been revived and elaborated with a truly marvellous enuity.[4] It has always been recognized that New Testament ters themselves make some use of these methods. But much dern 'biblical theology' assumes the later developed doctrines the Church and uses these to interpret images, types, phrases l key-words in the Old Testament and claims that the meanings, s extracted after being read in, are those of New Testament ters. The images, types and words are used as the bases of trines certainly not evident in the literal meanings of the text, contexts and dates of which are often entirely disregarded.

[3] *William Temple*, by F. A. Iremonger, p. 609.

[4] A devastating but by no means unfair account of their modern forms and was contributed by Mr. L. B. Cross to the September, 1949, issue of *Modern Churchman*.

The methods, and the uses made of them, are frequently grotesqu unless the books of the Bible are of equal inspiration, or a revelation delivered in cryptic forms, and so are sources fro which a large number of mystic similies can be taken and mad the basis of truth. The essential requirements for the attainme of 'theological truth' of this sort are a concordance, the ment ability of a cross-word puzzle expert, and a lively imaginatio These enable 'the biblical theologian' to regard a passage fro the Bible as possessing a truth-value surpassing that of reason, knowledge derived from any other source, or other well-groude belief. Fundamentalism is repudiated, but something practical identical with it is substituted, with the additional advantage th a literal meaning can be ignored or set aside as convenien Extreme examples of this fantastic exercise in ingenuity, and i results, abound in the writings of Dr. A. M. Farrer, Fr. A. Hebert and Fr. L. S. Thornton. It is far less surprising tha serious that no small proportion of the inadequate number present-day ordination candidates are confessedly Fundame talists.

In former generations Bible studies supplied the firm found tions supplied by divine revelation, which theology proper cou use to complete a superstructure beyond the resources of natur theology. Nowadays natural theology is discarded as useless not impossible; and any damage to the foundations supplied b divine revelation caused by modern critical and historical studi is ingeniously repaired by the use of material from the superstru ture, which is marvellously supposed to be in no way reduced b rather strengthened by the process.

A fair example of the modern theology which has so wide supplanted liberal theology, and one which conveniently illu trates our continuing task, is afforded by Dr. Alan Richardson *Christian Apologetics*. I have no wish to go out of my way attack this book; but if its basic contentions are sound, liber theology should take itself off. It is a relatively sober an restrained defence of theology in its proper sense, on the basis 'biblical theology,' many of the defects of which it reproduce I understand it is a standard textbook for study in our theologic colleges. In the first few pages of its preface one is led to expe a genuine facing of theological issues as they arise to-day for normal educated person of the modern world and as he wou wish to approach them; but any such reader and his expectatio

[5] Almost anything can be 'established' by such methods, just as a dogmatism can be held if appeal is allowed to an unverifiable divine gif faith.

ll be quickly disillusioned. The book abounds in slick phrases ;nich give an impression of an almost post-modernity, but it is tle more than an exposition of what is assumed, the extraction the foregone conclusions which follow from its premises, ough in the process of extraction there are sound arguments and t a little that liberal theology can accept. It contains so many ssages tending in different directions and left unreconciled that any criticism of any particular passage I do not doubt the thor would be able to point to others passages to show that he d been misunderstood.

The aim of the book is to show that theology is, not 'the queen sciences,' but a truly empirical science, entitled to use its own clusive categories; if it uses the categories of any other science is said to reduce itself to a mere branch of that science. Dr. chardson would hardly welcome the inevitable conclusion that hat is coming to be known as the philosophy of the sciences is e ultimate study which should include the empirical science of eology! There is no list of the special 'categories' of theology, d it is not easy to discern, apart from the category of velation, what are the exclusive categories of theology. The aim is that 'theological scientific method as applied . . . to the cts of the existence of the Church and Bible yields a body of owledge which requires and validates, at the scientific level, rtain strictly theological categories.' This is followed by the ly amazing statement: 'Theological existence must be shown be *un*intelligible in terms of any non-theological categories.'[6] nis sentence suggests the comment that no book is required to monstrate what, unfortunately, the majority of intelligent ople already take to be self-evident! I admit that if the propo- ion needs demonstration Dr. Richardson's volume supplies it. e are told that it is the existence of the Church which renders eology necessary. 'By theology,' says this writer, 'we here mean e study of Christian existence in history and to-day, that is, of l that appertains to the believing and witnessing Christian com- unity, the Church, both in the past and in the present.' This, of urse, has hitherto been known as Church History and Historical eology. In this book these subjects become, in themselves, idence of truth, for theology is apparently not the vindication of se objective studies as being the truth or evidence of truth, but l' the science which seeks to formulate categories by which the enomena of Church existence may be understood.' The appro-

[6] I have italicized the prefix in the word unintelligible lest any reader of mal mentality should suspect that I must have misquoted.

priate comment is that, given the truth of the Church's doctrine, o even the indubitable fact that this has been believed to be th truth, no special 'categories' are needed to understand 'Churc existence.' We are also told that a Christian philosophy 'is on which succeeds in interpreting the whole of experience solely b reference to the principle of biblical faith, without subordinating i to alien categories.' Why? If each science has its own 'categories (for this word in Dr. Richardson's book one should substitut 'assumptions' throughout), and if these 'categories' are 'alien' t each other, no philosophy of the whole of experience is possible No serious justification is given for so sweeping a claim, except th unfounded assertion that Christian faith is always a divine gif which Dr. Richardson says he will consistently maintain it to be Now no doubt man, being a creature of God, can have no powe that is not God-given; and in this sense the activity of faith is divine gift. Indeed this author quite properly, when it suits hi argument to do so, insists that faith is indispensable in the attain ment of any knowledge. What his argument requires to be shown and what he does not show, is that Christian faith is a divine gif in any sense in which faith in other activities is not. What analyti and genetic psychology have to say about faith and belief Dr Richardson does not consider; and on page 48 he quotes wit approval from a small book by Dr. F. T. Tennant without noticin that the book expressly disallows the notion of religious faith a in any special sense a divine gift. Indeed, Dr. Tennant's large work, *Philosophical Theology*, and Dr. J. Oman's *The Natura and the Supernatural*, could well be regarded as the most consis tent and thorough justifications of religious belief produced i English during the last forty years. Dr. Richardson nowhere pay attention to either or shows awareness that both have ploughed u in advance not a little of the ground which he assumes to affor a solid foundation.

'Revelation' is the key category of theology for this writer as for so many others. He proffers a correction of Dr. Temple' view that revelation consists in the coincidence of divinely con trolled events and minds divinely illumined to read them aright the amendment is made plausible by ignoring Dr. Temple's wor 'coincidence.' Of course *we* know of past events only throug written and interpreted history, but in many instances the origina recorders of the alleged revelation were witnesses of the event they so interpreted. In any case the contrast between 'history a an objective science' and 'no history without interpretation' i heavily overworked by those whose supposedly reliable history questioned; it seems to offer a way out of an otherwise formidabl

ficulty. We all know that history consists of selected happen-
gs which recorders judge to be significant, and that man can
serve, experience and judge only as man and not as a god or a
g may do; but that does not necessarily imply that two or more
rsons may not agree in recording events while fundamentally
fering in their interpretation of them; one of them may believe
t 'this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes,'
ile another may believe that the Lord has nothing to do with
and yet both may correctly describe what was apprehended by
e senses notwithstanding the qualitative difference which their
pective beliefs may cause the events to produce in their sub-
tive feelings. Nothing can remove or substantially modify the
ed to weigh the evidence for the occurrence of past events, and
the light any other relevant factors reasonably established as
owledge, to examine any interpretation which may have in-
enced the form of their recording.[7] Of course the position is
en complex when events of important religious or spiritual sig-
icance are in question; but in these matters, if the interpretation
s seriously influenced the record of events, then, unless there
independent grounds for judgment that a particular interpre-
on is a true one, the proper consequential attitude is agnosti-
m about the alleged events and not belief in them.

The progressive religious insights embodied in the Old
stament are admittedly very impressive and we may accept
ny of them as true. But exactly the same can be said of the
velopment of philosophical insights in ancient Greece, of those
law at Rome, and of science in the modern Western world.
e issue which those who so confidently write about revelation
ver squarely face or answer is why any *different* divine activity
equired to account for the development of religious insights in
ael than is required to account for the development of other
ivities of the human spirit elsewhere and at other times. In
y case, though he emphasizes the fact, Dr. Richardson seems
regard it as of no consequence that until last century the
ology of the Church depended on a very different notion of
elation from that which he accepts. He is himself, as he says
St. Augustine, no Bibliolater; but one need only contrast the
at African father's very acute treatment of the problem of time
h his terrible and grotesque doctrine of divine election to realize
t his formal freedom from Fundamentalism had no practical
sequence. His profound theological insight was more penetra-

[7] A historian may change his view in the light of new evidence without in respect modifying his otherwise derived pre-suppositions.

ting than this writer claims: it extended to knowledge of the sins he committed as a baby: whence such knowledge, except by deduction from scriptural texts? There is evidence, we read, that religion—and not only Christian religion—'is not man's search for God but God's search for man.' This is but an instance of the slick, reverential phrases so prominent in modern theology. What intelligible meaning can be attached to the Creator's *searching* for anything, and what can be thought of a *divine* search which has resulted in such boundless error as the history of religion discloses?

If the Church's life and expansion are, as Dr. Richardson thinks, weighty evidence for the *truth* of her theology, as distinct from evidence of the results of belief in it, what of the diffusion of Marxism and the speed of it? Of course, the facts of the existence of Christianity and the Church need accounting for: so do those of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and other claimants to revelation. What this book of Christian Apologetics seems not to perceive is that its assumptions could be equally well employed by defenders of other religions, and with equal result, whatever that may be estimated to be. To the then inevitable question 'Where do we go from here?' the only possible answer is that we must resort to that human reason of which Dr. Richardson insists that it is, except as illumined by Christian faith, incompetent to deal with such matters.

For, of course, in 'biblical theology' reason's incompetence is a consequence of the Fall. This doctrine is nowadays heavily emphasized as alone 'stating,' 'representing,' 'standing for,' certain indisputable facts about human nature. These *facts* are indeed facts of experience, never more obviously plain than to-day; so much so that they require no dubious doctrine to 'stand for' them. Nor, as a matter of history, did the Fall-doctrine merely do this: it purported *to explain their origin*, an entirely different matter. It did so on the basis of biblical texts and *a priori* assumptions which are irreconcilable with all the knowledge we now have about our human ancestry. In that knowledge there are gaps and inferences; but that does not make it reasonable to prefer, as a foundation for theology, views based on vastly less knowledge (exalted as divine revelation), mythology, and *a priori* dogmatism about what God must have created. The word 'fall' has no meaning unless it means collapse or descent from a higher or nobler level; and human righteousness, as distinct from mechanical correctness, must necessarily be attained by personal insight and decision, even if assisted by grace, or it is not achieved at all. Conceivably man could have been created as a correct

automaton or as knowing neither good nor evil: he could not conceivably have been *created* as ethically good or righteous. Over forty years ago a liberal theologian published two books, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* and *The Concept of Sin:* they have been praised almost without exception, criticized only in detail, and then ignored. I should be glad to learn of a serious attempt, not based on scriptural texts as authoritative revelation, to refute their main contentions.

Liberal theology must continue to affirm that nothing can undo the result of some centuries of critical examination both of the evidence for traditional beliefs *and of the processes by which all beliefs are formed.* The determination to find one, and only one, valid and final method for distinguishing truth from error, whether Church authority, the sacred scriptures, the test of practical experiment, reason, the evidence of the senses, or intuition, has failed; each in turn has been impugned and sovereignty attaches to no one of them. Liberal theology, however, can affirm, that, as may be required by the subject, some combination of them, or all of them together, may afford sufficient grounds for belief, while at the same time admitting that propositions which have appeared thus to be securely based may, in the future as in the past, have to be abandoned or modified in the light of new evidence.

In the last resort it belongs inalienably to man's God-given personality that his own informed conscience must make his own decisions. In fact he always does so. Can a man oppose his own judgment to the widespread consensus of informed opinions of ages-long duration? Is this not insufferable pride? Is not his judgment precarious and even capricious, and do not the consciences, like the intuitions, of different persons deliver contradictory judgments? Has not tradition of Church or Bible more weight than any private opinion, whether the subject be historical, intellectual, moral, or religious? The Liberal answer is that it is one thing to urge men to take account of, or to begin by giving primacy to, Bible, Church or tradition, in forming their convictions: it is quite another thing to tell them they ought not to form and hold them. Even acceptance of the Pope's infallibility must be either a blind leap or else a private and fallible judgment; to say that it is accomplished through a divine gift of faith is only a further private and fallible judgment. The questioning of every authority or test of truth must come before any acceptance of it is more than provisional, and it is in the questioning of it that intelligent and reasonable belief is to be distinguished from unintelligent and unreasonable acquiescence.

Every other task of liberal theology is secondary to this

primary one; for hereby alone is there a secure basis for sane religion and the only effective guarantee of moral and other liberty. Destroy or over-ride this right of personality, and the only corrective of any social tradition is taken away. To exalt 'the corporate conscience,' 'the civilized conscience,' 'the inspired judgment of the Church,' or 'the Christian conscience,' as though these were grander and more ultimate than the individual personal conscience, is to ignore the fact that the sole authority they have depends upon the continuing and fresh approval of individual judgments, whose verdicts they embody and express. The great insights, thoughts and movements which have changed men's hearts, beliefs, and the course of events, always come through great persons. There is no direct inspiration of a civilization, a nation, a church, or of Christianity: the reality is a gathering of personal insights and achievements and the gradual building up what is called 'a common mind' in societies. From this heritage the individual person, in his turn, learns the lessons of former achievements, and so guides his steps by an experience larger than his own, which is reflected in his own judgments. There is no such things as 'corporate thought': there is agreement in *what* is thought, but the thinking cannot be other than individual. Nine minds no more make a tenth or an 'over-mind' than nine stars make a tenth star; the minds can be called a society or the stars a constellation, but both words are only convenient descriptive abstract nouns. Moreover, in any social tradition there is a serious danger; simply because it has taken its place in the stream of human habit it easily ceases to be subjected to renewed personal judgment and is the more open to alien and corrupting influences. More particularly if religion has clothed it with the mantle of ultimate sacredness, its origins in fresh individual judgments become more and more remote and the admixture of less worthy elements more considerable. It may even come to change its original character and slowly pass into the contradiction of the truth it at first embodied.

Liberal theology must re-affirm the importance and necessity of natural theology, alike because there will then be something for Christian insights to illumine and complete (whereas at present there is something like a dualism between natural knowledge and Christian theology) and also because natural theology can afford some ground for the recognition and belief that Christian insight illumine it truly. For such knowledge as man can have, and therefore of such faith and belief as are reasonable, must be that which is drawn from the natural creation. There are differences in what claims to be knowledge of it and interpretations differ, just

is in Christianity itself. But the natural creation provides a large mount of common ground of a character the most objective ossible to man : it is there before us, and it is all that is there in hat objective sense, and if there be a God at all, it must be His ork. There is, initially, no other source from which we can at ll reliably learn anything of its plans and purposes, or whether has any. There can be no greater condemnation of its Creator an to affirm that it has a Creator but discloses nothing of His haracter. We arise within it and are conditioned by it and by hat happens in it. If it be held to reveal nothing of its Creator, His nature and His dealings with His creatures, then there is no round whatever for believing that any particular events and their terpretation can give us knowledge or grounds for religious elief.[8]

The plea that the human mind, by reason of its limitations or s damage by sin, is an unworthy instrument for this task must ther be accepted or rejected from the outset. If the plea be cepted, we had better not use the human mind for any serious rpose. There is no ground for supposing that the reasonings Christians are exempt from whatever limitations or damage fects the human mind. If God illumines the minds of Christians a divine gift of faith, so that they alone perceive and conceive ight, that He should withhold from other men who sincerely sire truth even the gleam of illumination whereby to perceive at Christians have it is but one more inscrutable problem. ristian arguments are ordinary human reasonings, often very man ones. We cannot assume the capacity of the mind to deal th these matters and then abandon the method when we are in fficulties or desire to maintain a particular proposition. That is her mental laziness or dogmatism aping the virtue of humility, whatever devout and reverent language it may be expressed or fended. The limitation and damage to the mind should be membered earlier. When we can get no further, it must be cause we are like explorers who cannot advance because of the fficulties of the terrain, not that we are trespassers warned off ivate ground.

If it is claimed that God's nature and ways are known from e Bible, that indeed is so; but it is not, for theology, the ultimate sting place. There must be grounds for believing that the Bible closes something about these matters truly, as against other and

[8] It is essential for sound theology to maintain the position that science ., ordered, tested knowledge) which does not proceed to natural theology a departmental, partial study, and that a natural theology not based on entific knowledge lacks foundations.

inconsistent claims to revelation above reason. If anything in th Bible is to be accepted as true, it cannot be simply because it i there, but only because there are sufficient grounds of (at leas probability to justify the belief that it is true. The starting poin must always come further back than the Bible. For in the orde of attaining human knowledge, knowledge of one's physical en vironment, the world (the more immediate aspects of it), and o the self, comes before any knowledge of God; though, when know ledge of God has been attained, the order of logical exposition ma be the other way round, and the world and the self be re-valued i the light of knowledge of God. If natural theology be impossible there can be no known or recognizable revelation, only groundles dogmatism. Science is no mysterious or esoteric form of know ledge: it is but a name for many sorts of accurate, ordered an tested knowledge which replaces more imperfect knowledge mor largely compounded of guesswork. When such writers as Dr Alan Richardson claim that theology is an empirical science the should remember that much modern empirical science, in claimin a discovery, means no more than that it has found that if an exper ment is carried out on a particular set of assumptions (categorie as Dr. Richardson calls his assumptions) a particular set of resul will be produced. It does not claim that the assumptions are there by proved to be true; in fact one hypothesis is continually bein substituted for another.

In conclusion I wish to say a summary word. We do no worship and pray to *doctrines*, however true we may hold the to be. All Christians worship and pray to God as made known i Christ, Who is a living, active, personal Spirit, the Ultima Reality. It is no small part of the continuing task of liber theology to emphasize this and to increase awareness of it.

LIBERAL PROTESTANTISM

By the Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's

NO one, I suppose, can fully understand the significance of Liberal Protestantism who did not study theology in the years before the First World War. No doubt it is possible to gain an adequate conception of the intellectual position which is described by the phrase by reading the works of its exponents, but to get the 'feel' of it, and to realize the hopes that it enshrined, one must have lived when it seemed to many the clear line of advance and the answer to the problem of religion in the modern world. Even those who remember those days have difficulty in carrying themselves back in imagination to the time when *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Harnach's *History of Dogma* and *The Jesus of History* could be accepted as, in some sense, final and decisive. We are often told that Liberal Protestantism is dead. The report is exaggerated — but it is true in the sense that we have all left the mood and outlook of the early twentieth century behind, and we cannot recapture them.

Liberal Protestantism as it was in the twentieth century was the result of a long development. It would be hard to say when that development began, but I suppose that we ought to trace its origin to the breakdown of the scholastic protestant theology which interpreted, and misinterpreted, Luther's religious insights. The eighteenth century was the epoch when so much began to dissolve which had been taken as fixed, and so much that was new began tentative advances.

The 'Age of Reason' may have had an imperfect notion of reason, but it certainly had a robust confidence in reason and applied it to the fundamental ideas of Christianity. Two names are of great importance, for they mark a turning point in the history of religious thought—John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Both these men were religious and desired to defend rather than destroy the Christian faith as they understood it, but each, in his way, contributed to the dissolution of the traditional dogmatic system. Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* is a work of Christian apologetics intended to persuade men to believe, but, as its title indicates, it bases its argument on reason. It is reasonable, Locke contends, to accept revelation. The Deists altered the emphasis to some extent and amended Locke's principle to read, It is reasonable to accept only those doctrines of Christianity which commend themselves to our reason. As a secondary, but very important tendency, we must note that, at the same time,

there began the serious historical criticism of the Bible and the controversy about miracles. It is generally said that the Deists were decisively defeated, but perhaps it would be nearer the truth to say that the battle was drawn, for the methods of the two great Christian thinkers who oposed them, Joseph Butler and George Berkeley, were not radically different from those of their adversaries; both at least, in the last resort, relied upon reason as the final court of appeal.

Kant, of course, was a more profoundly religious man than Locke, and a more systematic thinker; the results of his writings were correspondingly more significant. He believed that the real conclusion of his philosophy, as it affected religion, was that he had established it on the firm basis of 'moral faith' rather than on the insecure foundation of rational argument. Whether in fact this is what he actually did is, to this day, a keenly debated question, but it is quite certain that he dealt a staggering blow to the orthodox Protestant dogmatic system. That had been built on the so-called three rational proofs of the existence of God, which Kant believed he had shown to be fallacious. Whether he had actually done so is again open to question, but many people thought that he had and his 'moral faith,' as developed by him, appeared to have only a dubious place for revelation and to relegate the Church to the function of an ethical society. We cannot wonder that, after Kant, Protestant thought in Germany entered on a period of confusion and the search for new paths.

I suggest, tentatively, that the first great Liberal Protestant in the full sense was Schleiermacher. Whether this be so or not he exercised an abiding influence on the theology of the nineteenth century and still his spirit is powerful even when his principles are repudiated. The principal contribution of Schleiermacher to the development of protestant theology was his emphasis on feeling, or experience. He claimed for religion a distinct and unique place. It was not dependent on philosophical reason, nor was it as Kant had held, a kind of moralism. The essence of religion he asserted, is a 'feeling of absolute dependence.' He began the movement, which has had important consequences, to approach revelation and Christian doctrine from the standpoint of religious experience. In other respects too Schleiermacher had a decisive influence. He concentrated attention on the Person of the Redeemer and His God-consciousness. He was, however, very far from the position which has often been supposed to be characteristic of the Liberal Protestant with regard to doctrine and the Church. His most considerable book is a systematic work on Christian doctrine based on his initial assumption that experience

the root of religious faith. For him the dogmas of the Church re summary statements of the experience of God mediated rough the Church.

In the Liberal Protestantism of the end of the nineteenth cen- ry the influence of men who had been members of the Ritschlian hool was predominant. They had certain presuppositions — one ight even call them prejudices — which affected their thought most unconsciously. They went even further than Schleiermacher their distrust of philosophy or metaphysics: they regarded ysticism with suspicion; they were indifferent, on the whole, to e Study of Comparative Religion; they laid great stress on the ea of the Kingdom of God, and they drew a distinction between dgments of existence and judgments of value. Religion, or at ast the Christian religion, was, they thought, concerned not with dgments of existence, but with judgments of value.

A phrase current among the Liberal Protestants of this type th respect to the Incarnation was, 'Jesus has for us the value of od.' We must remember that the great theologians of the itschlian school were confronting the materialistic science of their riod which seemed to many to be destined to take all knowledge r its province and to make any kind of idealistic or theistic ilosophy out of date. When we detect, as we surely must, in- nsistency and ambiguity in their theology, we must bear in mind at they were desperately defending the right of Christian faith exist. They chose to retire into the fortress of value. Perhaps ey were right. At any rate it is clear that Christian faith begins a value-judgment and that the scientific method cannot tell us at is either good or beautiful.

It has been my good fortune to have had some contact with two minent representatives of Liberal Protestant Theology, one who nds well within the circle and one who marks, I think, the tran- ion to a different mode of thought. W. Herrmann was, in his y, a man of immense influence. He expounded the basic prin- les of Ritschlianism with special emphasis on the Kingdom of d. It is difficult to define his power or account for it. When I ended his lecture it seemed to me that he never really answered of the questions that were in my mind and, after this lapse of e, I can think of nothing which I learned from him, but yet memory of his lectures remain—and it is an inspiring one. He veyed, without any rhetoric or attempt to edify, the impression a personality which was centred upon his vision of the historical us and of one who, quite simply, loved Him. If I had not own that he would have repudiated the imputation with horror,

I should have said he was a kind of mystic — a Christo-centric mystic. And now perhaps when he has passed beyond these strifes of words, I may venture to say that is, I believe, precisely what he was.

We often hear it said that these German professors of Theology were remote and detached from the life of the Church. No doubt this was true of many — and it was deplorable — but it was not true of Herrmann, and still less was it true of Rudolf Otto the famous author of *The Idea of the Holy*. So deeply concerned was he with the life and worship of the Church that he devoted the closing years of his life to the attempt to compile a Book of Common Prayer for Germany and to make place for the sense of the 'numinous,' which he felt was lacking in protestant worship. In a broad sense, Otto belongs with the Liberal Protestants. He came from the tradition and he accepts the methods and results of Biblical criticism which had been achieved largely by the labours of 'liberal' scholars. Nor do I think he would ever have repudiated his spiritual ancestry, but he marks a new development in some degree a departure, from the point of view of the older Liberalism. He was deeply influenced by William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, a book which, both for good and evil, played a dominant part in the religious thought of Otto's generation. He began to face the challenge of psychology to the validity of religious experience. Further, he threw aside the hesitancy of many Liberal Protestants with regard to the religions of the world and embraces in his theology the whole range of religious phenomena. Perhaps even more significant was his recognition of the importance of mysticism. His *Study of Mysticism Eastern and Western* is, with the exception of *The Idea of the Holy*, the most valuable of his books. Nevertheless, like all the Liberal Protestants, his thoughts continually returned to the Historical Jesus, and his *Kingdom of God and the Son of Man* is evidence that, through whatever strange seas of thought his mind might range, at the centre of his thinking, as of his devotion, was the figure of the Crucified Redeemer.

I suggest that in Otto we see the Liberal Protestant movement beginning to transcend some of its limitations and taking a new form. But, of course, we should have a most imperfect view of Liberal Protestantism if we confined our attention to a few eminent writers, necessarily selected somewhat arbitrarily, from a large number who deserve mention; Liberal Protestantism was a movement which had a large following of men who would not claim any place in the history either of scholarship or of theology. It was a popular religious movement. As such it is more difficult to estimate

nate, for it assumed many different forms and existed in many different degrees of radicalism.

I suppose that the one conviction which all Liberal Protestants shared was that the literary and historical criticism of the Bible must be allowed to pursue its course unhindered, and that its assured results must be accepted, however much they might conflict with traditional beliefs. The battle has been won. Even those theologians who are most contemptuous of Liberal theology, do not, for the most part, call in question the legitimacy of scientific study of the Biblical text. Probably the debt which we owe to Liberal Protestantism for facing honestly the disturbing results of critical study will be forgotten, but it is a real debt which we of the Modern Churchmen's Union should be glad to recognize. Another common characteristic of the movement was its comparative indifference, rising in some cases to hostility, to dogmatic theology. Strangely enough, when we remember the earlier history of Liberal Protestantism, this was often associated with a distrust of philosophy and of the intellect. The thesis of Harnack's *History of Dogma*, one of the key works of the period, is that the original gospel was contaminated by the intrusion of Greek thought and the attempt to present Christianity as intellectually coherent. Though this would not be true of all Liberal Protestants, there were certainly not a few who were content with Harnack's view that the essence of Christianity consisted in the two closely related beliefs, the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man.

Very much of the spiritual power of Liberal Protestantism arose from its enthusiasm for the Kingdom of God. In my opinion, its conception of the nature of the Kingdom was mistaken in many points and depended on a misinterpretation of the New Testament, but that does not prevent me from honouring the zeal for social righteousness which it inspired. The 'Social Gospel,' as proclaimed by some of the more political Liberal Protestants, no doubt was open to criticism both from the theological and the economic points of view, but it had the great merit of insisting on the relevance of the Christian faith to the life of the community. The tendency to adopt a humanistic and sociological interpretation was carried, in some quarters, to disturbing lengths and combined with the revolt against dogma to produce some startling results. I suppose that the U.S.A. was the field where radical Liberal Protestantism had the largest following. Perhaps I may be allowed to illustrate one of its phases by a personal reminiscence. In the period between the wars I was asked to address a conference at Harvard of Christian leaders in Universities. Not knowing much about the conditions of American student life, I

chose what I imagined would be a subject on which there would be general argeement — the Christian belief in God. Somewhat to my surprise I found that my discourse and its subject were regarded by many of my hearers as unduly dogmatic, and it emerged in discussion that a considerable number of these ' Christian leaders ' did not in fact believe in God, nor did they feel that this was at all in conflict with their claim to be Christians. When they used the word ' God,' I think they meant by it a symbolical representation of the spirit, or the aspirations, of the community. I do not, of course, for one moment suggest that these young men represented the view of responsible Liberal Protestants, but I confess that from that time I took more seriously than I had before the criticism that Liberal Protestantism might end in Humanism and perceived more clearly that the Christian religion could not survive without a body of doctrine.

A natural transition leads me to such suggestions as I am able to offer on the causes for the decline of Liberal Protestantism. We ought not to pass over the obvious historical cause. The world in which Liberal Protestantism was at home came to an end. The assumption that peaceful progress and the growth of knowledge would prevail was shattered and the atmosphere in which liberalism of every kind could breathe freely was dissipated. Though there were many noble exceptions, it must be admitted that, when the time came for the Church in Germany and elsewhere to face a deadly attack on its freedom to worship, it was not, on the whole, Liberal Protestants who led the resistance. At that time of stress it was the men who held fast to the Confession of Faith, to the dogmatic system, who stood in the breach against the dictates of a tyrannical state. And in that time of crisis and the shaking of civilization the minds of many turned to the ancient doctrines of orthodox Christianity with a new understanding. The ideas of original sin, of the demonic power of evil, of the divine judgment of the need for salvation from the evil world by a redemptive act of God came to be relevant and urgent. It was not that these doctrines became suddenly clear and intelligible. They remained ultimately mysteries, as they had always been, but they appeared to be consonant with the character of the world and of human life. They seemed, so to speak, more up to date than Liberal Protestantism, because they expressed the tragedy of life and the sense of crisis. We are still in the crisis, and there is little prospect that the optimism of Liberal Protestantism, or its conception of the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God, will return in strength.

No doubt, in so far as Liberal Protestantism failed, it failed

ecause of its own limitations. I have glanced at some of them nd I will not repeat what I have said. The disregard of philosophy nd of the foundations of theology turned out to be a fatal weak-ess. Confronted with world-views, or with theories of knowledge, hich were hostile to faith, it had no thought-out system to oppose them, and too often its reply could be dismissed as mere senti-ent or a vague appeal to 'values.'

We may note that Professor Paul Tillich, who is certainly the tradition of Liberal Protestantism, has definitely abandoned arnack's theme that in the development of dogma the gospel was tellectualized and, as the fruits of his life-time of reflection, is ving us a systematic theology. Liberal Protestantism, it may be id, staked all on the Historical Jesus and confidently expected discover, when the trappings of dogma were stripped away, one ose teaching and character would appeal directly to the idealism the progressive Modern Man. In a sense, it was right. The istorical Jesus is the centre of the Christian faith and we can ver relax our efforts to understand Him. But the Historical sus does not so easily emerge when we have stripped the dog-tic trappings away. I do not want to raise the controversial estion of the validity of Schweiter's criticism of the 'Jesus of story' as seen by Liberal Protestantism, but at least we may say t there are reasons to doubt whether the Person disclosed in the spels is not more deeply mysterious than Liberal Protestants ught.

Liberal Protestantism, in its later form, drifted away from the ception of the Church which was so important an element in theology of Schleiermacher and also for Ritchlian, and this, nink, was a weakness. It made little of the idea of the Church the Body of Christ. In its more extreme forms it almost came gregard the Church as a voluntary association of like-minded sons. In this it was false to its own tradition and cut itself off m the witness of the continuing experience of the Christian mmunity which meant so much to a Protestant thinker such as leiermacher.

Though Liberal Protestantism of the nineteenth-century type ut of date and has been left behind, it would not be true to say it is dead. It is in a process of self-transcendence. As we have n, it is bursting through its limitations and repairing its omis-ns. Paul Tillich is the outstandng evidence of a development ch we may hope will gather strength. Those who contribute to ave taken over the gifts of the older Liberal Protestant move-t, its Biblical criticism and its free attitude towards orthodox matic theology. They have, however, seen that what needs to

be done is to build again a system of Christian belief based on theory of the nature of religious knowledge and of revelation, on which will at least make sense to the mind of our time and wil incorporate the religious insights and experiences which foun their expression in the traditonal dogmas. If we may judge fro what has already been done in this field, the new Liberal Protes tantism will not make the mistake of despising Christian mysticism but will incorporate its witness in its constructive presentation o the Christian faith.

If in conclusion I may take a glance over the hedge into m neighbour's field, I would suggest that the constructive work o the Liberal Protestant of the new type does not differ in essenc from what is being done by Liberal Catholics. No doubt there ar divergences of approach, but there is the same end in view. On of the disasters of the Modernist movement in the past has bee the conflict between the two schools of theological liberalism which led the Liberal Protestants to proclaim with unnecesar emphasis that they were not Catholic and Liberal Catholics to di own all connexion with Protestantism. We may hope that th puerility is a thing of the past and that liberal-minded men of bot traditions will concentrate on the common task of interpreting th Christian gospel to the present age. I do not doubt that, if th happens, they will converge. Here is the most promising path t Christian unity — unity in the truth will be prepared by unity i the search for truth.

LIBERAL CATHOLICISM

By the Rev. D. J. W. Bradley, Vicar of St. Luke's, Battersea,
lately Vice-Principal of Cuddesdon College

T is, of course, a truism to say that the word 'liberal' sticks in the gullet of most men of my generation and that it is therefore rather a bold venture for me to embark here, as I am required to do, I imagine, on the task of presenting an apologia for that liberal version of traditional Catholicism which, as I understand it, is characteristic of Anglicanism at its best. Both Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals within the Anglican communion are inclined these days to repudiate Liberalism of any kind because they equate it with humanism, and Christian Humanism is, for them, a contradiction in terms. I shall then be concerned in this paper with demonstrating that Christian Humanism is still defensible and that its maintenance is, in fact, a primary interest for Christendom at this particular juncture in its history. First, a disclaimer—I am *not* pleading for Catholic Modernism. As I see it, Catholic Modernism was a betrayal of essential Christian insights, a capitulation to a temporary mood in philosophy, governed primarily by Hegelianism and evolutionary scientific theory, an ephemeral nineteenth century phenomenon. Liberal Catholicism has its roots far deeper in Christian tradition and its pedigree is traceable back to third and fourth century Alexandrian theology, to thirteenth century Thomism and to the New Learning of the sixteenth century Renaissance. It is an abiding phenomenon in healthy Christendom, authenticated by both apostolic and patristic tradition as well as by subsequent developments in Christian thought and action, and its recognition is all the more important and urgent, now that perfervid enthusiasts orientated towards either a post-Tridentine Catholicism *contra mundum* or a crisis-ridden Geneva seek to discredit it to the grave peril of disputable Christendom.

It was the depreciation of Humanism in the Church Assembly's Report entitled 'Towards the Conversion of England,' published in 1945, which first sharpened my awareness of the division between Christianity and Humanism. One of the sections of that Report is entitled 'Humanism the Age-old Lie.' 'Humanism' we read 'is the word now commonly used to describe that view of life which sees in man the source of all meaning and value, instead of in God. All down human history these two attitudes to life have been in conflict.' The Report goes on to assert that the Fall was brought about by man's adoption of a

humanistic attitude towards life. Humanism in the Middle Ages was held in check by the very nature of the social structure itself but in modern times it has been nourished by scientific progress. Down to 1914 man seemed to have every excuse for cherishing the illusion that the momentum gathered since the Renaissance and the Cartesian Revolution, whereby man had escaped from the debilitating tutelage of tradition and embarked upon his career of unfettered progress, would carry him inevitably on to the goal of an earthly Utopia. This illusion, however, the Report affirms, has been rudely shattered by the experience of two world wars and man is now becoming painfully aware that his man-centred cosmology may well lead him to commit race-suicide with that very weapon (scientific progress) which he once hoped would help him win his way through to Utopia. The implication of the whole Report is that here is a situation ripe for exploitation in the interests of religion! Humanism has failed. Why not try Christianity? Humanism and Christianity are presented in complete antithesis the one to the other.

Now we must all, of course, agree that the two are antithetical if we allow Humanism to be defined as the Report defines it, *i.e.* as a view of life which sees in man the source of all meaning and value instead of in God. But do we allow this? Surely if we do 'Christian Humanism' becomes just as much a misnomer as some people believe 'Christian Socialism' to be. The two terms would be mutually exclusive. Many of us, however, would not feel able to agree that 'Christian Humanism' is a contradiction in terms and we could find a strong measure of support in Christian tradition for our contention to the contrary. Is Humanism not rather a vital force making for cultural advance without which Western man would stagnate as so many of the Eastern races have done, and may it not be 'baptised' by the Church and utilized in the process of Redemption? The Report 'Toward the Conversion of England' in damning Humanism out of hand without reservation served to convince me that Barthian transcendentalism, which postulates the same antithesis between Christianity and Humanism, had succeeded in gaining a greater measure of ascendency in the Church of England than I had hitherto thought possible, in view of the distinctive traditions of that Church. For I had, for some time, whether rightly or wrongly been accustomed to thinking of the Church of England, in contradistinction to the other Churches of Western Christendom, both Roman and Reformed, as par excellence the Church of the Renaissance. At the Council of Trent the Roman Church had, as Wilfrid Ward put it, declared a State of Siege. 'Invested by the

hosts of Protestantism and Secularism,' writes Maisie Ward in ner book entitled *The Wilfrid Wards and the Transition* (Vol. I, op. vi-vii), 'she' (*i.e. the Roman Church*) 'had drawn within her entrenchments, refused intellectual parley with a hostile world and concentrated on arming and drilling her subjects for the defence of the City to the comparative neglect of its normal development.' Here was a case of deliberate arrested development and the *status quo* selected as permanently normative was broadly speaking the 'Medieval Synthesis' achieved by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. It is indeed ironical that such a reactionary policy should have been adopted under the aegis of him, who, according to Lord Acton, might well dispute with the Devil the claim to the title of 'the first Whig'!—but so it was, and the history of the Roman Church ever since has only served to show how indissoluble is her marriage with a synthesis which its original exponent would probably have regarded as provisional merely. So the Roman Church had decided to repudiate the new Renaissance insights. Similarly the Continental Reformation, both Lutheran and Calvinistic, may be regarded as a reaction against, rather than as a product of, the Renaissance. In England alone, it seemed to me, could a clear causal connexion be established between the Renaissance and the Reformation, if it were allowed that the first impetus making for the Reformation of the Church in England and the driving force which for the most part sustained it in its progress and certainly determined the end-product was supplied not by the remnants of Lollardy nor by the Cambridge purveyors of Lutheran theology, but by the scholars and thinkers, both at Oxford and Cambridge, who brought the critical Renaissance insights to bear upon theology and produced the 'New Learning,' *i.e.* men like Colet, Erasmus, More and Pole whom Dr. T. M. Lindsay describes as 'Christian Humanists.' True, there was a time during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I when Calvinism captured the schools of divinity at both universities and threatened to quench for ever the more humane spirit which had inspired the first English Reformers, but the reign of Calvinism was short and when, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Church of England acquired some kind of equilibrium after her chequered career during the two preceding centuries it was a more liberal tradition which prevailed, as Dr. G. R. Cragg has recently shown in his work entitled *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (Cambridge, 1950). This liberal tradition, which has ever since remained the dominant influence in the Church of England, was well exemplified in the latter part of the seventeenth century by

the Cambridge Platonists. Confronted with a widespread disgust at the extremes of Laudianism and Puritanism and with a climate of thought in which natural science, with its new inductive method of reasoning, was rapidly eclipsing traditional theology, which employed the deductive method, the Cambridge Platonists sought to steer a middle course, which Simon Patrick called 'virtuous mediocrity,' between what the same divine called 'the meretricious gaudiness of Rome and the squalid sluttery of the fanatic conventicles,' and to effect a synthesis between religion and that natural science which was fast becoming the dominant factor in the intellectual climate. They readily accepted what must always remain a cardinal principle of humanism, a high estimate of the capacity of human reason for arriving at truth, but they insisted on its God-given character and on the, at least, complementary value of the insights afforded by revelation and mystical contemplation. Moreover they were convinced that the scientific quest, rightly pursued, could only lead to a deeper understanding of God as he is revealed in the natural universe which he has created.

As Dr. Cragg observes, 'The notable feature of seventeenth century intellectual life was the development of natural science. The detailed study of the physical world was preparing the way for a wholly new understanding of its character. One of the tasks confronting religious thought was to meet the consequences of this new knowledge and to weave its findings into the fabric of a spiritual view of life. *The attitude which merely renounced the world could never have faced this problem in a constructive way* (op. cit. p. 53). It was the Cambridge Platonists—Cudworth, Smith and Whichcote—who made the most notable contribution in this direction by reverting to the world-affirming tradition established by the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and refusing to regard Christianity and secular culture as necessarily antithetical. It was they who, as Dr. Raven has shown, provided the scientist John Ray with a faith for living and thinking and enabled him to remain at once a scientist and a Christian. As Dr. Raven puts it, 'They gave him a theology in which reason and science could find full exercise, and the highest kind of mysticism go harmoniously with observation and exact knowledge' (*John Ray, Naturalist*, Cambridge, 1942).

The adoption of this attitude towards the new knowledge by some Anglican theologians served the Church of England well for, in the following century, it supplied the Church with the means of defeating the formidable menace of Deism. It is hardly conceivable that Bishop Butler could have taken the line he did

n his *Analogy of Religion*, using the insights of natural science o deliver the *coup de grâce* to Deism, had there not been a well-established tradition in his Church in favour of viewing secular culture and scientific progress as allies rather than foes.

In the nineteenth century when the Church of England had to face the crisis constituted for her by a State and a culture growing increasingly secularized, this central liberal tradition was still not left without witnesses. Prominent amongst them was Dr. Thomas Arnold of Rugby, the heir of the Oriel Noetic School against which the Tractarians had reacted. 'For him,' writes Prof. Basil Willey in his 'Nineteenth Century Studies' (p. 54) 'for him the worst apostasy, the source of all woes, was the separation of things secular from things spiritual; this meant, on the one hand, the handing over of all temporal concerns to the devil or to the operation of natural laws, and, on the other, the retreat of religion into priestly inutilities. The first was the sin of the Evangelicals and Puritans. The second, that of the 'Oxford Malignants.' Like the Cambridge Platonists, he stands as a middle-man between High Church and Puritan; his place is in the succession which descends from Hooker, through the Platonists to Coleridge, and leads on through F. D. Maurice to William Temple.' Later in the century it was the same central liberal tradition which eventually persuaded the Church of England fearlessly to accept the assured results of the application of the critical method to the Scriptures while the Roman Church set up the Biblical Commission which enabled her to make a show of assent to the scientific method, advocated adroitly but rather unconvincingly, perhaps deliberately so, by Pope Leo XIII, and, at the same time, to remain intransigently impervious to its more disconcerting deliverances. This work of analysis has proved to be the indispensable prelude to the synthetic achievement of modern Biblical scholarship which has done so much to produce a new 'Church-consciousness' of advantage to orthodoxy. In 1931 Hoskyns and Davey had written 'There can be no advance in the interpretation of the New Testament until this work be done upon the basis of the older literary analysis' (*Riddle of the New Testament*, p. 101) and the sequel has confirmed this judgement. At the conclusion of this enterprise, though it has been little more than a sleeping partner, the Roman Church has not scrupled to press its claim as the residuary legatee, and if 'Form-Criticism' has, in fact, as Prof. R. H. Lightfoot is reputed once to have observed, 'led straight to Rome,' it is to the candour of Anglican and Reformed scholars rather than to the timidity and pusillanimity of her own, that the Roman Church is indebted for this novel form of apologetic.

Thus a fair case can be made out for regarding Christian Humanism as an essential differentia of the Church of England serving to distinguish her from other communions and it may with some justice be claimed that her central liberal tradition has made a contribution which has been of value not only to herself but to the whole of Christendom. Through her loyalty to this tradition she has helped to keep alive in Christendom a spirit of free enquiry and adaptability which if it has often been far to seek, on the official level, at least, in most contemporary Churches, can be shown to have certainly not been absent from the Church in earlier ages. For if in the early Church, largely due to the social level from which she recruited most of her converts, a more obscurantist spirit, reflected in Tertullian's dictum '*Quid Athenae Hierosolymis?*' prevailed, a different spirit was not slow to assert itself once the Church began to attract to her ranks men of more liberal culture, and it has in the past been the peculiar glory of the Church of England that it has insistently borne witness to the tradition established by the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and by St. Thomas Aquinas, who sought to express the faith of the Church in terms of contemporary secular thought.

A whole-hearted capitulation on the part of Anglicanism to a Barthian transcendentalism, with its denial of the Christian value of humanism, such as the report *Towards the Conversion of England*, and many other indices of the contemporary trend of Anglicanism would seem to imply, would spell apostasy to what I have called the central Anglican tradition, and such an apostasy would surely be a disaster, not only for Anglicanism, but also for the whole of Christendom, in so far as it has learned to look to Anglicanism for the very contribution which she now seems in danger of repudiating, and without which the *raison d'être* of Anglicanism as a separate ecclesiastical system would be hard to establish. For there is no place in Barth's system for a recognition of the intrinsic value of human culture, whether spiritual or intellectual. The life of faith, for Barth, is a life of expectancy and alertness for the word of God, punctuated at certain points, arbitrarily determined by the divine initiative, by vertical encounters with the Word of God which has no sequential relation with man's ordinary experience and cultural development. But the question remains, would this be an unmitigated disaster? Has the concern in the central Anglican tradition for Christian humanism in fact been consistent with the Biblical insights to which Karl Barth insistently appeals, and which Anglicanism itself has always regarded as its ultimate control? A superficial observer might be excused for the judgment that rigorism and Philistinism find more

support in the New Testament than humanism; but if we look deeper, the foundations of Christian humanism may be discerned even within the New Testament. A specific, and by no means unsympathetic attitude towards the natural order is perhaps implied by the saving acts themselves, notably by the Incarnation and the Ascension, whereby an eternal significance is conferred upon the natural order. At the Incarnation, God took flesh, presented the example of a holy life of obedience within its limiting conditions, and used it in the work of redemption. At the Ascension, this divinised flesh was incorporated for all eternity in the Godhead. It is unthinkable that there could be a contradiction within the Godhead. We are then left to infer, with St. Thomas, that there must be an essential correspondence between divine and human nature. Bishop Wordsworth put it admirably in his hymn on the Ascension, 'Thou hast raised our human nature in the clouds to God's right hand.'

Then again, assorting ill with the Barthian estimate of humanism, is the New Testament doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body. Throughout the New Testament it is affirmed that the eschatological event which will inaugurate the Age to Come will be accompanied by 'the resurrection of the body.' Now 'the body' in the New Testament 'symbolises' as Dr. J. Robinson puts it ('In the End, God') 'the corporate solidarity of every person in the natural, historical and cosmic order.' Our posession of 'sarx' and 'psyche' which, together, constitute the 'soma,' crafts us irrevocably into this solidarity of nature: it is our correspondence with the Spirit of God which partially disengages us from this solidarity and endows us each with individual personality. Through his possession of the Spirit man, in a measure, transcends the natural order, but not entirely. Through our possession of bodies our fate is permanently tied up with that of the natural order: thus it is that when Christ died on the Cross He wrought not merely individual redemption but *cosmic* redemption. 'For' writes St. Paul in Col. i, 19-20, 'it was the good pleasure of the Father that in him should all the fullness dwell; and through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross: through him, I say, whether things upon the earth or things in the heavens.' As the fall had involved the whole creation so must the redemption. 'The Christian Gospel,' writes Dr. Robinson, 'is not of the saving of individuals out of nature and history . . . but the redeeming of all the myriad relationships of existence into a new heaven and a new earth, the City of God, the Body of Christ.' God will finally be 'all in all' when the whole creation, including ourselves, the

Solidarity or Body of Nature, has been incorporated into the Solidarity of Grace in the Body of Christ. This is what is meant by the 'resurrection of the Body.' 'For we know,' writes St. Paul (Rom. viii, 22-23) 'that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only so, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.' The marriage relationship, which, perhaps, more than any other human relationship, commits the whole man fully on all levels, spiritual, mental and physical, is the point at which the tension between religion and humanism is apt to be felt most acutely; in it man is most keenly aware of himself as a denizen of two worlds; and, significantly enough, it is this which St. Paul uses in the Epistle to the Ephesians as a parable of redemption. 'For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh. This mystery is great: but I speak in regard of Christ and of the church' (v. 31-32). Our natural intuition is that it would be unthinkable for us to be redeemed *out of* this relationship, only in it; yet so much that is characteristic of this relationship depends upon the fleshly union. If the value of the relationship in any real sense is to be preserved in eternity something corresponding to the 'one flesh' into which husband and wife have grown must perforce persist. 'We cannot,' says Dr Robinson (p. 92) 'talk of history being "taken up" into the kingdom of God if the individualities of relationship that make it what it is are simply ironed out . . . the particularity of relation between say, husband and wife, is something that cannot perish without destroying an element integral to the "body" of both.' If man is redeemed *in* and not *out of* his marriage relationship there would seem, *pace* Barth, to be some warrant for a Christian Naturalism or Humanism.

But finally, where Barth seems to me to be most at odds with New Testament insights, is in his repudiation of any synchronism between the pace of human cultural development and divine revelation. He fails here to take account of the Biblical conception of 'kairos.' Two words are used in the New Testament for 'time'—'kairos' and 'chronos.' They are not truly synonymous. As. Dr. Robinson has put it: 'Kairos is time considered in relation to personal action, in reference to ends to be achieved in it. Chronos is time abstracted from such a relation, time as it were that ticks on objectively and impersonally whether anything is happening or not; it is time measured by the chronometer not by purpose, momentary rather than momentous' (p. 46). Perhaps

may best illustrate the difference between the two words by means of two examples. If I say 'I want that essay in by 10 a.m. to-morrow morning' I am thinking in terms of 'chronos'—for there is no particular significance about 10 a.m. to-morrow morning: it just happens to suit me, but it may not suit the student. On the other hand, if I say to my Parochial Church Council soon after my institution: 'It is highly desirable that reservation, six candles, incense, vestments and Benediction should be introduced, but the time at which they will be introduced will be contingent upon the death of one or two of the more prejudiced members of the congregation, the acquiescence or enthusiasm of the remainder and my judgment as to when the time is ripe,' then, I am thinking in terms of 'kairos'! Something happens at the 'kairos,' rather than the 'chronos,' when the determining factor is a personal purpose which respects and takes into account the personal context. Now it is significant that when the time of God's revelation to man in Christ is referred to in the New Testament the word used is generally 'kairos.' It was at the appropriate 'kairos' that the Incarnation took place. St. John the Baptist heralding the coming of Christ says: 'The kairos is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand' (*Mark* i, 14). Now God could hardly have judged the time appropriate unless he saw a relation between his intervention and the stage reached in human cultural and religious development. Human religious and cultural development was not the sole determining factor, but it was a factor which God took into account when he decided on the time at which it should take place, *i.e.* human cultural and religious development was a factor considered by God significant in relation to his redeeming purpose. Karl Barth seems to ignore this essential Biblical insight and to suggest that the Incarnation took place at a 'chronos' arbitrarily determined by God's fiat rather than at the 'kairos' which was appropriate to the contemporary human religious and cultural situation. He makes no allowance as the New Testament seems to for a *præparatio evangelica* in human cultural and religious development.

A fair measure of support may then be adduced from both Scripture and Tradition for Christian Humanism. It is true that while we are still *in via* a tension is bound to persist for us between the natural and the supernatural orders, but our progressive incorporation in the Christ, Who spans both orders, opens up the prospect of an ultimate resolution of this tension. The tension will, however, be resolved not by the complete elimination or supersession of the natural order but by its redemption. Thus the natural order is seen to have a permanent value in relation to

the supernatural order and, this being so, Christian Humanism is authentic.

A humanism which erects the natural order into an autonomous absolute and ignores or denies the supernatural order is, of course, incompatible with Christianity, but a transcendentalism which denies any permanent value to the natural order in relation to the supernatural order is no less so. Man's pride must be deflated, but not so as to deny all validity to ordinary human incentives, to rob man of the sense of significance which he acquires in work and to stultify human endeavour. If an excessive 'hubris' is to be detected in 'Scientific Humanism' it is certainly not apparent in the great mass of people to-day who are characterised rather by what Dr. H. H. Farmer calls their 'failure of nerve,' and to this the present anti-humanistic tendency in theology ministers only too faithfully. Moreover if there were dangers in nineteenth century Liberalism (and no one is tempted to-day to minimize those dangers) it had within itself, in the superlative importance which it attached to human reason, a certain capacity for correcting its own excesses. Its inheritance of the principle *Semper reformandum est* was one of its most encouraging features from the Christian point of view, but the denigration of reason in so much modern theology has served to subvert this principle and to exstinguish the very element in Liberalism which provided the ground of hope for its redemption. The complete lack of sympathy with Scientific Humanism which prevails in some Christian circles serves only to drive it further into the outer darkness and with it the whole of modern civilization in so far as it has come to look to it, primarily, as its beacon light. It should surely be an urgent concern of the Religion of the Incarnation for which nothing human is alien, to arrest this movement which can, left it to own devices, end only in disaster, by an exercise of imaginative and loving identification, and in this Liberal Catholicism can assist us greatly.

ENGLISH LIBERAL NONCONFORMITY

By the Rev. E. L. Allen, Ph.D., D.D., King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

FIFTY years ago a representative of the Free Churches, rising to address an audience drawn mainly from the Anglican communion, might well have been conscious of some suspicion on their part, while he would himself have needed to be on his guard against any suggestion of hostility in his tone. Happily, the position is quite different to-day, and even in circles less disposed to charity than this one, such a situation could be accepted as quite normal. Not, of course, that all distinctions between us have been obliterated. The traditional bias of Nonconformity towards individualism remains, even under the welfare state. Further, while we read one another's books in these days, so that the Congregational manse is well-stocked with Temple and Gore books—you will forgive me if I do not mention any contemporaries—and the Anglican curate dips into Vincent Taylor as he prepares his sermon, the ties between the Church of Scotland and the Free Churches are still much closer than those between the two Established Churches in the United Kingdom. I want to touch briefly on three points at which we see how great the change has been.

First, there is no longer any public controversy between the Free Churches and the Church of England. We may cross swords over the necessity of bishops and what exactly is meant by the title 'bishop,' we may smile over one another's peculiarities, but we no longer provide the world with the unedifying spectacle of Christians rending one another. The long-standing education controversy that had been the despair of successive Presidents of the Board of Education, proved quite tractable in the course of the second world-war, because we felt on both sides that it was finally not decent to quarrel about such matters any longer. I should commend the pamphlet *The Free Churches and the State*, by Ernest A. Payne, as an excellent example of the new attitude that seems to many of us the obviously right one. At the same time, I should perhaps say that a good deal needs to be done on both sides to clear away misunderstandings that have been forgotten by our leaders but linger on among the rank and file.

Second, this marked improvement in relations between the Church of England and the Free Churches has its parallel in the political sphere, where new alignments have rendered absurd the old easy identification of the Church of England with the Conservative party and the Free Churches with the Liberal party. The

removal of the last social disabilities under which Nonconformist suffered meant that they had no longer a political objective t unite them. At the same time, a far-reaching change came ove our politics when, at the beginning of the century, goverment began to interfere in industry and trade for purposes of socia reform. The Nonconformist conscience was only in part prepare for the new development, while thanks to men like Gore and Scot Holland, the Anglican conscience proved to be far better pre pared than many had anticipated. It can no longer be assume that if you know where a man worships on Sunday you can predic how he will vote at the next election. While I suspect that th proportion of Free Church ministers whose sympathies ar Liberal in the political sense is still high, there is no longer th overt alliance there once was.

Third, in some ways the most remarkable change that ha come over the Free Churches in my lifetime, I would say witho hesitation, is the growth of Church-conscionsness. The positio of the Presbyterians is somewhat different, because we have neve thought of ourselves as 'chapel' and our tradition on this point summed up in Carnegie Simpson's injunction to his students: 'E High Churchmen, gentlemen, not high clericals!' The ecumen cal movement has captured the imagination of the Free Churc ministry, our younger men insist that they are as 'Catholic' a any one, and the right of private judgment has largely give place to the demand that the Bible be read and interpreted with the Church. So great has the change been that a book like Em Brunner's *The Misunderstanding of the Church* tends to be rea by a Free Churchman to-day as a challenge to his positio whereas half a century ago he would have rejoiced in it as confirmation of what he had always stood for.

I have been concerned to state what has happened and not pass any judgment upon it. But, if there is any truth in what have said, it follows that one who speaks for Liberal Nonco formity to-day may well not differ noticeably from an Anglica I am one of the many Free Churchmen who feel that there is point in wrangling as to which of us has made more mistakes the past, we have enough to do to work together in the prese for the Christian good of England. I shall therefore speak simp as one who happens to be within Nonconformity, without a attempt to give a special flavour of some kind to what I say. seems to me that we have learned much in the last fifty years, ought to have done so. I trust that we have profited even fr some of the theological movements to which we have been m opposed, and that we are ready to ask what new questions are bei

forced upon us now and how we are to answer them. I shall try to deal with four topics, the place of the Bible in theology, our view of man, the problem of communication, and Christology.

I

Whatever our quarrel with Barth on other points may be, we are indebted to him for re-introducing the category of revelation into our thinking and writing. The older Liberalism was too much concerned with religion as one of the interests and activities of the human spirit, as a form of spiritual culture in fact. As such, it might only too easily degenerate into a vague religiosity, cosmic emotion or something of that kind. But all religion, even the most primitive, appeals to something that has been done by a higher power than man, to a divine disclosure on which he can rely. The movement from man to God is in response to a prior movement from God to man. A God who did not reveal and offer himself, who waited for man to find him out, would not be a God to command our worship. For the Christian, there is a connection of some kind between the revelation of God and the Bible, particularly the New Testament. To be a Christian means to be grounded in the Bible, to draw upon the tradition that comes down to us from prophet and apostle. So far, it seems to me, we must go with neo-orthodoxy.

We were told, when Barth made his first public appearance, that this was no mere return to fundamentalism. That was certainly the case. I remember asking a Dutch Reformed minister whose particular communion would not associate itself with the World Council of Churches why it took up such an attitude. He replied in genuine distress and horror that the World Council stood condemned by the fact that it had allowed the Amsterdam Assembly to be addresseed by a rank Modernist like Karl Barth. I would say that Barth is guilty of appealing to the Bible *simpliciter*, when in fact he is appealing to the Bible as illuminated by the liberal scholarship of last century. But if he can plead not guilty to the charge of fundamentalism, he does, especially in his *Dogmatik*, use the Bible as a store-house of proof-texts. He does work with the naïve identification of truth in religion with that which can be deduced from Scripture. The Lutheran criticism that he confuses faith with knowledge seems to me fundamentally sound. The Bible becomes for him a source of inside information about the supernatural world.

We on our side have to make up our minds just what value we assign to the Bible and the statements in it. It would be generally

agreed outside the Roman Church that the content of revelation is not propositional but personal. God, that is to say, communicates himself and not information about himself, though such information may no doubt legitimately be deduced from the personal meeting that is the primary thing. I suggest that we have to carry this principle farther than neo-orthodoxy has been willing to go. The Bible, as we have said so often, is not a text-book of ancient history or natural science. Nor is it a text-book of theology not even an unsystematic one that requires to be thrown into shape by some present-day scholar. The function of the Bible is to introduce us to God himself, it subserves that personal and life-enriching encounter that it speaks of as 'the knowledge of God.' It can do this because it has grown out of other men's encounters with God and preserves for us still the divine-human dialogue with enough of its original power to enable us to participate in this ourselves in our turn.

The Bible does not as such give us any information about God that can be taken over as it stands. It so brings us to him as to set us free to seek and find him where we stand in the world to-day. His truth awaits us there, where as the living God he enters into our situation. The Bible calls us to find him there at our own responsibility, and enables to do so. Theological reflection is bound to no authority that enables us to answer our questions. In theology, as in religion, we live with the kind of question that cannot be answered, and we do so in the strength of a personal loyalty. As Christians, we are committed to the God who reveals himself in Jesus Christ, alike in the Bible, in the Church and in personal experience. But just because of that commitment we are free over against every statement ever made about God whether in the Bible or outside it. Only the truth that is truth for us may command our service. We stand faithfully within the Christian tradition, but only where it convinces us personally are we able to live by it.

II

What I have just said about the Bible leads on to my second topic, the problem of communication. This has been raised for us afresh by Rudolf Bultmann in his suggestion that the New Testament needs to be demythologized. I remember how this problem came home to me as an officer in the first World War. More than once, as I sat in a church service while home on leave, I said to myself: 'Suppose you had marched your platoon into church this morning, how much of what is going on would they have

nderstood?' and I had to admit that it would largely have been neaningless to them. A commission appointed between the wars y the Church of Scotland actually suggested that we need two ypes of church, or at least of service, one for those who are teeped in the Christian tradition and are familiar with its lan- uage, and one for the outsider. Had their suggestion been acted n, it would, of course, have been necessary soon to create some ntermediary institution by which people could pass over from ne to the other. Too often to-day theology is practised as so pecialised a discipline that it is unintelligible except to those who ave acquired its peculiar language.

Let me state the problem as I see it, and, I think, substantially s Bultmann sees it. The only adequate language for the expres- on and communication of religious insights is that of myth, mbol, image, drama, and so on. To have power, such symbols ust accord with the world-view of the culture within which they ise; only so can they carry conviction and bind great numbers of en together in a spiritual community. But the culture changes d the world-view with it, so that symbols that were once fresh d potent become strange and incredible. They no longer give e but have to be maintained alive by the resolution of those who ill employ them. The European mind is no longer fascinated the horrors of hell and the bliss of heaven, though it is still ssible to enjoy Dante and Milton. Santayana's identification religion and poetry expresses what is in the minds of many of r contemporaries. It is extraordinarily beautiful, no doubt, but just isn't true.

There is only one way in which this situation can be effectively alt with, and that is the emergence of a new prophet who can e new forms to the truth that is eternal. We need new symbols t will convince and transform our whole civilization. We can y for this, we can prepare for it, but we cannot ourselves bring about. Our task is the humbler but still necessary one of trans- ing the Christian symbols into the language of our time as best can. We must find a language in which to speak of God, rist, and eternal life to men and women whose minds have been med by modern technology. Christian love forbids that we uld join the company of those who say to their fellows: 'This he word of God, take it or leave it at your own risk.' We are ily guilty concerning our brother if we make no effort to speak language, but require him instead to learn ours.

I think we must admit that liberals have often gone too far, t instead of commending the gospel to the modern mind, they e revised it so as to make it acceptable thereto. Bultmann is

surely right when he warns us against the kind of translation
the gospel that would eliminate the offence of the Cross. Wh
we should be concerned to do is to remove all needless offence
due to the employment of traditional language that is no long
intelligible, that men may be unable to evade the challenge th
is in Christ himself. I have read expositions of Christian doctrin
by modernist theologians that seem to me to substitute for th
faith something else. I am sure we should be on our guard again
such a surrender of the substance of the gospel while revising th
form in which it is presented. We need to preserve our freedo
over against the modern mind, neither capitulating to it n
opposed to it on principle. The Christian thinker should engag
in a conversation with his time, ready to learn from it but n
afraid to challenge it in the name of his Lord.

III

I come now to what is perhaps the most important of all th
changes with which we are here concerned. I refer to the revelatio
of the tragic qualities of human life that has come to us throug
two world wars, with their attendant economic distress an
ideological fanaticism. Liberal Protestantism allowed itself to l
too closely bound up with the success and security of our Weste
world, so that it was in mortal danger when these began to pa
away. But now it seems almost to have become a point of hono
with theologians not to say a good word for human natur
'Original sin' has come into favour again, though few take th
trouble to explain exactly what they understand by it. One mig
be happier if all this were indicative of a genuine religious insig
seeking expression. But this is only partly the case. It is no me
coincidence, I suggest, that neo-orthodoxy is so close to the moo
of our time, with its cynicism and its crippling sense of impotenc
The fact that a previous generation mistook the contempora
optimism for God's truth is no reason why we should surrender
the contemporary pessimism.

What have we in fact seen during these last thirty years
so? We have seen the return of cruelties and barbarities we ha
thought banished once for all from our civilization, the allian
of bestiality and science, the mass-worship of a charlatan, an
the elaboration of techniques for the destruction of hum
freedom. But this is not all. We have seen the capacity of t
human spirit to defy and survive all that may be done to destr
it, hope, charity, and even forgiveness flowering amid the shamb
of Buchenwald. Some of us have known personally men wh
released from a concentration camp, have refused to hate th

rturers, or who, at the call of conscience, have gone into exile ther than lend their name to support a regime that millions plauded but that they knew to be evil. In other words, we see an to-day as the wisest have always seen their fellows, as rangely compounded of good and evil, neither beast nor saint, t with the possibility of both in him. And the highest wisdom all, that of Christ, refuses to envisage man as merely what he ; it looks for what he can become and helps to bring that to pass.

Perhaps the existentialist philosophy that is making itself felt ven in this country now provides some of the best categories in hich to think and speak of man. We shall do well, it may be, t to ascribe to man a nature, lest by so doing we reduce him to mething fixed, static, and analysable. Man is the being who is ways in a situation, and a situation is more than a set of circum-ances. He is himself integral to a situation, it is to no small tent what he makes of it, he must take up an attitude to it, and e attitude he takes up not only makes something of his situation, makes something of him as well. As Heidegger puts it: 'Man that being who not merely is, but who has to do something about hat he is.' He is free and responsible, so that sin is never a tality that has overtaken him or a curse he has inherited from his ncestors; it is something of which he is personally guilty. And an exists only in relations. He is what he is in virtue of his lation at once to God and to his fellows. I say deliberately 'at nce,' for these are not two relations, they are two aspects of one sic and determining relation.

We need, therefore, to work our way through to some more lequate account of man. We need also, I think, to meet the harge that we have thought too lightly of sin. I would say that n belongs in a personal relation to God; it is a breach of the trust put in us when he gave us life and with it gave us one another. that is so, then we best show our understanding of what sin is humility before the God who searches our hearts and charity wards our fellow-men against whom we have sinned, and not all by rash generalizations about the human race, that is, about her people. Beyond that, I will only say that there is need to consider our whole conception of sin in the light of modern ychology. I do not think for a moment that psychology can smiss the consciousness of guilt as morbid, though it can and ould demonstrate that it has often taken morbid forms. When e psychiatrist has dealt with the phobias and insecurities that ake up the patient's suffering, it may be possible for the patient see just what is the remainder, for which he must say 'God be erciful to me a sinner.'

IV

I have little time in which to deal with my last point, but it i not necessary, I imagine, to say much. One of the major achieve ments of the scholarship of last century was the discovery of th historical Jesus. It could be said then with confidence that w were probably nearer to him than any generation since the on that knew him in the flesh. Books were written on his 'spiritua pilgrimage' and his 'self-consciousness,' the whole weight o Christian doctrine was thrown upon the impression his personalit made on the first generation of disciples and still makes upon th Christian. I think it is not going too far to say that for som liberals Jesus displaced God from the centre of religious though and life. Christianity tended to become Jesusolatry. The orthodo were quick to see how illogical this position was, that it in fac gave to Jesus a place in the devotion of the individual to whic he had no right, unless he were more than many liberals woul allow him to be. The worship of a religious genius is idolatry.

It might be possible to employ an effective *tu quoque* here, o course. Much popular piety has, in fact, been guilty of the sam confusion of thought. It can, I think, be argued that the worshi of the humanity of Jesus, whether by Catholic or Protestant savours of idolatry. One daring American theologian has actuall accused the World Council of Churches of idolatry for using th word 'God' of Jesus Christ in its basis. But there is somethin more important at stake here. One of the great needs of our tim is for unity. Our civilization cries out for some one central an unifying loyalty that is not subject to the changes and corruption that attend on all things human. Nietzsche was keenly aware o this when he felt it his duty to proclaim that 'God is dead,' bu shuddered at the avalanche of ruin he saw hurtling upon mankin when once that catastrophe had been grasped. We need t proclaim that God is not dead, that he is the living God, and t attest him as such with our lives. We cannot afford any longer t worship God *and* Christ, we can only worship God *in* Christ, i we and our time are to find this unity that is so much needed.

I have made several attempts myself to show how Christolog may be written in terms of action and not of substance, so tha the human life of Jesus may be thought of as the supreme an decisive deed of God for us men and our salvation. All thes attempts may be mistaken. The task remains, the task of s speaking of Christ that men understand that in dealing with hi they meet, not merely the Second Person of the Trinity while th First remains in the background, but God, the only God there i

od in his judgment and mercy. If anyone has succeeded in ing this, it is the Fourth Evangelist, who insists again and gain that the power and glory of the Son are not his own but the ather's, that he is in the world as the one through whose edience, loyalty, and love God personally draws near to men. ur modernism will be in vain unless we can somehow give to a istracted and confused generation that sense of the reality of od without which it may well perish. To do this we must understand Jesus Christ who belongs at once to history and to evotion that he substantiates the unity of God and does not reaten it.

PROGRESSIVE JUDAISM*

By the Rev. J. W. Parkes, M.A., D.Phil.

F we are to understand the nature of the progressive movement within Judaism we must begin by the realization that both in igin and in structure it presents important differences from the nilar movement within the Christian Churches. In the latter it s the scientific atmosphere of the nineteenth century, together th advances in Biblical scholarship, which invited a new attitude wards inherited Christian traditions and patterns of life and th; and these factors operated within the existing Churches. part from the Roman Church they did not normally lead to dividual excommunications, let alone schisms. The progressives d not have to found separate Churches; and among both clergy d laity men accepting and men rejecting the new thought were be found side by side in the same congregations, the same ological faculties, and the same conferences and religious ganizations.

In the Jewish field the origin of a progressive movement lay the political atmosphere of the end of the eighteenth and the t half of the nineteenth century, and from the beginning it was se Jews who sought and valued their political emancipation o were led thereby into paths of reform. However, the reforms ich they desired to introduce into the practices of the synagogue re almost wholly rejected by the mass of their fellow-Jews, so t they were obliged very early to create and maintain for themves new institutions against which the old fought, and still

*I have used the phrase 'Progressive Judaism' because the word 'liberal' has come to be used, with different nuances in different countries, to denote one section of the Progressive Movement.

fight, an unceasing battle. Thus from the beginning the move ment had a strong political emphasis, and its effects on Jewry wer more akin to the schism of the Reformation than the battles o modernism in nineteenth and twentieth century Churches.

The eighteenth century is one of the darkest periods of Jewis history. In the West of Europe Jews were few, and divided int two very different groups. On one hand was a small minorit largely of Spanish origin, who were wealthy and cultivated, an familiar with European life and thought. But even in the We the majority of Jews were of East European origin and lived live wholly isolated from their Christian environment, and wholl unfamiliar with contemporary European life and thought. I Eastern Europe itself, where the overwhelming majority of th Jewish people were to be found, the separation between Jew an Gentile was complete, and very large numbers of Jews lived ou their lives with no other contact with their Gentile environmer than the most superficial commercial or official dealings. Th 'fence about the Torah,' originally designed to preserve Jewr and Judaism from the influences of a corrupt paganism and fro the hazards of a life lived without political authority or geogra phical unity, had been rendered still more impenetrable by di ferences of language, of costume, of tradition and of custom, s that the barrier between Jews and Gentiles was, in fact an intention, complete. In this situation it seems paradoxical th emancipation and citizenship should have been within their grasp at least in Western Europe. But in truth it was neither sympath with the Jews, nor the recognition that they would make valuabl citizens, which motivated many of those Gentiles who demande the opening of the ghetto doors. It was a philosophy of enlighter ment, as often pagan as Christian in its origin. It was an implic tion of the equality and brotherhood of man, not a consequenc of Christian love or Jewish development.

This was the situation out of which progressive Judaism wa born. Those Jews who sought membership of the full Europea society could not but critize those aspects of Judaism and Jewis life which kept Jews apart and even made them repulsive Gentile eyes. Some, like the great Berlin philosopher, Mos Mendelssohn, sought to bring the Jews themselves to chang their ways and purify their customs and beliefs; the majority those who were able to choose between citizenship and loyalty tradition were too impatient to wait until all Jewry had change They either accepted baptism or declared their abandonment those aspects of their Jewish tradition which emphasized the separateness. For it was their desire and intention no longer

main separate, but to accept all of that fellowship and com-unity with the non-Jew which the grant of equal citizenship ould entail.

What was involved in this situation was made abundantly ear to them by the Gentiles who also accepted the idea of Jewish ancipation. It was that they should regard their religion as a atter of entirely personal and private choice, and reject any pect of it which might make a claim upon their corporate, tional or political loyalty. Thus Clermont Tonnerre in the rench revolutionary assembly demanded that 'everything should granted to the Jews as individuals, and everything should be fused them as a people.' Napoleon, in his convocation of a nhedrin, was primarily concerned to know that Jews regarded emselves as French citizens who would provide conscripts for s imperial armies. It was in line with these demands that we find new note in the Jewish apologetics of the period, including the itings of Moses Mendelssohn himself. Judaism was presented imarily as a system of personal ethics, inculcating into the dividual a high conception of his ethical duties to his neighbours. s individual imperatives were stressed, but its corporate character as ultimately openly rejected.

During the long period of the dispersion which had followed e two wars with Rome there had hitherto never been any tempt, on the part of either Jews or Gentiles, to deny that Jews ere a people. That fact was, indeed, regarded as axiomatic in th the pre-Christian and the Christian treatment accorded to em; and it was accepted by both Jew and Gentile in spite of e lack of any political or geographical expression of their cor-orate existence. While we need not attribute any underlying ilosophy of history to the Roman emperors who granted unique owers to the Jewish patriarch in Tiberias, in the Christian period th Jew and Gentile founded this acceptance on a conception of story which regarded the dispersion of the Jewish people as a mporary phenomenon to be followed by their restoration to the nd of Israel and the insignia of nationhood. That Christians nsidered that this would be accompanied by their conversion, d that Jews did not, does not minimise the importance of the ct that both sides accepted the nationhood of the Jewish people.

To gain emancipation Jews were asked to deny both their tionhood and their expectation of a return to the land of their thers. They had, in fact, to abolish for themselves all belief the coming of a Messiah. The lands of their exile were to come their 'native lands' to which alone they owed political yalty. They were to be distinguished from other citizens—as a

cruel witticism expressed it—only by the fact that they did no go to synagogue on Saturday while Christians did not go t church on Sunday. When emancipation was gained, then Jew who still retained these traditional beliefs naturally also becam citizens, but this tremendous act of abnegation cannot for tha reason simply be dismissed as a historical curiosity of more tha a century ago. For the battle for emancipation itself lasted mor than half a century, and the rebirth of antisemitism renewed th issue in the constant accusation of Jewish disloyalty. Even in ou own day the emergence of a state of Israel has raised the issu again in the problem of dual political allegiance.

The consequences of this long struggle for equality are stil shown in the tendency of one section of progressive Jewry t follow a path of extreme assimilationism, and extreme hostility t Zionism or any national idea within Judaism. It concentrate religious interest into the field of the ethics of the individual although it must be said on the credit side that this has neve meant the refusal of assimilationists to identify themselves wit Jewish needs elsewhere and to contribute to the immense fund for relief of distress which have been a feature of the Jewish worl in our own generation.

The denial of a national identity was not the whole of th price asked for emancipation. Access to the universities an political life of the West meant inevitably a new intimacy o relationship at every level with the non-Jew; and it was just thi intimacy that the hedge about the Torah and the vast body o inherited customs in the ghetto were designed to prevent. Man Jews found the consequent struggle too difficult and simpl accepted baptism for themselves. But those who wished to retai some contact with their Jewish tradition found themselves involve in a continual process of abandonment. Both the Jewish hom and the synagogue were involved; as the one sought to become place to which Gentiles could be freely invited, and the other form of worship which would look as like as possible what woul be found in a Protestant church. And both alike tried to attun themselves to the somewhat crude demands of a 'scientific' an 'enlightened' age.

This picture, drawn without the shading which would b needed if it were a complete study, amply demonstrates the wid differences between the development of new progressive move ments in the two religions. For on the Jewish side what is con spicuously absent is any new theological or religious motivatio for the changes which were made. They were dictated primaril and sometimes exclusively, by political and intellectual desire

hey were not due to a conviction that traditional orthodoxy had ased to be the true expression of Judaism, or the vehicle of the vine promises. Progressive Jews themselves agreed with their ponents that they had become 'less Jewish' by the changes ey had introduced. This admission was all the more possible cause there was no recognized Jewish theology by which change the refusal of change could be brought to a higher tribunal, and stified by basic metaphysical principles. But it was a profound isfortune for reform, since it emphasized its negative rather than positive aspects, and imposed on its adherents a perpetual ndency to a minority complex in the presence of orthodox position.

Inevitably it provoked a further development among those o were dissatisfied with the traditional practices of Judaism, t who saw no need to go as far as had the earlier reformers in eir jettisoning of traditional customs and practices. A 'con-rvative' reforming movement came into existence, but such was e intransigence of the traditionalists that this also led to schism, d to the founding of separate synagogues and separate igious institutions. Nevertheless it was mainly among conser-tives that a new development took place which was of the eatest importance to the whole of nineteenth century Jewry, d also brings it more into line with what was happening in ristianity during the same epoch. This was the growth of what s known as 'Die Wissenschaft des Judenthums,' the scientific dy of Jewish religion and history, and the provision of a firm se in first class scholarship for the view already put forward by n like Moses Mendelssohn and others, that Judaism was essen-lly a religion which had been the result of continual historical owth and development. At one end Jews might claim a super-ural, at the other a natural, explanation of this phenomenon; growth and development came to be commonly accepted as a ture of the religion.

There is one final factor to be brought into the picture of the kground of progressive Judaism, and it is again one which is uliar to Judaism, and is not shared by Christianity. In the ddle of the nineteenth century, after the failure of the year of olutions, 1848, Jews in Europe entered on a period of increas-difficulties, culminating in the beginnings of modern anti-itism thirty years later and the pogroms and flights from Russia the '80's, and to a very large extent the scene of the further elopment of Judaism is shifted from Europe, especially rmany, to the United States of America. It was in the United tes that Isaac Mayer Wise founded in 1873 the Union of

American Hebrew Congregations, drawing together the left wing of reform; in 1877 he created a rabbinical seminary for the movement in the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati; in 1885 the movement produced 'the Pittsburgh platform' which was to determine the character of reform for the next fifty years; and two years later the rabbis of the movement produced the Union Prayerbook which is still 'the Book of Common Prayer' of liberal progressive Judaism.

The Pittsburgh platform is too long to quote in full, but these are its main points:

It affirms belief in one God, but expresses this belief in terms of immanence rather than of transcendence. While recognizing truth in all religions, it holds that 'Judaism presents the highest conception of the God-idea' and that the Mosaic legislation existed to train the Jewish people for a world-wide mission. But of that legislation it accepts as still valid only the moral laws 'and such ceremonies as elevate and sanctify our lives,' for 'Judaism is a progressive religion, ever striving to be in accord with the postulates of reason.' Rejecting belief in a return to Palestine, it asserts that 'we consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community'; and in place of a personal Messiah it sets belief in Jewish participation 'in the great task of modern times to solve on the basis of justice and righteousness the problems presented by the contrasts and evils of the present organisation of society.' If, on the negative plane, it is fair to draw attention to the thinness of the theology, on the positive it is right to emphasize the typically Jewish insistence on social righteousness, and to remember that this statement was made as early as 1885 and expressed the view, not of a left wing minority within the movement, but of the movement as a whole.

The Pittsburgh platform shares the disability of all such statements whether drawn up by synagogue or church. It is as much an expression of the general feeling of nineteenth century optimism as are the Thirty-nine Articles expressive of the religious atmosphere of the sixteenth century. As the mood passed, so inevitably the statement came to be felt inadequate. The wholesale destruction of ceremonies had robbed both homes and synagogues of much of the warmth and tenderness of the old tradition; the uncompromising rejection of the conception of the Jews as a people led to a long and largely sterile conflict over Zionism and the re-emergence of a state of Israel. It is not surprising that the conservative wing of the Progressive movement found itself unable to accept a platform so negative towards traditional Jewish values, and in the next half-century developed its own congre-

ational and intellectual institutions, stressing the corporate spects of Judaism and the continuing value of its traditions even modified to suit a new age.

In the event the somewhat shallow metaphysics of the ittsburgh platform were of much less importance than the prac-cal effect of having a united and simple platform, very congenial the period of its production, as a basis for the development of new communal life for those Jews who could not accept tradi-onal orthodoxy, and were in no sense living a separate life in a netto. It enabled American Jewry to build up a new technique communal organisation, again a task to which there is no arallel in the Christian story. In the ghetto, life centred in the nagogue automatically, and the leadership of the rabbi was timately related to the fact that the kind of new problems which embers of the community were called upon to solve could be t variations of traditional problems on which the rabbi was an knowledged expert, problems of kashruth, of marriage and ivorce, of social and economic life within the narrow confines of e ghetto. Emancipation had thrust upon the individual Jew a st of problems on which the rabbi might be much less well-formed than he was himself, and on a local Jewish community e problem of seeking the basis of a voluntary cohesion when the mpulsory cohesion of the ghetto, and state laws of exception, d been swept away. The new synagogue had to set out con-iously to attract its members, and to provide them with a reli-ous instruction and loyalty which could not be automatically sumed to be available in the fact of Jewish birth.

The new American synagogue pattern was rightly and fruit-lly developed on the analogy of the Protestant parish. The nagogue itself came to be the centre of a group of buildings, ass-rooms, rooms for social life and recreation, rooms for study d discussion, and the rabbi came to be more akin to the Protes-nt minister with wide pastoral responsibilities than to the rabbi the orthodox community or ghetto. He had not to decide on the shruth of a chicken, nor could he have done so, but he had to d ways of strengthening the religious loyalty of Jewish families, awing their children into his religious classes, and helping to eate friendly relations with the Gentiles and Christians in the vironment of his community. These were new tasks for a Jewish inister of religion, and their accomplishment was considerably sisted by the somewhat vague—to our present feelings—atmos-ere of religious liberalism in which they were performed. Liberal ws and liberal Christians exchanged pulpits without either side eling an excessive strain. Jewish writers freely explored the life

and character of Jesus of Nazareth, of course on the basis of hi Jewishness, not on the Christian hypothesis of his messiani claims, while Christian neighbours found that Jewish ethics wer very similar to their own and that Jews and Christian could happil and profitably combine in a multitude of social and communal er deavours.

While this far-reaching task of adaptation and reconstructio was still in progress it was, perhaps, fortunate that the inadequac of the theological and metaphysical basis of the whole develop ment since emancipation remained unexplained and almost un noticed, save for the denunciations of the traditionally orthodox But by the beginning of the twentieth century the ground ha been prepared for work at a deeper level. In the work of Jewis scholars, especially in Germany, the history and tenets of rabbini Judaism had already been subjected to detailed and sympatheti scrutiny, in the universities of many countries Jews had alread become familiar with the modern philosophical approach to th destiny of men and the nature of the universe. A reinterpretatio of Jewish monotheism, of Jewish religious history, and of th tasks of Judaism in the modern world, became possible, and it i these tasks which occupy the centre of the picture to-day.

When considering this development it is important to em phasize that it has been accompanied by a happy blurring of part labels and distinctions. The task of reinterpretation is one whic has been proceeding simultaneously from all except the extrem wing of orthodoxy. The first number of the *Jewish Quarterl Review*, published as early as 1888 under the editorship of Israe Abrahams and Claude Montefiore, promised—and the promis was without precedent in Jewish history—'to invite contribution from every section of modern Jewish opinion. The results o "original" orthodox thought we shall be neither more nor les willing to insert than the results of original "reform" thought One promise at least we may make in all assurance of its fulfil ment—the promise, that is, of absolute impartiality.' This was a important declaration that progressive Judaism of all shades— and its original makers themselves represented right and lef wings of reform—kept open door to the appeal of tradition. One o the earliest contributiors to the J.Q.R. was the Cambridge scholar Solomon Schlechter, who became in 1902 President of the con servative college, the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York founded two years before it, and so far as I know, the first Jewis academy for the training of rabbis which called itself a *theologic* college, though the extent to which it teaches what a Christia would consider 'systematic' theology is very small.

The fifty or sixty years which have been occupied by this last ase in the development of Judaism may seem long enough to low of the making of conclusions, but in my opinion at least at would be rash. Judaism is still in full flux, and the reasons e not far to seek. For even among assimilated progressive Jews e life of the synagogue is still more intimately associated with e life of the people than is the case within Christendom, and ese sixty years have brought crisis after crisis to the Jewish ople demanding the most searching and violent adjustment. ne flight of several millions from Tzarist Russia, the upsurge d hideous flowering of political antisemitism, the murder of re than one third of the whole Jewish people in the space of ar years, and the emergence of a Jewish state in the land of rael, all these events have been crowded into these sixty years.

These years have witnessed such various phenomena as the profound re-interpretation of orthodoxy in *Die Stern der Erlösung* Franz Rosenzweig, and the totally new approach to Christian gins of Claude Montefiore's *The Synoptic Gospels*, the bold sentation of a Judaism at once conservative and progressive in o Baeck's *Essentials of Judaism*, the re-examination of chas- ism and mysticism in the many works of Martin Buber, the empts to recapture in new forms the essentials of the religion a dedicated community in Mordecai Kaplan's *Judaism as Civilization*, or a new God-centred mysticism in Abraham schel's *Man is not Alone*. The list could be indefinitely pro- ged with the works of other significant thinkers of the modern ish scene; but if I must close it for lack of space, I must do with the drawing of attention to an outstanding service to the glish-speaking world outside as well as inside Jewry by an glish orthodox Jew, the late Jacob Davidson, who over the rt period of twenty years made available in beautifully pro- ed editions translations of the great classics of Jewish odoxy, the Talmud, the Zohar, the Midrash Rabba, and a es of orthodox commentaries on all the books of the Hebrew le. With the exception of the extreme right wing orthodox it be said to-day that along the whole line Jewish thought is on move.

One battle, originally in the centre of the picture, is, to all nts and purposes, over. The left wing of reform had so cted the peculiar characteristics of Judaism that their religion l little more than an ethical monotheism, often uncertain ether there was objectively any Theos to justify it being called sm. To-day there is not merely more reference to 'God' than

to 'the God idea,' but there is common recognition that ritual a ceremonial correspond to a need in human beings which any syst of however elevated a rationalism cannot supply. In regard both home and synagogue there is a steady return to the signi cance of practical discipline and beautiful and symbolic ceremor But meanwhile a new issue, and one which affects orthodoxy als has come to the front. That is the nature of the state of Israel.

The actual position is that there is only one form of Judais enjoying official recognition in Israel, and that is the orthodoxy the Eastern European ghetto. This paradox is the more easily e plicable when it is remembered that long before Zionism car into existence Jews had lived in Jerusalem and elsewhere in t Holy Land, and had lived there a life of extreme and concentrat pietism. There were no agricultural settlements, but there we many yeshivot or academies devoted to the study of the Talm and rabbinic literature on the Eastern European model. The were no statesmen or scientists, but there were many rabbis Eastern European ways of thinking. Some of these orthodox Je accepted the idea of a state of Israel, but desired that it shou in all its features correspond to the 'Torah state' of their hithe academic imaginings. Many would not even accept that, and co sidered that they were still in 'exile' even in Jerusalem until personal Messiah summoned them forth. Neither stream had a idea of accepting the implications of reforms which emancipati in the 'exile' had produced, or had any real understanding of t problems of a state in the modern, secularist world. The con quence has so far been disastrous, or at least, extremely d appointing. The Judaism of Israel has provoked perpetual cris on details of conformity; it has offered no moral guidance to t young state whatever on fundamentals. Meanwhile progressi Jews have been increasingly prominent among the leaders Zionism, but they are still fumbling towards an expression of th religious concern and responsibility for the life of the state whi Zionism has produced. That it must go beyond the establishme of a few synagogues following a 'reformed' ritual they are co vinced. But how to make a larger impact is, at this prese moment, a subject of earnest enquiry.

Finally something must be said of what is ultimately the m fundamental problem of all, that of an autonomous Jewi theology. There has been nothing in the battle between orthod and progressive Jews parallel to the hideous overthrow of a libe theology by the reactionary obscurantism of continental theo

ans, but, alas, that is not because the theology of the progres-
es was strong enough to resist attack, but because the orthodox
d no theology with which to attack such theological notions as
progressives put forward. Judaism has never developed
ologically the monotheism which underlies its conception of a
ople chosen for a unique destiny. Only slowly is any section of
wry coming to see that it needs to do so in the modern world,
d all are still at the stage where they are more at home in deal-
g with His immanence than with His transcendence. The 'I—
ou' philosophy of Martin Buber is, perhaps, the most penetra-
g expression of immanence, in so far as it leads Jews to see
t the 'Thou' must exist independently of the 'I' to enter into
manent relations with it. But the transcendence of God is to be
nd expressed only among those traditional orthodox who meet
guments that this or that custom is no longer comprehensible
h the reply that understanding is not asked of us, but only
dience to a Will beyond our understanding; or those who, like
schel, are seeking to develop a God-centred mysticism new in
daism. The majority of Jews are still concerned not to prove
even argue that God exists, but to examine the pattern of
ing based on the assumption of His existence, whether, in fact,
be objectively true or a traditional folk-way. How the next
ge will develop it is impossible to foresee, but I am convinced
t a next stage, and one more theological in approach, is only
t round the corner. For without a firmer theological basis many
their other problems will defy solution.

CONTINENTAL THEOLOGY, PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC

By Professor MARCEL SIMON, Dean of the Faculty of Letters, University of Strasbourg

'*SCHLEIERMACHER kommt wieder*,' Schleiermacher will return; such is the prophecy once uttered by one of the most distinguished representatives of dialectical theology. There are for the time being, but few symptoms of a genuine revival of religious liberalism on the Continent. But there are some. And it may well be worth while, without venturing too precise a prognosis, to try and review, though very briefly, the progressive factors and trends now discernible in the ecclesiastical and theological life of Western Europe. I take the word 'Western' in its precise geographical meaning, *i.e.* I shall limit my remarks to France, Western Germany and Switzerland, excluding both the Mediterranean and the Scandinavian countries, as well as the Netherlands, on which I am not sufficiently informed. But I think it advisable, within these limits, to consider Roman Catholicism as well as the Protestant Churches. For although the present policy of the Vatican can hardly be described as liberal, there is undoubtedly some progressive thinking going on in certain quarters of Catholic opinion. Nobody knows what its future will be, but it certainly deserves attentive consideration.

* * *

Liberalism was at its highest at the beginning of this century. It has been steadily declining since the first world war. The causes of this process have been investigated more than once. They are undoubtedly to be found in the war itself, and in the spiritual confusion it created. In Germany, the national collapse dealt a severe blow to optimism, belief in progress, faith in reason and its ability to give life its true meaning, which had been a characteristic feature of the Wilhelmine era. There was an outburst of irrationalism and spiritual despair. Even in the victorious countries, the horrors of war had made an optimistic view of life and mankind very difficult. The consequences of this psychological upset made themselves felt in the religious as well as in the political field. 'Back to authority' was, on both sides, the watchword. It brought forth the Nazi and Fascist movements on the one hand, the various shades of neo-orthodoxy on the other. The name

theology of crisis' often applied to Barthianism accurately describes the circumstances under which it was born, as well as its spirit. The dialectic moment, which had been emphasized by its exponents at the beginning, gradually lost its original importance as things went on, and the main result was the constitution of a new type of absolute and intolerant dogmatism, opposing the totalitarian Church to the totalitarian State.

Nazism has gone, at least for the moment. But it might come to life again. And, in face of Communist totalitarianism, the temptation is still strong to take recourse to an equally intransigent form of Christianity. The conviction is still present in many minds that we must necessarily choose either this or that, and that there is no other choice left. The second world war has certainly not made faith in reason and man more easy. Whatever the future of liberalism, it will certainly have to reconsider and mitigate that optimism which has been one of its features in the previous generation, and insist more than it used to on the tragic element in human evolution and on man's proneness to sin. A return of liberalism in its classical form, as illustrated for instance by Harnack, is most unlikely. It would, moreover, be inconsistent with the very nature of liberalism, which looks forward and not backward, and cannot remain in the second half of this century exactly such as it was some fifty years ago. The Barthian reaction has probably reached its climax by now. Even its own exponents seem to be aware of this fact, and would, I think, generally admit that the pendulum is likely to swing in the opposite direction before long. But Barthianism, even if it is declining, cannot be simply ruled out. Its influence has been too considerable not to make itself still felt, though certainly lessened, in the future. A mere turning back to the *status quo ante* is unthinkable.

Meanwhile, the classical type of liberalism has not completely died out. In France, it is represented chiefly by individual members or small fractions of the Protestant Churches, with very few organized activities. Its most distinguished representatives belonged to the previous generation, which stood under the prevailing influence of Auguste Sabatier and Ménégoz. Maurice Goguel carries on their line of thought in the field of New Testament studies and early Church history. He stands almost isolated. But this 'grand old man' enjoys considerable prestige in all quarters of French religious opinion. It is noteworthy that, when a volume of *Mélanges* was presented to him by his friends and colleagues, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, the Editor succeeded in gathering contributions even from Catholic scholars, which would probably have been impossible half a century ago.

In Germany, the religious resistance to the Nazis was heade as is well known, by the so-called *Bekenntniskirche*, which w definitely anti-liberal in outlook. And it must be said that son at least among the liberal-minded elements were only too rea to compromise with Hitler and to support the attempts made build up a genuinely German Christianity. There were of cour exceptions on both sides: it would be a distortion of reality ju to identify political and religious resistance with orthodoxy, ar pro-Nazi policy with religious liberalism. But as the most co spicuous leaders of religious opposition, Niemoeller, Karl Bar himself — who was deprived of his professorship at the Universi of Bonn and expelled from Germany — were anything but liberal the cause of liberalism suffered, under those circumstances, an u doubted loss of prestige which contributed, along with the the logical reaction already initiated before 1933, in weakening i position.

That there still exists a liberal wing in German Protestantism illustrated, to take only one example, by the considerable amou of interest which has met Prof. Bultmann's attempt to 'de-mythol gize' the gospel. I cannot, for lack of space, insist at length c Dr. Bultmann's theory, which has, moreover, been careful analysed in the last issue of the *Modern Churchman* by Profess Brandon (*M.C.*, June 1953, pp. 86 ff.), and has thus becom familiar to the members of this Conference. It is of course que tionable whether the term 'liberal,' in its traditional acceptatio can adequately describe Dr. Bultmann's views, of which it h been said that they are rather to be considered as a compromi between liberalism and orthodoxy. But the problem which h raises, namely, that of the appeal and intelligibility to mode minds of the genuine Christian message, has always been liberals the most central problem; and the way he approaches an resolves it, though very personal indeed, is none the less co genial to the liberal tradition. It is, in fact, an endeavour to r think the essentials of the Christian faith in terms of mode existentialism. If Bultmann's views do not fit in exactly with th liberalism of the past, they may perhaps give some indication to one possible line of development of liberal thought in the futur

The uproar caused by the 'Bultmann case' shows clearly tha as regards rank and file, German Protestantism is, in its majori of a strictly orthodox and pietistic brand, and that the Churc authorities, whatever their own opinion, must necessarily take th fact into account. An official condemnation of Bultmann wou have been welcome to many. But the energetic intervention some authoritative bodies of the Church, of the Faculty of The

gy of Tübingen and even some of Bultmann's adversaries, has far prevented a heresy trial being initiated against him.

But the stronghold of Protestant liberalism to-day, as regards Western Europe, seems to be located in Switzerland, or, at least, is there that the proportion of avowed liberals in the Church ems to be the highest. Although the presence of both Barth and runner has given a considerable impulse to the opposite tendency, e liberal tradition has been carried on. Even here the liberals e a minority, but comparatively larger and probably better ganized and more active than in the neighbouring countries. hey have their own magazine, the *Schweizerische Theologische mschau*. Their main leader in recent years has been Martin erner, who produced an important historical study on the origins d growth of the Christian dogma (*Die Entstehung des Christ-hen Dogmas*, 1941). His work is carried on by men like Fritz iri, Walter Nigg, the author of a well-known history of religious eralism published before the last war, and Kurt Guggisberg ose book, *Der freie Protestantismus*, a statement of the liberal ith as he conceives it, first published in 1942 at the iniative of the viss Association for Free — *i.e.* liberal — Christianity, has been published last year. Its inspiration is, on the whole, that of late neteenth-century liberalism. On some points, however, as for stance when it deals with the recent evolution of New Testament ticism and specially with 'consequent eschatology,' it breathes new spirit. The influence of Albert Schweitzer is here clearly t, even as it is in the attempt to make liberalism less strictly ellectual than it sometimes has been in the past, and to leave large as possible room open for mysticism.

If we consider the future of liberalism in the countries here amined, there is possibly some help to be expected from various ctors which, though not liberal in themselves, may, if only in e long run, indirectly and even unconsciously, play their part promoting a new liberalism: I mean all those movements and idencies which either aim at bringing together people of different diences, or lay the main emphasis on some other aspect of ristian faith and life than credal orthodoxy and dogmatic sertions.

The oecumenical movement, for instance, however strongly ncerned to remain within the limits of traditional orthodoxy, is me the less attenuating the strength of denominationalism, and cessarily implies some measure of belief in the relativity of doc-nal formulations. In fact, the confessional barriers between the rious Protestant bodies have, except in a very few instances, most completely disappeared. In France, the difference between

Calvinists and Lutherans is, in most cases, hardly more tha administrative, and wherever both Churches are present, not on is the fact of adhering to the one rather than to the other a matt of tradition rather than of doctrine, but ' conversions ' from the o to the other are very common, without requiring the least ritu formality or sanction, and are usually inspired by personal co venience — proximity of the church, friendship with the parson much more than by theological conviction.

The same may be said of the so-called Oxford Groups, whi exert a fairly widespread influence, mainly, but not exclusivel among the more cultured laymen of various denominatio Although their members usually belong to Churches of traditio outlook and may stand, as far as their own personal theology concerned, on deliberately orthodox ground, the spirit of t groups as such could be described as liberal. Their aim is to uni people representing various schools of thought, notwithstandi their differences, in the practice of a common ideal. The emphas is on religious ethics, behaviour, personal devotion, rather than theology : *religio Christi* and not *religio de Christo*.

On the other hand, the Christian Social Movement, whi inspires, in France, the review *Le Christianisme Social*, in callin all Christians actively to promote the instauration of the Kingdo of God, may contribute to the decline of that type of eschatolo now prevailing among the neo-orthodox, which speculates on t Parousia and waits, in passive awe, for the trumpet to be sounde The liturgical movement too, although of a completely differe inspiration, may, in its way, lead to similar consequences : whi laying stress on the predominant importance of corporate religio life, it may, up to a point, lessen the importance of the mere dogmatic and credal issues. Ritualism, liturgical interest and do trinal intolerance are not always and necessarily combined, as th are in Anglo-Catholicism. It is to be noted, for example, th Professor Heiler of Marburg, the leader of the Lutheran Hig Church movement, is a very convinced and outspoken liberal, wh has recently written a very sympathetic biography of Alfred Loi

The opinion has even been formulated that Barthianism itse might well become one of the elements out of which a new libera ism could evolve. This sounds at first somewhat paradoxical. B the Barthians have at least this in common with the liberals, against the more traditional type of orthodoxy, that, to them als faith is primarily a matter of personal experience, of direct relati to Christ, rather than of subscribing doctrinal formulas. It m not be forgotten, so we are told, that to Barth, Revelation is indi solubly bound up with and resides in the act or event in whi

od reveals Himself. Consequently there exists no such thing as revelation with an objective substance expressed in dogmas. Dogmas still are of capital importance, but they are no longer intended to express Revelation in an absolute way, but rather to mark out that which is specific in the event of Revelation. The essence of dogma is to express the claims of God *vis-à-vis* man. There is no room left, in such a view, for the traditional conception of orthodoxy. On the contrary, it could indeed provide a starting point for a new liberalism.

Whether this optimistic interpretation of Barthianism, which is developed for me by one of my Strasbourg colleagues, is right, the future will show us. However this may be, it can at least be foretold that the liberalism of to-morrow will almost certainly be much more definitely Christocentric and also more positively interested in the Church and in the corporate aspects of Christian life than its predecessor at the turn of the century.

* * *

But what about Catholicism? To apply the word 'liberal' to the Roman Church may at first sight seem to involve a contradiction in terms. This it does undoubtedly, if we think of the Church as a whole, of her doctrinal position and of her supreme authority, and if, on the other hand, we give the word liberal itself a strictly intellectual connotation, as if it described a clear-cut and definite body of doctrine, a kind of reversed orthodoxy. If, on the contrary, we take liberalism as meaning a certain spirit, a certain way of approaching and interpreting religion and theology, and if we consider not Catholicism, but the Catholics, both clergy and laity, who make up the Church, then it is, I think, legitimate to speak of religious liberalism even in these quarters.

In fact, there cannot be the slightest doubt that it exists, and makes itself strongly felt in the religious life of France, where a considerable proportion of the clergy and of the religiously interested laymen can be labelled liberal or progressive. France, who claims to be the first-born daughter of the Church, is also her 'enfant terrible.' The Vatican is fully aware of this situation and considers it with careful interest and considerable anxiety. It is well-known fact that the papal encyclical *Humani Generis*, issued in 1950, was intended chiefly to warn the French Catholics. And the Pope followed the advice of some of his counsellors, he would, so I was told, have entitled it 'Against recent French heresies.'

What are these heresies? Just let us have a look at this very interesting and important document. As regards philosophy, the

encyclical denounces the dangers of existentialism, of what it cal
'a false historicism,' as well as of an uncontrolled use of evol
tionism in matters of both biology and history. As regards biblic
exegesis, it condemns those scholars who tend to weaken the divi
authority of Holy Scripture by restricting its inerrancy to religio
matters only, and who do not take into account, in their interpret
tion of it, the traditional teaching of the Church. In the field
theology, it deplores the tendency, which it admits to be ve
common, to minimize, in the fallacious hope of promoting Chri
tian reunion, the differences between Catholics and Protestant
and even the importance of dogmas, which leads to, or rather i
plies, the idea of 'dogmatic relativity.' It denies the possibili
of expressing the eternal and revealed truth in terms of changi
philosophies, and once more praises the too often neglected a
despised Thomism, the 'philosophia perennis,' as the only mea
of giving the Catholic dogma its adequate intellectual formulatio
Even those who think it necessary, in their search for such a form
lation, to go back from Thomas Aquinas to the Fathers and to Ho
Scripture are judged very severely. There are some, we are tol
who call in question the existence of the angels as personal cre
tures, who distort the notion of original sin, and of sin in genera
who think that the doctrine of transubstantiation can no longer
held, that the consecrated elements are but 'the effective signs
the spiritual presence of Christ and of His intimate union, in H
mystical Body, with the faithful members of it,' and that th
mystical Body is not one and the same thing as the Roman Cathol
Church.

All these perverted theories and interpretations 'are being di
fused not only among the clergy, either secular or regular, in th
seminaries and religious houses of learning, but even among th
laity, specially among professors and teachers.' And they a
expressed not so much in printed books as in courses, lecture
private discussions and conversations. The danger, to be sure,
considered by Rome as very serious. In fact, the encyclical give
in terms of condemnation, a very accurate and precise descriptio
of a widespread phenomenon. It is probably not exaggerated
say that the largest part, by far, of the French Catholic *élit*
whether priests or laymen, are, in some way or another, implicate
in the 'erroneous opinions' thus denounced by the Pope: it wou
be very easy to write names, and very well known and distinguishe
ones, in the form of marginal notes to each paragraph of the po
tifical document. And it is quite obvious that, although
Catholic to-day would call himself a Modernist, the spirit
Modernism is still alive and active, half a century after the solem

ondemnation uttered by Pius X. It could even be maintained, as e Barthian reaction, though declining, is still very strongly felt, at there is more progressive religion now, in the ranks of the atholics, at least in France, than among the Protestants.

This is undoubtedly of the highest importance. The capital ctor in the present situation of Roman Catholicism, as I see it, the very serious tension between what is commonly called inte-alism (French : *intégrisme*) and that progressive type of Catholi-sm condemned by the encyclical. Integralism, according to ather Congar, O.P., 'is characterized by its repudiation of the odern world, by love of authoritative decisions . . . It is instinc-vely attracted to what is already given, clearly defined, and has ly to be imposed and accepted, as against what is going to be, s not yet been said, still has to be reached. It does not like what mes from below, but is delighted in what imposes itself from ove. In religious matters, this attitude leads to such positions the following : insistence on the corruption of nature, on original ; delight in authoritarian methods, also in education; repulsion wards the idea of evolution and even of development; frowning hen one speaks of "life" and "experience"; a will to keep the ole abruptness of Catholicism, and even to increase it . . .' ather Congar, one of the most outstanding French theologians d an authority on oecumenism, is also one of the spiritual aders of progressive Catholicism. His recent book, *Vraie et usse Réforme dans l'Eglise*, is of fundamental importance. It very significant that this work, published with the usual *nprimatur* of French episcopal authority, was later on withdrawn om circulation, but not explicitly condemned, by decision of the atican. This means that integralism is very influential in Rome, t is, however, not strong enough to achieve complete victory. here has been, so far, no nominal condemnation of progressive aders. The aims of papal policy are fundamentally the same as the beginning of the century, but the methods have become less utal.

This change is certainly, in part, a matter of personal tempera-ent : the present Pope is much more of a diplomat than Pius X, d he has not, so far, yielded completely to the extreme obscuran-sts in the Curia. But there is probably another reason still, mely, the considerable success of the 'liberal' movement, the mber, quality and undoubted fervour of its members. The hurch is very proud to have regained so large a proportion of the rench intellectuals who, at the end of the nineteenth century, ere mostly positivists and agnostics. An explicit condemnation the tendency to which they belong, or of the men whom they

consider as their leaders, would carry with it very serious consequences. It would provoke a crisis and possibly stop the remarkable Catholic revival among the *élite*. The Vatican seems to be fully aware of this fact, and preoccupied not to lose what has been gained. It attempts, in consequence, to keep the balance, as far as possible, between the two opposite tendencies which divide the Church. This accounts probably for the apparent contradictions in the present policy of the Holy See, which on the one hand issues the encyclical *Humani Generis* and proclaims the dogma of the bodily Assumption of the Virgin — an undoubted victory of integralism and of the Spanish type of Catholicism — while, on the other hand, it allows, probably with very little enthusiasm, and just as a necessary evil, in matters of biblical criticism for instance opinions and interpretations which would certainly have been radically condemned half a century ago. These concessions are possible without too great a risk, because the scholarly *Revue Biblique* is read only by a small proportion of the Catholic world and exerts no influence whatever on the mass of the faithful, who have not the slightest idea of or interest in the questions thus discussed. As long as progressive opinions are given no publicity a certain amount of tolerance, within cleverly calculated limits, may be advisable, as the necessary counterpart to the now prevailing integralism.

Progressive Catholicism is not limited to intellectual circles only. The liturgical movement, for instance, which aims at making the people take a more active part in public worship, by means of a larger use of the vernacular, and at adapting the traditional liturgy to modern needs and conditions, follows the same inspiration; and so does the social movement, which culminates in the activities of the working priests (*prêtres ouvriers*). I can do no more than mention these forces which, together with the Catholic *élite*, build up what we may call the front-line of liberal Catholicism.

As regards the future of Catholic 'liberalism,' it is, of course, impossible to make any statement. It is obvious that it cannot overpass certain limits, which are given in the very nature of Catholicism. Whether these limits will be reached or not, whether progressive Catholicism or integralism will become the leading element within the Church, depends on many factors: on the personality of the man who will succeed Pius XII; on the proportion, in the central staff of the Church, of Italians, Spaniards, South Americans, French; on the attitude of the episcopate, which, for the time being, seems to have lost not only every initiative, at least in doctrinal matters, but even the will to resist the initiatives of the Vatican: it is hardly exaggerated to say that the Roman Church

no longer to be numbered among the episcopal Churches, and s become a strictly papal Church.

But the future also depends, and perhaps very largely, on the itude of the enlightened laity. The increasing interest of the tholic laymen in religious and even theological matters is one of characteristic features of contemporary French Catholicism. ese people usually combine an indefectible faith in the Church d a sharply critical mind *vis-à-vis* the recent developments of man ecclesiastical policy. Their opposition has not, so far, been blicly manifested. Whenever a step is taken by the Vatican ich they feel is an unhappy one, they do, of course, criticize it, t they still hope that, in the long run, things will take a better urse. As for the present, they attempt to give the pontifical cisions the most optimistic interpretation, or to minimize them; metimes they would even think and say that they do not matter all . . . They try and make a distinction between the essentials Catholic faith and what they consider, more or less arbitrarily, unimportant and negligible. The practice of casuistry and ntal reservation seems to have, by necessity, become fairly com- n among Catholic intellectuals. And there is, as far as I can , an increasing discrepancy between the recent teaching of the urch, as expressed in *Humani Generis*, in the dogma of the sumption or in the papal declarations on the visions of Fatima, d their personal convictions. If the present evolution goes on, day will certainly come when this latent crisis will become ite, and an increasing number of cultured Catholics will realize t submission to supreme ecclesiastical authority is not the most ndamental of Christian virtues, and that, under certain circum- nces, resistance and spiritual revolt may become right and even ty to every conscientious Christian.

An open schism is most unlikely. For it is another feature of eral-minded Catholics that they cannot imagine any other atti- le than clinging to the Mother Church with all their heart: nversions to Protestantism are practically non-existent. But I convinced that a *non possumus*, energetically expressed at Vatican, in the form, for instance, of a petition signed by ndreds or thousands of devout Catholics, and handed over with proval by members of the hierarchy, would be able to prevent v and disastrous steps in the line of reactionary integralism. is implies, of course, that the complex of fear in face of Rome lich the Catholic mind has developed as a consequence of ultra- ntanism, and of which the phrase 'Christian humility' is, too en, but the euphemistic translation, will be overcome. Although ave, for my own part, taken another course, which means that

I am not very optimistic concerning the near future of Roma Catholicism, it is my fervent hope that, sooner or later, the pro gressive forces which I have just attempted to describe will mak themselves strongly and salutarily felt in the life of that Church

FREEDOM IN RELIGION: ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS

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THERE are a number of approaches we can make when w set out to discuss the relation of psychology to religion. W can take the purely psychological one of examining all th phenomena and content ourselves with impartially setting out ou findings. Few achieve this in its purity, but William James in hi classic *The Varieties of Religious Experience* came as close to i as anyone. We can take the opposing point of view and see from psychology the evidence to strengthen the conclusions i religion which we already hold or, more frequently, seek th means by which to become more efficient in carrying our convic tions into practice—in our pastoral work of dealing with souls i distress, in preaching and teaching. This is the attitude all to common among the clergy, who will welcome psychology as handmaid but not as a critic, even a friendly one. My inclinatio is more to the first approach than the second, but I suggest a thir way as more suited to the needs of those like ourselves who wan not merely to know the truth but to live by it. We ask of psycho logy whether it can give us the means of discriminating amon religious faiths (I use the term to include the broad types o religion—Christianity, Islam, etc.—but also different types o Christianity, which cut across denominational differences) and o arranging these in some order of value. Such an order of valu cannot be conclusive but it can be very suggestive, even per suasive, if the criterion by which the discrimination is mad comprises the central characteristics of human personality, an if, in addition, the same criterion is found to be an effectiv measure in other fields of mental and spiritual life.

Such a criterion has, I believe, been emerging from th researches of psychologists in many fields—in the study of chil dren and of the mentally ill, in particular, for a great part o modern psychology is given to these two inter-connected fields

The practical necessity of understanding human nature which the rearing of children and the care of the neurotic impose on us to-day has stimulated psychologists to search for some standard of normality, that is, some standard of ideal perfection, of perfect mental health. This standard is slowly emerging, even if it is hard to set out in precise terms, and the forms in which it is held by different psychologists or schools of psychologists appear to vary. In psychological clinics healing is not defined as the attainment of this standard of normality, even if it is from evidence provided by clinical studies that the standard is strongly suggested. Psychological healing is content to restore average efficiency of life and adjustment to the requirements of living in a society—that other meaning or normal. In education, however, we aim higher, and the remarkable developments in the education of the very young which have occurred in the last generation bear witness not only to the esteem in which psychology is held by educationists, but to its success as a guide in education.

Religion cannot afford to scorn this guidance even if in religion, as in education, it means the overthrow of long cherished theories. Indeed we have some justification for maintaining that religion is the true end and the completion of education, even if that opinion is not so widely held as it used to be. I imagine that all of us here, at least, would subscribe to it. We should therefore be ready to anticipate that psychology will bring us fresh understanding and even new insights into the values we hold in religion.

My subject to-day is a limited one, but a very important one, the psychological bases of freedom in religion. Freedom—what kind of freedom? Is freedom a positive or a negative state, a freedom for something, or a freedom from something?

No doubt the one implies the other, but we are usually more sensitive to the restrictions upon us than of the freedom we already possess for positive action. In religion these restrictions are primarily in ourselves. There are plenty of external hindrances which prevent us doing what we would like to do; the sheer brutality of circumstances limits everyone very considerably, circumstances which largely lie beyond our control. But the religious man rather seeks first freedom from sin, from the sense of guilt, from bad temper, from weakness. 'The evil that I would not, that I practise. Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?' (*Romans* vii, 19, 24). Sometimes, of course, we seek to be delivered from circumstances which appear to hinder our ability to practise our faith, illness, impatience and other thorns in the flesh, but in the main we recognise that it is from our fears and

our sinfulness that we need to be delivered. And from th struggle, so unsuccessful by our own efforts, in which thes involve us when we try to live by our ideals.

There is another kind of freedom which we must consider, f it will prove to be closely bound up with that of which I have ju been speaking. One way by which we seek to escape from our ow sinfulness is by handing over our minds and consciences to Go direct or through the mediation of His Church. We becom slaves of God. We accept what we believe to be His teachin His law, His authority and find peace through the assurance His forgiveness. Is this psychologically sound or do we deceiv ourselves? Ought we not as a precondition of truly finding Go and living in Him first be free from Him and from His Churc free in the sense of independence, not isolation? To find a answer to these questions we must look at the doctrine of man nature which emerges from psychology.

At first sight the astonishing thing about man is that he sin at all, except through ignorance. He has a conscience which n merely prompts but commands him to do that which is right : an unconditional obligation. He may have difficulty in dete mining what is right, but once he sees it he accepts it as bindin on him. I say nothing of the promises of suffering held over hi by law or divine judgement if he do the wrong. I speak only his recognition of what he will probably call his true self, who authority he admits without question and which punishes him b producing a most painful sense of guilt and unworthiness wh he departs from what it commands. His real self does not whol conform to this ideal self for in fact he does sin against it. Th can only be because the real self is under pressure from anoth source which compels him to defy the bidding of his ideal sel We are prone to think we have explained this weakness in man b ascribing it to original sin or original sinfulness, or man's fall nature (if we don't throw the responsibility on the devil—in whi case we still have to explain man's greater readiness to listen him rather than to God), but these are only ways of describin what we do, not explanations of it.

Psychology has given us the explanation by showing th within the one personality are what for the moment we may ca three selves : the self which tempts, the self which yields to tem tation, and the ideal self which judges what is right and wron These three are bound together. But since consciousness, perhaps to be very precise I should say self-consciousnes belongs to the real self, the sinning self, it perceives the other i as in some way external to itself and acting upon it. This is ho

e know ourselves in introspection, but it is incomplete knowdge. It denies the unity in complexity of the trinity of selves. n any case it is a distortion to think of them as selves. It is a istortion also to present them in these theological categories of ood and bad selves.

What I have called the three selves of the personality is less bject to confusion of false meanings if we adopt the technical rms of psychology, where they are known as the *id*, the *ego* and e *super-ego*. They still have to be explained and I cannot say at the explanation is simple. The three functions (to adopt a lourless term) of the personality are not all given at birth except rhaps in nucleus. They are developed in the course of growth d the tensions between them vary from individual to individual cording to the temperamental endowment and the particular cumstances of growing up in each case. Growing up in the nd or personality consists in attaining the ideal balance between e three functions so that conflict between them is reduced to a nimum and they work together harmoniously as one, so that fact one loves the good when one knows it and does it without sitation or need to struggle with oneself.

Putting it as briefly as possible, the genesis of *id*, *ego* and *per-ego* is as follows. At birth, or just before birth, the mind the infant is almost entirely *id*, impersonal, unconscious. It s had minimal experience of a world outside itself and has had occasion to make an effort to deal with the world. The infant s, however, been equipped by nature with a number of instinc- e drives which come into action at appropriate moments— nger, fear, anger, aggression and sex, though in the infant the nifestations of sex are not associated at first with the organs of oroduction. Birth brings the first experience of sharp contact h the world and the infant's mental life begins there with the areness of pain. As well as its instinctive endowment the infant s sense organs which begin to function and give knowledge of world, memory to store those experiences and recall them for e, imagination to use past experience to build up pictures of future and so on. These sense perceptions stored in memory d used in thought are the beginning of the *ego;* the instinctive dowment is the *id*.

It is important to understand the connection between the *ego* d the *id*. All desire, all impulse, all energy come from the *id*, hich is the driving force of life. The energy generated there atial terms are only a metaphor) seeks release in appropriate ms of expression, *e.g.* in the young infant the hunger instinct ds to the muscular movements of sucking. Satisfaction of

these impulses or desires can only be obtained in the main fro the environment. The *ego's* function is to lead those impulses t the most efficient satisfaction attainable in the *circumstances*. Th *ego* is the servant of the *id* is one way of putting it. Or the eg is an instrument used by the *id* to handle the world of fact. Th *ego* is compelled by the *id* to seek certain types of satisfactio but it can only provide those which are possible. That is, the eg is limited by the nature of the real world in what satisfactions can procure for the *id*. The *id* is governed entirely by the que for the pleasure of release of energy. The *ego* has to be governe by the reality-principle, by what is practicable. It has, as it wer to persuade the *id* on occasion that satisfaction must be pos poned, that it must bear frustration temporarily, or that it mu accept satisfaction in a form different from that first desired. can easily be understood that in some circumstances the *id* resis this attempted guidance on the part of the *ego* and insists on th original desire. Failing objective attainment the *id* will resort vivid phantasies of satisfaction. I cannot spare the time to g into the details of what may happen when there is this confli between *id* and *ego*, between desire and possibility, but o general procedure is for the *ego* to treat the situation as a dange situation and to flee from, repress, the urge from the *id*, to refu to acknowledge it. This is the beginning of repression and of th formation of the third function of the mind, the *super-ego*.

The *super-ego* is only fully formed as a consequence growing through the Oedipus Complex, the rivalry of the your boy with his father for the possession of the mother. I need n here enter into a detailed exposition of what is involved in th Oedipus Complex. To experience it is a normal part of growt To miss it is a calamity for which I know no cure. Abnormali comes by failure (usually partial) to grow through it. The mann of growing through it is by identification with the father (on who are projected also some phantasies derived from the charact of the mother) and introjecting this image of the father thus bu up by the boy. The introjected image strengthens the forces work in the boy—love and fear of the father, self-love—to ma him obey the father and renounce sensual love of the moth This introjected father-image remains in the mind as a permane modification of the *ego*. It is the *super-ego*. Note that it is form from the boy's image of the father and that that image is dete mined much more by the boy's own desires than by the actu characters of his father and mother—though these can accentua the conflicts involved. The *super-ego* is thus developed a means of helping the *ego* to resist the demands of the *id* f

ossession of the mother. The *ego* saw it in the first place as a nger situation—it produced the fear of destruction by the ther. What the *id* wanted was forbidden by the father, in the y's imagination. When the father-image is taken into the mind continues to act as a censor of conduct. Now it is inside the nd, and its commands change their character from external essure by threat of punishment to internal pressure or con- ience. Having taken it into itself the *ego* cannot question its thority. It is unconditionally binding. The young child has ssed out of the age of innocence. He has become a moral being th a sense of right and wrong.

In obedience to the *super-ego*, the *ego* strives to reject those mands of *id* which are disapproved. Many of them are forced o the unconscious because the *id* will not let them go and the *o* is compelled by the *super-ego* to renounce them and it can ly do that by refusing to become conscious of them.

Once it is formed the *super-ego* gathers into itself rules of nduct subsequently acquired by indoctrination or by reason and e *content* of conscience is susceptible of alteration in this spect. It also takes into itself two other elements. It takes over e earlier struggles of the *ego* with the *id*, when the *ego* was weak d defencelsss against the *id*. If these struggles were severe, for instance, the infant chanced to be unduly frustrated in feed- g or some other way, the *super-ego* may gain very considerable ength, strength which is not really in proportion to the moral ement in its judgements, but is derived from, and unconsciously ntinues, purely psychological conflicts in early infancy. The ner element taken in by the *super-ego* is the *ego-ideal*.

The *ego-ideal* is extremely important for religion. It is the dividual's picture of what he wants to be. It is derived from o main sources—from the picture he built up in infancy of what s parents wanted him to be if they were to go on loving him (and eir love was his greatest need) and from what he wanted to be a means of winning their love. These are not the same thing. ne first comes largely from his parents' treatment of him. The cond comes from his own desires in conjunction with his obser- tion of other people. The young boy sees his father so much rger and more powerful than himself, knowing everything, ving every privilege, having all skills. If he were like his father thinks he would be so much more lovable, so he builds a picture himself like his father as his positive ideal. Later on he will e other heroes and set up their imagined and desired qualities the ideal to which he strives to attain that he may be worth ving and be freed from his sense of unworthiness.

When we examine our religious experience in the light of th understanding of human personality certain things at once becom clear. We can see, for instance, why we so frequently do th which we believe to be wrong. The self we know is our *ego*. W also know in part what our *super-ego* commands or forbids. Th *ego* cannot always obey the *super-ego* because the demands the *id* are too imperious. More than that the *ego*, under pressu from the *super-ego*, has, as we have seen, repressed into th unconscious some of the desires of the *id*. Unfortunately repre sion does not destroy them. They cannot now appear in their ow form and repression prevents them finding another goal of sati faction. They do the only thing possible. They gain expressio by disguising themselves, without changing their nature, an enter consciousness and pass into action without being reco nized by the *ego* for what they are. They usually mingle wit some quite legitimate action. Because these elements of thoug and action are really activated by the unconscious they are out control of the *ego*. 'The evil that I would not, that I practise describes it exactly; the self is under bondage to the unconsciou The *super-ego*, however, recognises the nature of the act, becau it meets the *id* in the unconscious. The *super-ego* compromises b allowing the forbidden desire its expression in disguised for but exacts the penalty of a feeling of guilt, which also may b unconscious but quite often rises into consciousness.

A second thing which becomes clear is the origin of our sen of innate unworthiness, that sense of sin which haunts mankin The moral element in us, the *super-ego*, comes into existence help us give up incestuous desire for the mother. By the form tion of the *super-ego* the desire is driven into the unconsciou But it has been in existence, and in the unconscious it still ha psychological reality, so that in becoming moral creatures w come at once under the condemnation of having sinned, for we had not had those 'temptations' we should not have neede to form the *super-ego* to deal with them. They were amoral whe we had them, but they are part of ourselves. Hence to be mor is to know ourselves as sinners.

Since it is the pressure of the unconscious which leads us do that which we believe to be wrong the first essential to inwa freedom is to reduce that pressure. For those who are growing u that is a matter of right nurture, far more important than rig teaching. For those who are grown up various remedies lie ope It would take me too far afield to consider them. All I want to d here is to try to indicate how this gives us guidance in our use religion.

The basic question is, whether the stress in religion should e with the *ego* or with the *super-ego*, with freedom or with uthority. The factors which point towards the *super-ego* are owerful. In the first place it sets the standards of conduct and renuously opposes impulses towards breaches of them. Surely, erefore, religion should be called in to strengthen the *super-go*, to reinforce its authority by backing its internal sanctions ith those of divine judgement. There is a tendency in us to cept this point of view without question because there is a close sychological affinity between God and the *super-ego*. Both are erived from the infantile father-image. The *super-ego* is formed its introjection into the mind as a permanent alteration of the *go;* the idea of God is first associated in the young child's mind th the father-image, because that seems to fit best the attitudes wards God displayed by adults and in the teaching they give. he *super-ego* then tends to be the voice of God and the moral w His law.

Strong as the inclination may be—and it in fact dominates great deal of our religion—it should be resisted. An excessively rong *super-ego* argues severe repressions of an infantile aracter and that means that a considerable part of our per-nality is cut off from the possibility of growth, but will because that intrude into conduct in disguised forms out of effective ntrol or direction; it means that we shall be permanently the ctims of a strong guilt complex, largely unconscious and un-lated to our conscious moral standards; that the quest for rgiveness will be an emotional rather than a moral need; and ally it usually means a life governed by fear of punishment th emphasis on the negative virtues. *Super-ego* religion tends fix us in infantile attitudes sometimes only thinly disguised.

Instead of *super-ego* religion we should have *ego*-centred igion, for in religion as in other activities of the personality e way of growth lies through the strengthening of the *ego vis-vis* the *id* and the *super-ego*. The *ego* grows by its use of the ality-principle and its ability to learn by reasoning from the cts. It requires freedom to take an independent critical attitude all that it encounters, to work, in a sense, by the pragmatic thod of test by concrete results. Thus it accepts its moral ndards not because they come with authority but because they pear to solve the great problems of living. God is not the figure a judge waiting to condemn but a living reality to be encoun-ed and explored in all His creation, in history and in the lives men and women. He is the meaning of all things to be sought st diligently.

We can only get freedom from our worse selves by gettin freedom from our supposedly better selves, strange as it ma seem. Surely that is the meaning of Christian humility, the hone appraisal of ourselves. We need to be able to educate our mora selves as much as our natural selves if we are to attain the inwar harmony and integration which enables us to give ourselves wholl in what we do. Even against God we must be independent if w are to find Him and love Him with our whole heart and mind. W need not be afraid of offending God. He is the truth, and it the knowledge of the truth that sets us free. God is giving u freedom. It is by freedom from God that we grow into freedo for God.

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM

By Rev. H. C. Snape, M.A., Vicar of Whalley

It will doubtless be remembered that in 1945 there was issued a report by a commission of the Church Assembly entitled 'Towards the Conversion of England,' in which it was stated that the present irrelevance of the Church in the life and thought of the community in general is apparent from two symptoms which admit of no dispute (1) the widespread decline in church-going, and (2) the collapse of Christian moral standards. The blame is laid at the door of what is described as humanism. It is quite clear from the report that under humanism would be included what we think of as liberalism and that Christian liberals are to be regarded as the carriers of this pernicious infection into the body of the church itself. Humanism, however, it is said has ended in disillusionment which sweeps religion into the rubbish bin (p. 15). It would be universally admitted that there has been a simultaneous decline in the practise of religion, respect for Christian moral standards, and the strength of liberalism, particularly in the field of religion. Is liberalism, therefore, not only a compendium of all the heresies but also the source of all the evils of our times and having undermined faith and morals is dying of its own corrupt nature? The title of my paper seems to suggest that this is the question I should at this juncture try to answer.

Readers of Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History* will recollect that (p. 49) he suggests that primitive societies, as we know them by direct observation, may be likened to people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a precipice below and a precipice overhanging above; civilizations may be likened to companions of these sleepers, who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb up the face of the cliff above.' I would ask you to extend the simile and if I may be forgiven a good mixture of metaphors, to regard what is usually called the peak of a civilization as the next ledge above attained. Up to now every civilization known has declined and become extinct, *i.e.* to use Toynbee's simile has fallen back to the lower ledge defeated. I propose briefly to analyse how this has always happened, to consider our own position on this spiritual ascent, and, since all moral values imply some measure of civilized life, to seek an answer to the primary question, 'Does liberalism promote or destroy the good life?'

Primitive societies are static; so are communities of bees and ants. All their members are creatures of habit. Through some

mysterious inner urge in response to some challenge from without the 'cake of custom' is broken, some human society goes on the march and by painful steps climbs the precipice to the upper ledge. As Bergson emphasized in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, a human society in its primitive state is a closed society with a static morality and a static religion which are ingrained in its customs, ideas, and institutions (p. 232). The cake of custom is preserved and respected because the human species cannot live except in a social medium. There is on the other hand a dynamic morality and dynamic religion which become operative as soon as a human society begins to climb the precipice to the upper ledge of civilization. The prophets of Israel proclaimed dynamic religion and morality in the terms and attendant images of justice, mercy, and humility before the promptings of the inner voice of the spirit, while Christianity disclosed that the dynamic religion implied an open society. To quote Bergson, 'Humanity had to wait till Christianity for the idea of universal brotherhood, with its implication of equality of rights and the sanctity of the person, to become operative.' (p. 62.)

But although a primitive society breaks the 'cake of custom' as it goes on the move and climbs the precipice, yet men still remain creatures of habit; they try both to keep their cake and eat it. What may be termed 'secular morality' very much resembles the morality of a primitive society except that it is in the hands of critical intelligence. Hence it only enjoys a limited respect because it has lost its religious sanction; it is moulded by the fears and desires of the individual. It affords us a moral holiday as soon as our condition unexpectedly changes; it finds no offence as long as form is preserved. While it prevents us from appearing in the wrong clothes it is prepared to countenance illicit dealings in a black market as long as they are not discovered.

Once a society has become civilized, *i.e.* has attained the ledge, its religion tends to become a closed system of formal practices and beliefs conforming in spirit and character to secular morality. The faith and hope which inspired the community on its long journey through the wilderness are enfeebled now they are at rest in the promised land and the pillar of cloud and fire has come to reside in a habitation made with hands. As with good manners religious ritual survives deprived of its power to quicken worship and beliefs survive as formal statements for assent. After all a civilized society only suffers from the common ills which beset all those forms of life which have ceased to accept life's challenge—slavery to habit, inertia or slothfulness, self-satisfaction, blindness and pride. At some stage of spiritual advance a society

dges that it has reached the ledge which it mistakes for the mmit. Then truth seems to have been revealed in eternal and nchanging forms; the channels and institutions which are inended to be means of grace become petrified by blind use and ont. What in origin were scaffolding to enable men to climb to e ledge are now regarded as the foundations of a permanent ructure. The infallibilities of church and book minister to blindss of heart, pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy and all uncharitleness no less than to fear and inertia. Critical as we may be the doctrine of original sin in its traditional form, it contains is significance, that human nature shares with the rest of creation almost unconquerable aversion to accept the challenge of ring and a facile willingness to rest content on some ledge in e laborious ascent which seems to constitute the path to the ngdom of God. Wherever the dogmatic temper prevails pride les the day and the institutions through which it operates survive e long lifeless years which are so often granted to all forms of e which have declined life's challenge.

Liberalism in its widest sense is a temper of mind and may be scribed as the temper of the man who has recognized not only at no ledge is ever the summit, but also that whatever ledge we y have attained there still comes the challenge to climb higher ich we refuse at our peril. He claims that there is always truth be discovered, deeper insights to be granted, new occasions to ng new duties. His moral foundations should be secure cause he does not take the ledge which he has attained as his ntre for orientation but takes into account the depths from ich he has emerged and the heights still above him. But, while t may be described as the distinguishing mark of the liberal it by no means true that all liberals are Christian or that all ofessing liberal Christians are liberal in the sense in which Jesus s or Paul or the author of the Fourth Gospel. For there is that eralism which is born of disillusionment. Having reached the lge after intense struggles between keen enthusiasms and faiths s easy to think that there is nothing more and that the height of sdom is to have seen through every ideal and to have recognized e folly of every faith. Such is the origin of the only reign of erance which Christendom has ever known. Its most notable stle and exemplar in England was the historian Gibbon, who Arnold Toynbee asserts, rightly compared his own age with t of the Antonine Roman Emperors, but mistook them both for e noon-day of their respective civilizations whereas they were ally the Indian summer. It was Gibbon who could write of the oman empire, 'The various modes of worship were all con-

sidered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher a equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful.' H ascribes to the Roman empire the temper of his own age. Toynbe writes (p. 300), 'It can be called "religious toleration" only in th sense that it was a toleration of religions; if we look to its motive it should rather be styled irreligious toleration . . . The Cathol and Protestant factions rather suddenly abandoned their struggle not because they had become convinced of the sin of intolerance but because they had come to realize that neither party could an longer make much headway against the other. At the same tim they seem to have become aware that they no longer cared su ficiently for the theological issues at stake to relish making an further sacrifices for their sake.' It is the liberalism of Mephi topheles often assumed to be Christian liberalism by its enemie and sometimes alas! rightly so.

But the Christian liberal realizes his position on the ledge a precarious; he knows that he canot stay and must ever climb he is to live fully, and to climb is an adventure of faith and cal for grace from God to be found in Christ as the guide and com panion of the voyage. Humility, I would say, is the moral founda tion stone of Christian liberalism. Here I will quote some sen tences from a book which seems to deserve a wider appreciatio than has been given to it, *Creative Morality*, by T. A. Rei 'Humility is a virtue which by its very nature is either unaware o its own virtue, or, if aware, is so absorbed in serving, or learning or worshipping, that its joy is not a joy in itself, but is absorptio in the self-transcending activities of service or learning or wo ship.' (p. 205.) 'Whereas (p. 206) 'inferiority feeling' betwee human beings may have one of two opposite effects on conduc tending either to depress or paralyse effort, or to exaggerate sel assertive effort, the humility of man in the presence of (th Christian) God tends to inspire a creative though still humbl response . . . Humility is not merely a passive emotion but conation, and it is not merely negative but positive, not mere sub missiveness, but hunger and longing, not a mere feeling of th gap between man and the holiness of God, but an inspiration t attain greater things, born of an intimate and loving relatio between God and man.' (p. 110.)

If we have this kind of humility we believe in God, *i.e.* w trust and rely upon him. As Dr. Oman stated in words whic should now be classic, 'Only when, in contemplation of th subject, belief constrains us, and we have no need to constrain i is faith real.' (*Grace and Personality*, p. 139.) Can we have fai in God and can we at the same time keep the open mind whic

is asserted is of the essence of liberalism is a question which in ie way or another is put to those of liberal outlook. Are there pt positions which must be defended at all costs? Since William mes propounded the will to believe it has become a common- ace that underlying all human activities even pure science and ire philosophy are many assumptions whether you call them ioms, postulates, or hypotheses. We cannot suspend our judg- ent until the day of judgment; our day to day activities will tray our beliefs whatever we may think. But it can be rightly id, when you are experimenting intellectually you may act as your idea was true, but we cannot turn our lives into an experi- ent: experience cannot be made into an experiment: faith in od cannot be faith in a hypothetical God!

Our religious beliefs, however, can be divided into those ich are central and specifically religious and those which may called intellectual accesories. The division cannot be made th precision. Beliefs shade off from a core of inner experience nstituting for the believer intuitive insight and spontaneous nviction shading off to a perimeter of statements which haltingly press the logical relationship between our convictions and our terior environment. The latter being matters of the mind rather an the heart we must be ready to revise and reconsider whenever ere may be occasion. That is one of the essential claims of the eral spirit. Indeed liberals would say that it is one of the duties man. Why it is was stated with precision by Auguste Sabatier ien he wrote, 'Why is the evolution of dogma necessary? mply because the material of which it is composed is in a state flux and evolution . . .' It is always with notions borrowed om current science and philosophy that the Church constructs r dogmas. But science and philosophy are continually evoking d carrying dogmas in their train. Everything changes, even our anner of thinking. Theologians of all schools are naturally clined if for no other reason because their dominating interests e intellectual to exaggerate the importance of these external liefs to the extent of ignoring the vital importance of a man's ntral and often unexpressed convictions: liberal theologians ve been specially blamed on this account largely because their eral temperament leads them to ask the questions and so set de ball of discussion rolling.

What of this essential core of religious belief? 'This (in batier's words) is not a theoretical doctrine: it is a religious ex- rience—the experience of Christ and his disciples through the nturies. It is the gospel of salvation by the faith of the heart, the velation of a moral relation, of a new relation, of a filial relation,

created and realized between the man who is sinful and lost, an the Father who calls and pardons him.' We can see at once tha every attempt to analyse this central conviction is futile. No per sonal relationship can be broken up into logical categories, stil less if it is a relationship of love with one whom eye hath not seen c ear heard. If it is God who loves then God takes the initiative. 'W love him because he first loved us.' At the same time his service i perfect freedom and the response which we make is our own. Fro the logical contradiction has ensued the long and fruitless debat concerning grace, freewill, and predestination. On this I ca safely refer you to Dr. Oman's classic work *Grace and Personality* All I would add is that in addition to the Christian experience o the love of God and that central conviction of the divine initiativ there is also the religious experience of human solitude an abandonment by God symbolized for us in Jacob's struggle, th cry of dereliction from the cross, the doubts of Thomas, and des cribed by the mystics as the dark night of the soul. This experienc which in some measure comes to all so far as they are sensitive t the world's agonies and sufferings can no more be explained i terms of logic than that of the divine love. But if intellectua doubt is the condition of all intellectual progress and all know ledge is the answer to a human question, might it not be said tha to experience spiritual loneliness is the condition of all spiritua progress, because only in loneliness do we become aware of ou personal responsibility for our salvation which freedom place upon us. There are times and seasons when we are confronte both from within and without by offences and we seem to lose gri on the essentials of belief. At such times we shall adopt a fata course if we seek for infallible certainties. Rather our professe liberalism will then be proved. The issue is in fact decided belo the level of consciousness; the edifice of belief is proved by th storm to be built on rock or sand.

Liberalism to-day is despised and rejected of men many o whom would be ready to assert that its moral foundations were s insecure that its downfall was inevitable. I have taken huma history to be the story of the growth and decline of a successio of civilizations and have suggested that civilizations declin because man mistakes a ledge for a summit. Thus liberalism lie on a secure foundation because to be liberal in spirit and mind i to accept no expression as final, in other words not to make a idol of an idea. There is the false liberalism which flourishes a times when some point of rest appears to be reached. Such wa what Toynbee calls the eighteenth century rally in our ow civilization. It proved, he says, abortive and ephemeral (p. 59

cause the toleration achieved by 'the Enlightenment' was a eration based not on the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and arity, but on the Mephistophelian maladies of disillusionment, prehension, and cynicism (p. 553). Another point of rest was ched in the first decade of this century when what we can now to be a timid liberalism sought to accommodate the external essories of traditional faith to the demands of a questioning but timistic generation. There has followed, to quote Toynbee ain, a swift succession of catastrophic events on a steeply unting gradient which inevitably inspires a dark doubt about future (p. 554.) With it has come what amounts to a loathing of kind of liberalism, true or false. Men clamour for shelter m the storm and darkness of the unknown; there is presented the churches a subtle temptation to refurbish old infallibilities d antiquated mechanisms. If that is the requirement of the time n all the Protestant churches are destined to go out of business l leave Rome supreme. But these happenings in no way reveal aw in the foundations of liberalism. It is possible now to look k and see that the liberals of the nineteenth century were gely concerned with issues which in the twentieth century are wn to have been superficial. Nevertheless it was one of our st illustrious presidents, Dr. Inge, who earned the soubriquet 'the gloomy dean' by questioning the popular beliefs of com- cent optimism and automatic progress and heralding the rent of a dark age. The report on Doctrine of 1938 sanctions nin the Anglican communion the symbolic interpretation of ed and tradition thus leaving the gate open for those who ieve that this is the interpretation which will eventually prevail. n are trying desparately to patch up the old wineskins. But to te some words of Tyrell, 'We can have no word of God,' he te, 'no revelation, except the ideal or eternal Man : the Christ. at is as much of God as we can ever see; but we can have the se of the infinitely more and other that God is. It is only ause He presents Himself to us as the Christ, with a human it, face, voice, and hands, that we can speak to Him or deal n Him at all. Mystics think they touch the divine when they e only blurred the human form in a cloud of words. The best sticism is to submit to the limitation *consciously;* to realise that best God is but an idol, a temple made with hands.' (Life of orge Tyrrell, vol. II, p. 417.) That is the essence of liberalism by that faith liberalism will live, strong in the strength and nortal with the immortality of truth. Days of apparently declin- faith the true liberal sees as the prelude to the resurrection of h. 'Behold! I make all things new,' says the Spirit.

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

By Gilbert Murray, O.M., D.Litt.

WE are in many ways a bewildered generation. The univer shown to us by science, with its millions of light-years a its infinity of worlds that are born and die, is something utte unlike the geocentric and anthropocentric universe, with a grea light to the rule the day and a lesser light to rule the night, whi all religions took for granted. Externally we are surrounded the unknown and unimagined. And in ourselves, in human natu we have found both by the new doctrines of psychology and the experiences of this age of war a similar depth and height terrors and of hopes, unknown and scarcely considered possib We are conscious of the narrow island of things known on whi we stand in a vast sea of the unknown, and we want a faith, som thing to trust.

In the international world, some feeling like this was wi spread after the horrors of a war more desrtuctive than a before, breaking out upon a generation more humane a civilized, as well as more united by ties of interest and intercour than any before. It took shape in the League of Nations mo ment, afterwards the United Nations; an attempt to escape fr war not merely by discussion and compromise but by a consci and positive co-operation for mutual help. There was in movement an element which might well be called religious. was enough so, at least, to arouse the suspicions and at first disapproval of the Pope. There was a desire to have proceedi opened by prayer or some similar religious motion. But w religion was it to be? All the religions of the world were rep sented. Attempts were made to suggest some form of words which all could agree, but none could be found. The Cathol especially could not make the required concession. At last as experiment delegates fell back on the Quaker method, a min of religious silence. This suggests two conclusions. First, th though we cannot define it, there is a common nucleus of relig which all mankind feels or recognizes; and, further, that an en mous change of religious outlook has taken place since the ti when every organized religion assumed as almost self-evident t it itself had a direct revelation from God, while every other relig was the way to Hell. The blinded Papists, the Protestant re against Christ, the unbelieving Jews, the followers of the Mahound and even the innumerable nondescript heathens

ia and Africa, do now seem to be recognizing one another as in ne sense striving towards the same end. In detail one finds rd Halifax and Gandhi, Christian and Hindu, drawn to each ner, rather than separated, by their religious feelings; Sir ancis Younghusband finding a bond of agreement with Tibetan ddhists and founding a Congress of Faiths; Stephen Hobhouse d his Mahometan servant worshipping together in church or sque indifferently.

This blurring of outlines is no doubt open to criticism; strict herents of particular creeds will, of course, condemn it. But ch criticisms surely dwindle to something like insignificance en we compare it with the intolerance that went before and the ful results to which it led. The religious wars and persecutions, horrors of the Inquisition, the ingenious prolongations of the ture of heretics in order to imitate as closely as possible the rnal flames to which their Creator has destined them, are things can scarcely believe to be historical facts. It is hard for us w to realise that our good grandparents did really hold such liefs; they seem to us so incredibly absurd as well as wicked. We puzzled as well as shocked to learn that good people in the uthern States thought it wrong that any Christians should be slaved, and therefore made it a criminal offence to convert any ve to Christianity. We are amused to learn that in New York re is a Baptist Hospital, and relieved that Mr. Eden can be ated there without joining the Baptist community. We are used at the old Scotch lady who had long doubted the salvation anyone except the minister, and herself, but now began to have r doots about the meenister'; amused to hear that in Fiji s a legal offence to convert a Wesleyan to Catholicism or vice rsa because such conversions were apt to lead to tribal wars.

Where does the old intolerance come from? Why in the world ould there be such intense feeling about differences of opinion practice on such a very remote and obscure subject? In the in, no doubt, from that most inescapable and most readily dis-ised of all the passions, simple egoism, sanctified in this case the almost universal conception of God as a tribal god, whose in duty it is to protect his tribe and confound its enemies. Sir thur Keith in his book, *A New Theory of Evolution*, shows what a great extent our moral ideas and emotions derive simply m Group Feeling in its two specific forms, a duty of amity, alty and self-sacrifice towards the group which we regard as s, and of hostility or at least resistance and suspicion towards y alien group. We do not know it, and it may be an enemy. hweh was a good tribal god. He hated the gods of Moab and

Edom because it was his business to hate the gods and the peopl who were enemies to his people. Allah approved of puttin Christians to the sword not so much for their speculative views because his people were at war with them. Xenophobia, or th hatred of any group for an alien group, is one of the very bas human passions, and is apt still to be very strong in low civiliz tions, and in this matter it was intesified by all sorts of superst tious terrors; a prayer which was not the right sort was likely to b a disguised curse. The alien armed with a sword was dangerou but not quite so dangerous as the alien who prayed in an unknow language to some unknown god of his own, and not half so detes able. The Greco-Roman religions were on the whole free fro this vice. They were local and therefore not intolerant; eve nation naturally had its own gods, just as it had its own custom and when you were in their territory you respected them. But fear that Greek philosophy did in one respect combine with th traditional Jewish xenophobia to make the Christian church, rig on until modern times, treat theological error as a crime. Mat philosophers treated philosophy like mathematics. Every questio had a right answer, and if you were wrong you were wrong. The were no degrees of wrongness; to say that the error in questio was merely intellectual, not moral, was not to the point. Th heretic had missed the truth and was therefore lost.

Can we among all these confusions see at all what element o religion is accepted as true in that silent prayer of the League o Nations, and would be accepted, for example, by Gandhi an Bishop Creighton and J. S. Mill? The general answer is simpl Apart from the political committees whose work is to appease di ferences between groups which are confessedly discordant, th activities of the League of Nations, or United Nations, are almo all directly benevolent, humanitarian, works of love towards a concerned. And that is the purpose most emphasized in the maxim of all the great religions. It is group feeling again, this love o mankind. It does not mean that you ought to feel a person affection for individual foreigners; it means that you feel mankin to be your kind, your community, to which you naturally fe loyalty, and whose welfare is your welfare.

The contrast between the ordinary social and econom activities and the special political work of the Security Counc throws light on this. International politics is an affair of nation and nations are particularly tough groups, highly conscious o their own separateness; consequently the political work of U.N is constantly hampered or paralysed, while all the rest goes su cessfully on. The religions which used to be as bad as the natio

worse, are now nearly all responsive to the call of brotherhood. It is this call of brotherhood, this practical loyalty to the welfare of mankind, enough really to satisfy the demands of religion?

Not quite, it seems. Dr. Micklem in his little book on Religion claims very justly that all races of mankind, however much their dogmas and mythologies differ, have a conception of 'the sacred'; that is, of something which 'has infinite worth and involves unconditional obligation.' It is not sacred because it is beneficial to society, nor yet because it is 'fair' or 'practical' or anything else. Again, 'sacred' is not the same as 'true' or 'just' or 'right'; for some untruths or injustices or things which are not right may be tolerated, while an offence against what is sacred absolutely cannot. The idea of 'sacred' comes here rather close to that of 'honour,' which seems at first sight so different. In a story of Conan Doyle's, some Europeans are seized by fanatical Arabs who try to make them trample on the Cross under pain of death. One little, opinionated, French anti-clerical, who has been loudly airing his sceptical views, absolutely refuses to do so. The emblem of the cross was not, to him, sacred in itself, but there was something sacred involved, something affecting his honour, which he could not do. It clashed with an 'unconditional obligation.' One can easily imagine a case where the simple wish for human welfare would clash with this special sense of the Sacred. For instance, if it was not merely his own life, but the safety of his whole party that was at stake, which ought the sceptical Frenchman or, still more, which ought any real Christian to prefer, his own sacred point of honour, or the welfare of all his friends? Such a question is easy to ask and hard to answer, and the problem does sometimes occur. You need not necessarily imagine a prisoner caught by his enemies and tortured to make him betray his friends, or some violent situation of that sort. It may to some extent occur, in less clear-cut forms, in the ordinary course of life, where the conscientious man feels bound to make himself, in the judgment of others, needlessly disagreeable. However, I do not remember any trouble being caused in the League of Nations by any aggressive religious scruples. The nearest approach I can think of was a dispute over the appointment of a custodian of the Holy Places at which many different Christian sects, as well as Moslems and Jews, made trouble. I forget how it was settled, but I remember that at one point Lord Balfour asked if, in view of all the objections made to every religion and every European nation, we had better look out for an American atheist. As a rule the common service of mankind was a sufficient bond of unity between all faiths and scepticisms.

I have used the word 'honour' rather than 'duty' or 'justic in this connection because it seems to me that the test is curious enough a social one. There are some things which, if you do, y can never look your fellow creatures in the face again. You a unclean, polluted. To the hypothetical Primitive Man, we a told, his group or tribe is all there is; if it condemns or rejec him, god has rejected him. There is no appeal, no argument. Durkheim's phrase, 'Le dieu est le désir collectif projeté, pe sonnifié.' Why does Zeus so particularly hate a perjurer? Becau society hates and fears perjurers and does not know how to dete them. The collective desire is projected, personified. But her of course, come some well-known apparent contradictions civilized societies. A really conscientious man is not one who co tentedly obeys public opinion. Quite the reverse. The conscie tious objector seems at first sight to be committing a sort arrogant self-assertion. But in reality I think he is appealing fro the judgment of his limited and imperfect tribe to some f greater ideal tribe or tribe leader. When Cromwell differed fro his ministers, Carlyle tells us, he sought counsel from God. (C course we may smile at the fact that he generally found that G agreed with him and not with the ministers, but that is not t point.) A man sincerely acting according to his conscience alway I think, feels that he is obeying some eternal and univers authority, that he is appealing from this temporary and unre Group to which he belongs in the material world, to his own re Group, eternal, if for the moment unseen, to which he owes h true loyalty. An old Greek saying seems to me to throw light this problem; ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἀεί. What is beautiful, is φίλ it belongs to my group. Conversely, and much more clearly, wh is αἰσχρόν, ugly, is ἐχθρόν, it belongs to the enemy. We look a certain action and see that it is καλόν and we love it; or that is αἰσχρὸν and can never be ours. It is what we can never do. think Sir Arthur Keith is right in making this group-distinction- 'ours,' 'good for us,' or 'no,' 'not ours'; 'theirs, the aliens'— motive of primary importance.

On the whole then, I should say, there may at any time a situation in which action for the general welfare may be accor ing to the sensitive judgement of some religious body αἰσχρὸν intolerable, but such situations do not seem to cause frequent serious trouble. In general, if the world goes well, I believe th all religions may find peace and unity in working together for t good of mankind; but not without some concessions or sacrific

Let us consider that point. What sacrifices will be demand from the three or four great religions in order to produce re

ncord in working for the good of mankind? For one thing, ery religion is associated with a civilization or social order of own, of which it cannot divest itself. There is a Moslem vilization, a Hindu civilization, and so on. I think here it is vious that Christianity has a great advantage over all others. It based on a higher and stronger civilization. That is the obvious use of its great wordly success. It is fairly obvious that the eeping conversion of the divers barbarians to Christianity in e dark ages and later was due chiefly to the general outstanding periority of Roman civilization. It is the same now when a uropean nation is in contact with the nondescript heathen. A jian or Maori becomes a Christian not by the force of theolo- al argument, but because the white man is so obviously superior knowledge, power, social customs, etc., and also because there really no systematic and definite Polynesian religion to put up resistance. A member of the Achimoto settlement told me that ssionaries had made no great impression on the native women that region. What really converted them was the sight of water d on in pipes and running from taps; and actually some taps t and some cold! People who could do that must know every- ng. This line of thought might suggest that perhaps the whole rld will become Christian, but that is not likely. There are no ass conversions of Jews or Moslems, nor perhaps of the more tablished forms of religion in India or farther Asia. There is o to be borne in mind the great and growing prejudice against e White Man, and all his ways, which is now at work in Asia m West to furthest East.

What then must be given up? One thing chiefly. There must t be too much emphasis on creed in itself; and certainly no rsistence whatever in the doctrine *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, the preposterous mutual hostility between Christian sects which s been such a hair-shirt to missionaries. The actual Creeds can doubt be kept, except where they insist on the damnation of tsiders. But even if you insist that your own Church's statement out the ultimate mystery is the exact truth, you must not be thout sympathy towards the imperfect attempts of other bodies express it. I confess that the way will be much clearer if we do t claim to possess exact truth about matters outside the range our faculties, but recognise that, with our limited human intel- ence, we are not capable of expressing the inexpressible.

Such a sacrifice of the actual central creed may be on any large le impossible; indeed, may not be wanted. But every religion, e all systems of widespread thought or practice, is penetrated ough and through by traditions which are much older than the

religion itself, and are, I think, all of them guesses, metaphors symbols, serving as helps to imagining, as Plato would say, what the mystery is like, not correct statements of what it is. Plato calls them myths or images. Sallustius, the fourth century author of a Pagan Creed, describes them as προκαλύμματα, veils as it were hanging up with the real truth behind them and dimly shining through.

Buddhism is overpoweringly rich in myths, and often very daring ones. For example: Buddha once met a tiger, but instead of either shooting it or flying from it, he noticed that it had a suppurating wound on its leg. He proceeded fearlessly to treat the wound, and cleaned out the maggots that were feeding in it. But before throwing them away, he reflected that he had a duty toward them as well as to the tiger. So he made a wound in his own body and put the maggots there. The challenge is bold and the logic unanswerable, but as far as I understand, no pious Buddhist would insist on the historical truth of the story. It is not a fact it as a προκάλυμμα, a veil through which the hidden truth may shine. How different is a Confucian veil. A certain person asked Confucius, "What is your opinion on recompensing injury with kindness?" The Master said: "With what then would you recompense kindness? Recompense kindness with kindness. Recompense injury with justice!" Or again Mencius, "I treat my own elders with the kindness due to age and extend it to the elders of others. I treat my own youth with the tenderness due to youth, and extend it to the youths of others. Observe this, and the rule of the whole empire is in your hand." This expresses the correct Confucian doctrine that if the rulers are really virtuous gradually all the people will be virtuous too. "The rulers are the pot, and the people are the water inside it. Whatever the shape of the pot, it will give that shape to the water." All this is part of the Confucian tradition, as rich as the Buddhist, but much more concerned with common sense. It is probably based on more historical knowledge of that sage's life than is available for Gautama Buddha or Jesus, but I do not think the most pious Confucian lays any stress on the historical truth of the personal anecdotes. They illustrate the doctrine, and that is enough. These are mere casual samples of what I mean; let us try to analyse in more detail our mass of traditions.

Our religion is, of course, based on the Old Testament, the New Testament and a vast body of tradition. From the Hebrew we have our dogma of the One God, who still has many tribal characteristics about Him; in war, of course, He becomes definitely tribal. We have also from the same source a number of

rict, and I should say, extremely valuable, sexual tabus. But e most definite Hebrew tradition that is alive with us is a very rious one, the sanctity of the seventh day. It remains strong, spite of two solid difficulties: though it has been altered from aturday to Sunday to mark a distinction from the Jews, and ough its origin is a Babylonian rule not to start any enterprise on e seventh day because the seventh day is bad and unlucky. nother Hebrew idea has had accidentally a very great historical fluence. Like many conquered countries, like Ireland, like the orshippers of Timor in Asia, like the Sudan with its Mahdi, like enmark with Ole Danske, and others, the Jews long cherished e idea of a national deliverer or Messiah, of royal race, who ould restore their independence and ancient glory. In Christianity is was merged in the quite different idea of a World-Saviour, a on of God, who was to reject the polluted past and be the author a new αἰών or βασιλεία. In origin the worship of this Saviour, or faithful Son (Damu-Si), if we give him the name he bore in abylon some 3,000 years before Christ, divides into at least ree main patterns. He is, first, simply the vegetation personified; is born of the marriage of Sky and Earth; he is cut down and lled in the harvest that we may feed, and he is re-born in the w year. This is the Attis, Adonis, Osiris myth. But by some of ose strange reasonings that appeal to the primitive mind, it is fer and better in a crisis that a King or King-Child should play e part of Damu-Si and die in order to save his people. Some- nes he is just killed as a sacrificial beast would be killed. The ng of Moab killed his son on the wall as a sacrifice to save his y, and did save it (II *Kings* iii, 27). Abraham was just spared om killing his. We hear nothing in particular in these cases out the son's feelings. In Greek legend, on the other hand, this crifice is considered sometimes as the greatest of crimes; *tantum ligio potuit suadere malorum*, as Lucretius says of the sacri- e of Iphigenia: sometimes, as when Erechtheus killed his ildren to save the city, as a regrettable necessity; sometimes, as th Macaria dying to save her brothers, or Menoikeus contriving, spite of his father, to sacrifice himself on the wall of Thebes, *Codrus, pro patria non timidus mori*, as a heroic act of self- crifice. This was canonized in the regular self-immolations of ithras, and has, of course, reached its culmination in Christianity.

Then, secondly, there is the more normal duty of a Faithful on to be the protector of his Mother and his people, a brave and fective fighter in the ordinary earthly sense. Most of the Greek ns of god are assumed to have done this.

The third special aspect of the Saviour in Greek tradition

involves more of a story. This Saviour or Young Zeus, or Τρίτ Σωτήρ, forms almost the centre of ancient Greek religion. Th general idea is familiar to us all now, since the writings of S James Fraser. He comes third because first there is the Ol King, last summer or last harvest, then there is the second Kin winter or death or darkness, then the New King, representin recovery, and a new unstained Year, with all its possibilitie He is always a New King, a son of Heaven and Earth, that i of a god and a mortal woman. Besides this general function, h affects the ancestral legends of all the royal houses. Almost eve race or nation derives itself from a heroic ancestor who is the sc of a god and a mortal woman, and who may be said to introduc a new age or kingdom of his own, in the sense that he establish some race or city. The myths begin to crowd round this Σωτή and we shall find that many of them survive in Christian myth of which there is no trace in St. Paul. To begin with, he is a *bab* god. The babyhood of Zeus is dwelt upon. Being a destine king, he is in danger from the jealous old king, and is carrie away to Lyktos, in Crete, where he is protected by the arme Curetes shouting and clashing their shields so that his cries ca not be heard. The birth of the child brings in a new and glorio kingdom, as in the fourth Georgic of Vergil. Then παιδός ἡ βασιλή the Kingdom is the child's Kingdom, as Heraclitus says. It the same with the special Zeus-child, Dionysus. He is worshippe as Liknites, the babe in the cradle. The Egyptian Baby-Go Harpocrates, was very widely worshipped, far beyond the boun of Egypt.

The life of this divine child is full of adventure. Ther is always a wicked older king, a Herod, who works to kill hi Like the baby Jesus, he has to be exposed and hidden, general among animals, though I find no actual mention of a manger. B he is suckled by cows and mares, brought up among kids an lambs. He is sometimes himself a kid or a lamb. The mort woman, his mother, is a personification of the earth, her body torn by the plough, or perhaps struck by lightning. She is always *mater dolorosa*. The divine birth in its simplest form is the fertili ing of the Earth by sunshine or rain from the Sky. It is due to th mere overpowering force of the god. Then, as the creatures the myth become more like real characters in human stories, th outrage is explained away. Sometimes it is a comparatively harm less love-story, as with Tyro, or the mother of Rhesus, but mo often, under Egyptian influence, it is a virgin birth by the layin on of a hand, or the touch of divine light, as with Io and Dana Plutarch mentions that the Egyptians explained the birth of a

ns of god in this way, and he himself finds their view *οὐκ ἰθανον*. There are traces of it also in Babylonian myth.

The mother, the holy Θεοτόκος, was already in pre-Christian nes the subject of passionate and long-established worship all rough Asia, from Babylon to the Anatolian coast. There is not word of this in St. Paul, nor even in the Gospels, and the idea ust have been highly repugnant to Jewish feeling, but it was so ong that it penetrated irresistibly into the Christian tradition, d in both the Greek Church and the Roman the divine Mother God is still a centre of intense devotion. It is perhaps a trace this repugnance which has turned an original Trinity of Father, other, Son, into a conception free from all such ideas.

This story of the baby pursued by an angry old king, exposed nong animals who suckle or protect him, and eventually recog-sed as what he is and enabled to introduced his kingdom, forms e plot not only of the *Ion*, but of quite a number of the frag-ntary tragedies, the *Alope*, *Antiope*, *Auge*, *Melanippe* and *ypsypyle* of Euripides, and *Tyro*, *Aleadae*, *Hipponous* and *mae* of Sophocles. It is clear, I think, that a great deal of the thical element of Christianity is derived directly from a much der tradition. How far the myths were purified and ennobled by e great religious movements which dominated the Greek world the Hellenistic period before the early Church felt any attrac-n to them is a subject that would require much study both of ilosophical and mystical texts. Much moral purification came doubt from Jewish feeling. A general allegorising must have me from the Hellenistic philosophies, Stoic, Pythagorean and like. But to hazard a guess in an obscure subject, I think one the great sources of hope and strength in Christianity was obably the actual idea of the New Age, or New Kingdom of d which was to be realized when the present harsh and polluted world was cast aside and the new kingdom of the Saviour s brought in. The idea is a perpetual inspiration. Another great rce of strength, I feel almost sure, is that Christianity under Roman Empire started as one of the many religions of the pressed; Blessed are the poor, Blessed are the meek, the merci-, Blessed are they who weep now, Blessed they that hunger, essed are ye when men shall persecute you and revile you. That religion which regards those in power as on the whole wicked alien, and promises comfort and reparations in some dim here-er to the injured righteous. It never contemplates endeavour-to conduct or reform the government of the world. The lilean fishermen feel no responsibility for that. How different s from the prescription for a good society laid down by Cicero,

who did feel responsible for government. His first requirement *pacta sunt servanda:* contracts must be kept. One of the ne earliest is a *judex severus*, a judge who will not take bribes.

Is it not rather remarkable that the other great religions had their founders men with power and responsibilities, men accu tomed to large practical decisions? Mahomet was the head of nation. Gautama Buddha was a Prince, speaking on equal ter to Kings and Generals until he saw the vanity of human greatne and found peace and holiness as a mendicant brother. Confuci was a man of position, and for some time actually a Prir Minister, though he resigned office and became a meditati recluse when his King could not be made virtuous. His insisten on the duties of the *Jiun Tze* or on the conduct of 'a true gentl man,' admirable as it is, shows a point of view very different fr that of the Gospel. The Gospel gives its message not to princ and ministers, nor yet to saintly mendicants or philosophers w have deliberately rejected the world, but to the ordinary poor a oppressed. I do not for a moment wish to say that the poor a oppressed are always right, still less that their philosophy is, b what I suggest is remarkable about Christianity is, that when got into a position of authority, such as it has had almost from t time of Constantine, it generally tried to remember and preser the gospel which it had preached at the time when it was helple and oppressed. The fifth chapter of *St. Matthew* in the mouth a turbulent revolutionary would not be a wise guide, but in t mouths of Princes and Prime Ministers it is beyond price. O may notice how close to violent revolution the early Christi tradition came, in the book of *Revelation*, with its exultation the coming overthrow of all the kingdoms of this world and pa ticularly the destruction of 'the harlot sitting upon seven hills, w is drunken with the blood of the saints,' and the terrific punis ment of all her obedient subjects. No wonder Rome regarded t Christians as a dangerous secret society. The oriental religions d not, as far as I know, deal in threats of violent corrections of t unrighteous world. They contented themselves with explaining th it was unreal, it did not really exist. The Church, too, prudent saved itself by repeating four times over in the New Testame the injunction, 'Slaves, obey your masters' (*Eph.* vi, 5; *C* iii, 22; *Tit.* ii, 9; I *Pet.* ii, 18). Bad as slavery might be, it was n going to advocate the horrors of a servile revolt. Akin to this another possible temptation which haunts the steps of all the gr religions, the temptation to confine its interest to a select body the faithful and let the rest of humanity drift. Confucius, unl I misread him, definitely speaks only to the *Jiun Tze*, men who

e superior to the common herd; the Brahmins have no dealings
n the lower castes; the Buddhists vary immensly, but seem on
whole to put their message beyond the reach of ordinary
rage men and women. Christianity has, I think, historically
aking, been torn in two between the exclusive sects, which
erfully made outcasts of all but a chosen few, and a general
it of catholicity, welcoming all humanity and rejecting none
he children of God. There is one other characteristic of the
istian tradition as it now is which seems to me to place it far
ve all its fellows, however sublime their maxims may be. It is
hality which I should think it derived not from its Eastern, but
n the Roman and its Nordic elements which it absorbed in its
g experience as a master religion. The actual sacred books
Christianity contain some of the exaggeration which is charac-
stic of all oriental writing, but Christian, or Western, civiliza-
is almost unique in keeping, or at least trying to keep, a close
tion between the word and the fact, the profession and the
g really done.

It is difficult, perhaps, for Westerners to boast, after the
gs Western nations have done in the present century, but on
whole I think the Westerners have more sense of reality.
re is not such a startling difference between the professions
the acts of an average good Western statesman as there is in
case of oriental nations, or even the Chinese. When a Christian
ws that he must forgive his enemies and if possible love them,
loes recognize that he must do so with a full understanding
the law will punish them as they deserve. He agrees with the
ible Confucius about requiting injuries with justice. There
ossibly some inconsistency between the general tone of the
pel and that of an average good Christian's behaviour, but it
t very great, set against the story of Buddha and the tiger,
h is valuable as a parable but as a rule of life simply does
and cannot, mean what it says. The European tradition seems
eep nearer to common sense, to the rule μηδὲν ἄγαν, to the
nable behaviour of Confucius' gentleman. It does try to live
o the great myth which it professes, and that myth, though
etimes violently contradicted by the facts of experience, has
onderful power not only of inspiration, but of practical
ance.

Does it seem that I have made too great a claim for the
gue of Nations or United Nations in saying it is really a
terested organ working for the good of mankind? I am
king, of course, of the movement, or spirit, not of the actual
king of an obviously imperfect and fallible human instrument.

But I do think that there has occurred in our lifetime a grea half-conscious revolution in political thought and practice. If yo consider the working of such organs as U.N.R.R.A., a first effo at healing the wounds of the war before the war itself had ceased the Refugee Organization, the International Health Organizatio the Food and Agriculture, the Technical Aid and some of th enterprises of U.N.E.S.C.O., I think you will perhaps in the fir place be struck by the great results actually achieved. The effe tiveness of this humanitarian work of the U.N. makes a startlin contrast with the helplessness of its political efforts. But, apa from that, it is, I think, a new fact in history that not merely th feelings of exceptional individuals, but common public opinio and more than that, even the ordinary official custom of gover ments, has now accepted as an obvious duty the help of all huma beings, the relief of all human suffering. Of course there a limits; the task in full is quite beyond our powers: help given nations at war with U.N. would do more harm than good. Th whole attitude of mind is so new that people try to apologise f it. They pretend that the starving or helpless will make war not fed and relieved, though we all know that wars are not mad by the starved and helpless, but by strong nations that ca expect to win. No: a new principle is really being accepted international relations. The civilized nations, those of th Christian or Hellenic tradition, are seeing that no nation ca safely stand alone. They can only be saved by mutual hel And this mutual help is not only a course to which they are drive by need or economic pressure; it is actually the expression of deep desire, much the same as that principle of love that lies the heart of all the great religions. An ancient philosopher, name unknown, trying to find God, fell back upon the faith: *De est mortali mortalem iuvare;* God is the help of mortal by mort We are mortal, weak things that perish, creatures creeping for short lifetime on the surface of one of the lesser planets, yet al somehow, we are capable of being things of infinite value; capab of a love, a devotion, to the unity to which we belong and to son higher, unseen unity that we feel to be καλόν and therefore tru 'ours.' Possibly some germ of thought or feeling of this kind the mind of religious men is what is needed to transform me kindly group-feeling towards our fellow-creatures into somethi which they would feel as love of God, and therefore as religion.